
















Europe Faces Europe examines East European perspectives on European identity. 
The contributors to this volume map narratives of Europe rooted in Eastern Europe, 
examining their relationship to philosophy, journalism, social movements, literary texts, 
visual art, and popular music. Moving the debate and research on European identity 
beyond the geographical power center, the essays explore how Europeanness is conceived 
of in the dynamic region of Eastern Europe. Offering a fresh take on European identity, 
Europe Faces Europe comes at an important time, when Eastern Europe and European 
identity are in an important and vibrant phase of transition.
Johan Fornäs is professor in the Department of Media and Communication Studies in the 
School for Culture and Education at Södertörn University, Sweden. His previous books 
include Digital Borderlands, Consuming Media, and Signifying Europe, the last of which was 
published by Intellect Books.
‘This is an excellent thinking guide for 
today’s Europe whose narratives are filled 
with suspense and the happy end is far out 
of sight.’
Maria Bakardjieva is professor of 
communication at the University of 
Calgary, Canada.
‘Centred around Fornäs’ explanation of the 
concepts of narrative and identity as applied 
to Europe, this collection contains many 
valuable insights into the big questions 
about Europe: what it is, what it means, 
where it is going, what it stands for. This 
book brings some order to the bewildering 
diversity of narratives of Europe from 
the East. It deserves a place in every 
academic library.’
Michael Wintle is professor and head of 
the Department of European Studies at the 
University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.
‘The book offers a brilliant multi-disciplinary, 
cross-platform analysis of the new European 
master narrative and the view of Europe as 
a symbolic universe. The book is a major 
contribution to the fields of European studies 
and cultural studies as well as research on 
transnationalism.’
Vlad Strukov is associate professor in 
film and digital culture at the School 
of Languages, Cultures and Societies, 
University of Leeds, UK.
‘Europe Faces Europe offers a penetrating 
and timely twist to default notions of Europe 
by exploring how it is identified in narratives 
from its Eastern half. And in the process, 
it wonderfully demonstrates the forensic 
power of cultural analysis.’
William Uricchio is professor of 
comparative media studies at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US, 
and professor of comparative media history 
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Chapter 1
Europe Faces Europe: An Introduction
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The European Commission (EC) has campaigned for a ‘new narrative for Europe’ to breathe new life into the European spirit. In March 2014, its cultural committee report emphasized the ‘shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law’ but also 
the role of culture as ‘a major source of nourishment and supply for Europe’s social and 
political body’. Indeed, cultural aspects linked to symbols and narratives seem increasingly 
central to Europe’s future prospects, functioning as a means of identification and interaction 
between the severed halves of the continent. 
Top European institutions, often in grand self-congratulatory terms, look for ways 
to use such aspects as strategic tools to secure popular support. This is done on several 
different levels, including, for instance, both the European Union (EU) and the much 
larger Council of Europe (CoE). However, redefining Europe is not just a top-down task for 
dominant institutions in Brussels. All over the continent, other actors have also for a long 
time been engaged in unfolding narrations that rework conventional traditions and thus 
redefine European identities, as critical movements and grass-roots debates either propel 
or challenge European interactions, adding new dimensions that serve to undermine or 
revitalize dominant discourses.
Since 1989, some of renegotiations of identity have particularly centred on the post-
Communist borderlands of Eastern Europe. While this integration process has been a major 
concern for many on all levels and in all regions, little attention has so far been given to 
how East European voices themselves relate to Europe as a dynamic project. How is Europe 
identified in narratives from its eastern half? This is thus the core question asked in this 
volume based on the multidisciplinary research project ‘Narratives of Europe’.1 The book 
chapters’ systematic in-depth studies of selected mediated discourses investigate how Europe 
faces Europe in a range of cultural fields, mapping, comparing and interpreting narratives 
circulating in phenomenological philosophy, international geopolitics, news journalism, 
social movements, visual art and popular music. 
Narratives are powerful tools for shaping formations of identity, as they seek in various 
discourse fields to identify Europe’s past, present and future. Such narratives are sometimes 
echoed in European studies but rarely closely investigated in terms of their main constituents 
and forms, or of the meanings and identities they give to Europe. Many previous studies of 
Europe have dealt with the political or economic dimensions of its history. Here focusing on 
cultural and narrative dimensions casts new light on the intricate processes that indicate in 
which directions European mentalities and structures of feeling are moving, and thus what 
Europe may become tomorrow. 
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This introductory chapter will first situate the issue of European narratives in relation to a 
series of recent and current transitions and then problematize the often assumed East–West 
divide. Next, theories of narrative identification are presented, leading to the suggestion 
of a methodological model for studying such narratives from a critical-hermeneutic 
perspective. Finally, some results of the six case studies will be summarized, indicating 
possible comparisons across cultural genres and fields as well as between different regions 
within Eastern Europe. The reading of this final part of the introduction can therefore also 
be postponed until after reading the empirical chapters.
Narratives of Europe
People living in as well as outside Europe develop ways to identify it in thought and (inter-) 
action, giving it a range of meanings that link it to a variable set of characteristic traits or 
values. Europeanness is then always intertwined with other identities, including those 
involving nationality, ethnicity, class, age, generation, gender, sexuality, religion and political 
affiliation. Identities are relationally constructed through discourses that construct 
differences to ‘others’, in Europe’s case notably Islam, Asia, Africa and the US, even though 
they in some respects actually may also be regarded as integrated within that same Europe, 
for instance through Muslim immigrants or the strong US American influences on academia 
and popular culture. 
Europe has no fixed essence or existence. It is always in a process of becoming: a Europe-
in-process, always contested and always in a crisis. This process has – from varying positions 
and in shifting terms – been interpreted by a range of social theorists. Jürgen Habermas 
has, for instance, argued for new forms of interlinked public spheres that could serve as 
infrastructures for Europeans to communicate on shared issues and be ‘united in diversity’ 
(the European motto): with plurality not as a barrier but as a resource for unification.2 
Jacques Derrida has insisted on the acknowledgement of difference and alterity for a ‘Europe 
still to become’.3 Zygmunt Bauman likewise regards Europe as an unfinished adventure, 
defined by its lack of fixed identity and yearning for transgression.4 Europe’s rich history 
of superimposed differences has, Étienne Balibar argues, lent it a particular capacity to act 
‘as the interpreter of the world, translating languages and cultures in all directions’.5 ‘The 
future of Europe’ is seen by Paul Ricoeur ‘in terms of imagination’, outlining a series of 
models for a ‘post-national state’ to combine identity and alterity at different levels: asking 
for a ‘translation ethos’ of hospitality that could mediate between different cultures, and 
where people take responsibility for ‘the story of the other’ in mobile identifications through 
readings that constitute narrative identities.6 
Many have problematized the lack of sufficiently rich and successful narratives of a 
shared European identity. They have questioned the elitist and exclusivist nature of official 
conceptions of European identity, suggesting that they may obscure cultural complexity 
and diversity.7 Policies devised and implemented by elites centrally and from the ‘top down’ 
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are too unresponsive to the more organically emerging cultural practices and symbols of 
European identity.8 Oppositional narratives implicitly presuppose a grand narrative, usually 
centred on the EU HQ in Brussels, which serves as a contrast to their own alternative 
versions. Though the EU certainly has strived to develop a doxa, a core story of Europe’s 
quest for greatness, this grand narrative is subverted and transgressed by the cross-currents 
of many different intersecting ‘small’ narratives found in the continent’s various peripheries.9
Europe has thus always been an unfinished project, and in some kind of crisis. The 
twentieth-century world wars almost annihilated this whole project, and for more than four 
decades, it was in a semi-frozen state due to the forced separation between its eastern and 
western halves. The post-1989 eastern expansion of European institutions then demanded 
a reformulation of shared identities that could encompass diversity rather than being based 
on any given common characteristics. 
This unexpected shift did not end the turmoil of European politics. Francis Fukuyama’s 
vision of the end of politics in fact appears less and less relevant.10 The reflections on narratives 
presented in this volume are not distanced meditations in a phase of calm stability. Instead, 
they are positioned in a highly transitory phase of history when European identity is again 
questioned and in crisis, as a series of further transitions and convulsions currently continue 
to challenge the project of European formation and integration. Geopolitically, there are 
changing patterns and growing sizes of migration as well as intra- and interregional shifts 
of balance, including the traumatic effects of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its 
Eastern bloc on Russia’s relations with the EU as well as with Ukraine and other neighbouring 
countries. The economy is troubled by shifting phases of marketization processes, including 
the raging financial crises that are even threatening to break up the EU. There is an ongoing 
restructuring of social relations between classes, genders, generations and ethnic groups, 
linked to the menacing growth of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, 
anti-feminism and right-wing populist nationalism. Technological changes have given risen 
to the digital network media, which culturally enable new modes of representation across 
genres. These transitions are accompanied by swift political post-1989 changes, with the 
accelerating and expanding European integration process creating a demand to renegotiate 
the basic understanding of what it means to be European. Ann Rigney notes that ‘“Europe” 
is continuously narrativized, seen as a region in transition between the past (of division) and 
the future (of integration)’.11 Integrating the experiences of ex-Communist East European 
countries into the European master narrative demands a renegotiation of how to evaluate 
and combine different regional and national experiences and traumas.12 The EU and the 
geographically much larger CoE have sought ways to codify some kind of European identity, 
using key symbols to identify Europe from ‘above’ and ‘within’.13 Europe is more than just 
the EU, but this union’s presence has installed a dominant institutional apparatus that frames 
how Europe is understood today, both inside and outside of the EU. 
Such transformations of European identifications may be traced through the shifting 
narratives of Europe – as an idea, a geographical territory, a political-economic 
institution and a social community. Europeanness is identified and narrated in various 
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ways in different parts of Europe as well as in different genres of narration. Philosophical, 
political, journalistic, activist, art, musical and other mediated narratives have over time 
developed specific ways of depicting Europeanness, though there are also common 
threads between them. 
Looking for New Narratives
In 2009, the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) initiated a project to look for ‘New 
Narratives for Europe’ since ‘Europe needs a story to tell’, according to ECF’s then head of 
research and development, Odile Chenal.14 ECF was set up in Geneva in 1954 and has since 
1960 been based in Amsterdam. Its founders included the Swiss philosopher Denis de 
Rougemont and the French politician Robert Schuman, one of the leading architects behind 
the EU, the CoE and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and whose ‘Schuman 
Declaration’ proposed by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 is 
annually celebrated on Europe Day (9th May).
Like several previous initiatives, often driven by the EU and the CoE, such as, for 
example, various ‘People’s Europe’ and ‘Europe for Citizens’ initiatives from the 1970s 
until today, ECF’s European narrative project was based on the apparent ‘disconnection 
between Europe and its people, between the EU and its citizens’, Chenal continued. The 
equation between Europe and the EU was taken for granted. The dissatisfaction with the 
Brussels bureaucracy seemed to fuel ‘a withdrawal to within national borders’. ‘Many 
people, especially young people, do not see the need for Europe between the local and 
the global. Europe as a project for peace and shared welfare, which was the vision after 
WWII, does not “work” any more. Even the magic of 1989 is forgotten.’ Chenal argued 
that ‘Eurocentrism is dead’, and that ‘WWII cannot engage as a widely-binding story 
across greater Europe’ anymore, especially among the young generations in West and East 
Europe. Also, while ‘unity in diversity’ (or as the European motto actually goes, ‘united in 
diversity’) is a prominent narrative for European institutions, it is overly vague and too 
multiculturalist to convince Eurosceptics.15
ECF’s wish to revitalize European narratives derived from two main factors, one temporal 
and the other spatial. One problem was the lapse of time and the generation shifts that 
made the historical motors behind unification slip into oblivion: young people apparently 
needed something more up to date than the last-century European wars to spark any 
enthusiasm for the EU. Another had to do with the geographical expansion eastward, as ECF 
representatives felt certain that East Europeans needed the European project to counteract 
Russian dominance in the region. However, these representatives suspected they wanted a 
slightly different kind of Europe than that constructed by the old West European narratives. 
To improve that situation, ECF supported and commissioned artistic projects, seminars and 
publications, gathering ‘intellectuals, artists, politicians and journalists from across Europe 
and beyond’.
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The EC ‘new narrative’ campaign mentioned in the beginning was a key step in that 
direction. In Brussels, on 23 April 2013, the EC president, José Manuel Barroso, launched 
another new project devoted to reformulating ‘a new narrative for Europe’. ‘Citizens’ 
Dialogues’ were organized, young people were specifically asked to contribute, and a 
special cultural committee of 20 distinguished members was set up, led by the Belgian art 
historian Paul Dujardin, artistic director of Palais des Beaux-Arts (BOZAR) in Brussels, and 
including, for instance, the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas, the Icelandic visual artist Olafur 
Eliasson, the Basque sculptor Cristina Iglesias, the Hungarian author György Konrád, the 
director of the Free Word Centre, Rose Fenton, and the president of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, Michał Kleiber. In Berlin, on 1 March 2014, the result was unveiled in the form of 
a declaration on a ‘New Narrative for Europe’.16 This initiative will be returned to later in this 
volume and is especially important for Carl Cederberg, who will relate the declaration to a 
long-standing philosophical tradition in European thought.
After some years of searching for a plurality of narratives, the report boldly stated that it 
is now time to present ‘a new narrative for Europe for all citizens’. The declaration seems not 
to have impressed the general public. Just to mention one example, Michael Privot, director 
of the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), already on 27 February, two days before 
the declaration was launched, published a criticism on the EurActiv Network home page, 
describing the initiative as a move ‘from myth to mythomania’. He attacked the illusions 
that the European project is motivated by a shared culture, spearheaded by the classical 
Western high culture heritage. Instead, the anti-racist ENAR network proposed its own 
‘progressive’ narrative: ‘Realising full equality, solidarity and well-being for All in Europe’. 
This critically responded to the leading institutions’ austerity policies of crisis management, 
which had resulted in increasing resource gaps, the dismantling of social welfare and failing 
representative democracies: ‘nobody can deny that culture and arts play a central role in our 
lives, but today Europeans want a future, not a culture’.17 
Several narratives thus competed for influence, but Barroso and the cultural committee 
preferred to construct one coherent story out of this polyphony, abandoning the idea of 
‘new narratives’ in favour of the singular: ‘a new narrative’. Despite all initial talk of ‘new’ 
narratives for Europe, all reformulations seem also to reproduce what may be seen as ‘a 
European master-narrative: the idea that all European nations have a history of bloody, 
deep, fundamental divisions that, at some point, were overcome’, in the words of Amsterdam 
professor of European Studies Joep Leersen at the 2010 ECF seminar.18
The March 2014 Declaration of the EC Cultural Committee constructs a metaphor of 
Europe as a combination of mind and body. Europe’s body consists of its social and political 
institutions, and this body needs a mind: it needs the sciences, the arts and cultural heritage 
to counter disintegrating ‘populist and nationalist narratives’. The new narrative is meant 
to distil the essence of this mind: ‘Europe is a state of mind formed and fostered by its 
spiritual, philosophical, artistic and scientific inheritance, and driven by the lessons of 
history’. It is based on ‘civic, political and social movements that have defended the rights 
of those without power’ and ‘rooted in its shared values of peace, freedom, democracy and 
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rule of law’. The emphasis is on culture in the broad sense: ‘Europe is an identity, an idea, 
an ideal’. Dark sides are mentioned, from colonial conquest, world wars and Communist 
dictatorships to the recent economic crisis – these together motivate the need for a narrative 
vision of a better future.19 
Finally, ‘Renaissance and cosmopolitanism’ are suggested as the ‘two cultural ideals’ that 
should inspire Europe’s future. These two concepts deserve some reflection. Both can be seen 
as just slightly revised versions of those core values that have long been central to Europe 
and are recurrently mentioned when European identity is discussed, for instance when 
Tzvetan Todorov identified rationality, justice, democracy, individual freedom, secularism 
and tolerance as Europe’s leading political values.20
The EC Cultural Committee argues that ‘Europe needs a societal paradigm shift – in fact, 
nothing short of a “New Renaissance”’. There was a general need for change, but instead 
of the too radical ‘revolution’ or the overly conservative ‘resurrection’, the more liberal 
term ‘Renaissance’ was used, combining a general idea of rebirth with a memory of those 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century ‘revolutions in thought’ that laid the foundation for the 
modern ‘Knowledge Society’. Just as that Renaissance period based its modernizing ideas 
on classical Greek and Roman heritage, this new European narrative likewise strives to 
combine innovative transformation with historical continuity.
The cosmopolitan spirit has for some decades been on the agenda in political practice 
as well as in social theory. The voice of Rem Koolhaas rings in the utopian vision ‘to 
imagine Europe as one great mega-city interconnected by means of transportation 
and communication’.21 This links to a European tradition of emphasizing intercultural 
communication, for instance symbolized by the windows, doors and bridges on the euro 
banknotes, but also resonant with the classical myth of the Middle East princess Europa 
being transported over the waters to Europe by a bull-shaped Zeus.22 Translation, mobility 
and plurality have indeed long characterized this continent, and the focus on ‘soft power’ is 
in that spirit also recommended in this declaration. Cosmopolitanism combines the more 
general appraisal of (ethnic, linguistic, national, cultural and political) diversity with an 
urban sense of hybridity and transience that avoids the trappings of communitarianism and 
other kinds of identity politics that have threatened to undermine multicultural discourses 
from within. 
These two ideals will not remain unquestioned. The nostalgic elements of the idea of 
renaissance might tend to reproduce traditional Eurocentrism and hinder those more critical 
voices from asking for a radical overturn of all forms of unjust domination, including those 
that have characterized each past ‘golden age’. The city-centred ideology of cosmopolitanism 
might on the other hand annoy those who, for instance, wish to upgrade rural lifestyles. But 
their combination is effective, in that the difficulties of each (conservatism/trendiness) are 
balanced by corresponding strengths in the other, even though both tend to favour precisely 
those cultural and intellectual elites who support this declaration.
It is easy to criticize the declamatory pathos and blind spots of this recurrent quest for 
a visionary European narrative, not least when it is contrasted with the harsh realities of 
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South and East Europe’s borderland conflicts on migration and Russia’s backlash against 
the collapse of its former sphere of influence. Yet it may be wise to retain at least some 
version of the temporal perspective of resurrection or renaissance. Europeans may need 
to acknowledge their own participation in the self-inflicted tutelage and its ensuing 
disasters, and the necessity of taking responsibility for a better, more peaceful and just 
future. It may simply be more appropriate to build on narratives that live on among 
the people of Europe than to try and install an artificially constructed metanarrative 
from above. At the same time, it is important to retain a spatial and social perspective 
of communication based on diversity rather than on uniformity. The reason being that 
the striking national and subregional differences between cultures, languages and media 
systems within Europe – as well as its global interconnectivity through heavy two-way 
flows across its external borders – make it necessary to replace any unitary conceptions 
with a rich sense of diversity. 
Divisions, Mirrorings and Continuities
There are thus multiple ways to identify as European, and such identifications continually 
transform through history. Identifications always come with divisions, and Europe has for 
long periods been subdivided along shifting axes, where each part mirrors itself in what it 
constructs as its opposite, while strong continuities still bind the halves together. The East–
West divide is one such fold through which Europe faces Europe as the other yet the same, 
an imaginary dichotomy constructed by a number of discursive processes. Especially today, 
these processes are notoriously unstable due to the contemporary geopolitical transformations 
making all maps in need of continual revision.
Eastern and Western Europe were constructed as each other’s opposites by the latter in 
the age of Enlightenment, with roots actually as far back as at least the division of the Roman 
Empire and Christianity into a western Catholic and an eastern Orthodox branch.23 Eastern 
Europe was then ambiguously both included in and excluded from Europe, being placed 
in a precarious mediating position between Europe and the Orient. The post–World War 
II bifurcation drew the border differently, placing, for instance, Catholic Poland and other 
central European countries on the eastern side, but the divided structure remained in place.
This intermediary position has come into new focus as a consequence of the post-1989 
fall of the Iron Curtain and the gradual inclusion of a series of former East bloc countries 
into the EU, subsequently necessitating a radical redrawing of the European map, redefining 
its internal and external boundaries, with the eastern periphery as one of the most intensely 
debated border areas.24 This has called for a refiguring of European identity as well – what 
Europe and Europeanness means – as Eastern Europe’s current efforts to re-identify its 
position within or vis-à-vis Europe are closely linked to Europe’s parallel need to redefine its 
own meaning and identity, renarrating European history and reconfiguring its past, present 
and future. 
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By 1989, EU citizens had already for some time felt a growing need to vitalize a sense of 
European identification in order to underpin and legitimize the political-economic project 
of unification. This became even more urgent, as the inclusion of ‘new Europe’ radically 
expanded the geographic area and population of the EU, severely testing its political and 
economic resources. This expansion made a self-redefinition both necessary and much more 
difficult, as a lot of what West Europe had previously taken for granted was no more valid. 
It is, in fact, impossible to map out a well-defined geopolitical East European area, as there 
are too many fuzzy borders involved. To the north and south, one may dispute which Baltic 
and Balkan countries belong here. To the east, it is virtually impossible to distinguish Eastern 
from Central Europe, as it is, for instance, hard to decide how much (if any) of the large 
Russian territory comes under Eastern Europe, and the post-Soviet countries as well as Turkey 
and other Middle East countries have shifting allegiances to Europe. The continent, therefore, 
has no clear eastern boundary. Since once divided by the Iron Curtain, even Germany may 
be seen as balancing between centre and periphery, and, for instance, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary are also variously identified as belonging to either Central or Eastern Europe.
Hence, East Europe is no strictly delineated entity. It is also far from homogenous. 
With radically divergent historical experiences, different countries have chosen distinct 
paths vis-à-vis the European project of unification – some joining the EU, others staying 
outside. Some regard themselves as East Europeans, while others prefer to see themselves 
as belonging to Central Europe, with the Soviet era merely a state of exception that by force 
temporarily prevented them from developing or displaying their true identity. Yet others are 
ambivalently split between self-identifying as either European or Eurasian. 
This book thus questions the fundamental division between East and West. Still, it 
chooses to study precisely East European narratives that often define themselves as in some 
sense peripheral. There is of course a risk that this ambiguity might lead to an unintended 
reinforcement of the dichotomy. However, the intention here is to consider historical 
experiences and shed critical light on the conventions of European identities and differences 
in order to check where inherited categories do not suffice and make it possible to move 
further beyond the same divide.
The concepts of East–West as well as old–new Europe are thus all problematic 
dichotomizations that need to be carefully deconstructed, or in the words of Sudeep 
Dasgupta and Mireille Rosello at the University of Amsterdam:
The rhetoric of linearity and teleology that separates old and new Europe not only hides 
the simplistic association between new and desirable, old and obsolete, but also obscures 
the fact that each part of Europe is both old and new in different ways and struggling to 
come to terms with what, about new and old, can be celebrated or critiqued.25
East–West divides, drawn both by Western and Eastern actors, are surprisingly persistent. 
Merje Kuus has highlighted postcolonial traits in the discourses that renegotiate Europe’s 
East–West boundaries. She employs Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden’s concept 
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of ‘nesting orientalism’ to describe how such dichotomy becomes a flexible gradation of 
Europeanness and Eastness, as each country strives to be accepted within Europe by othering 
its eastern neighbours, in a scale from Central Europe to East Europe’s aspirations to Russia’s 
outsiderhood.26 Europe is never fully ‘united’ by this process, with the main dividing line 
being just continuously pushed eastwards.
Rather than focusing on any geopolitical mapping, this book will therefore give particular 
attention to a peripherality of voice. Different chapters will scrutinize and exemplify what this 
may mean and also discuss the problems of such an approach. The voices studied here claim 
to thematize Europe from a peripheral perspective, making a point of this marginal position, 
which they sometimes claim allows them to identify Europeanness differently than the 
central top-down statements from mighty European organizations such as the EU. Neither 
Europeanness nor peripherality can ever be defined once and for all, as they both are dynamic 
and relational concepts, always in a process of negotiation and contestation. The intervention 
made in this book aims to shift the focus from West to East Europe but even more to question 
the divide itself and reflect on the commonalities that transcend all such borders.
Peripheries are not necessarily of less importance than centres. On the contrary, Harold A. 
Innis has argued that changes tend to derive from the margins of society, where people need 
to invent new media and other cultural resources in order to challenge the authority of the 
centre.27 Yuri Lotman has in a similar vein described peripheries of cultural spaces as more 
dynamic areas of ‘semiotic dynamism’, where new meanings are born of the confrontations 
between different cultural spaces, while centres tend to be more culturally rigid.28 Meanings 
are most intensely renegotiated on the frontiers of a cultural field, and innovative renewal 
takes place through incessant interaction with the outside and the creation of innovatively 
hybrid cultural forms. This creative dynamic can only fully unfold when borders are at 
least relatively open, permeable and blurry, which was not quite the case during the cold 
war. However, in this sense, Eastern Europe has since the 1989 collapse of ‘the wall’ been a 
productive laboratory for the re-identification of Europe. Auksė Balčytienė argues that Eastern 
Europe’s transitional societies are ‘symbolic social laboratories where all the controversies and 
contemporary challenges of modern life can be tested’ since these post-Communist societies 
have particularly rich experience of ‘dealing with and assigning meaning to a very rapid 
change’.29 If some East European narratives present themselves as peripheral to an imagined 
(Western) centre, they may therefore nevertheless be key to the formation of contemporary 
European identity. 
The aim of this book is thus not to pinpoint an essential or fundamental Europeanness, 
nor any unitary East European voice. Instead, its purpose is to map out some of the 
crossing and multiple identifications that today are narrated and circulated in different 
media genres and geopolitical subregions in Eastern Europe, in counterpoint to such 
narratives of identification perceived as central and dominant. European identity is 
formed in interaction between symbolic identifications of Europe and the (individual and 
collective) self-understanding of Europeans. In this web of identification, narratives play a 
central and dynamic role, foregrounding the processual and temporal element of European 
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identifications, linking them to clusters of meaning that thematize Europe’s character of an 
unfinished project moving from past to future. 
Narratives of Europe are thus diverse and full of discursive tensions and contradictions, 
such as those between ‘Fortress Europe’ and Europe as a communicative node, between 
unity and diversity, stability and mobility, universalism and particularism, or pluralist 
cosmopolitanism and identity politics. Europe may be depicted as male or female, old or 
youthful, strong or fragile, linked to critical enlightenment or hyper-bureaucracy, steadily 
progressing to perfection, in tragic decline or resurrecting through catastrophes to maturity. 
Narratives of identification may refer to religious myths and rituals, historical events, political 
and economic practices and institutions, science and technology and the arts. There are 
traces of Christian heritage, colonial history, Enlightenment ideas of progress, experiences 
of war and many other kinds of old and new transnational connections. Some develop a 
quasi-utopian image of Europe as the cradle of Western civilization, prosperity, freedoms 
and rights. Others instead question such affirmative ideologies and formulate alternative or 
critical narratives of Europe in terms of colonialism, control and inequality. Still, others seem 
indifferent or direct themselves towards other poles of attraction, having no wish to jump on 
the pan-European bandwagon. This adds up to a complex and plural understanding of what 
Europe symbolizes and what it means to identify as European in different regions. 
Narratives of Identification
Before introducing the case studies, the link between the concepts of identity and narrative 
deserves closer theoretical attention. The following is a general reflection on our own 
theoretical premises, which form a background to the following chapters, even when these 
basic assumptions may not be explicitly mentioned in them. 
Identities are meanings attached to individual subjects or collective actors of some kind.30 
They emerge through acts of interpretation in which people use signs, symbols and texts 
of various kinds as expressions that characterize themselves or others. These identifying 
processes are dynamic, in that different people may in different contexts identify themselves 
or someone else differently, and also that such identifications change over time.
All personal, social and cultural identities are dynamic, multiple and relationally 
constructed through discourses that construct (but also emerge from) differences to various 
‘others’, as, for instance, Stuart Hall repeatedly stressed:
[I]dentities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and 
fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting 
and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical 
historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation.31
Julia Kristeva talks of the ‘subject-in-process’, and Ricoeur suggests a decentred selfhood of 
‘oneself as another’ as a project or task rather than a given essence.32 ‘[T]here is no essential 
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identity’, Chantal Mouffe argues, ‘but only forms of identification […], they are always 
contingent constructions made possible through a variety of practices, discourses and 
language games’.33 Homi Bhabha stresses the openness and diversity of culture in his 
theoretical approach to cultural hybridity and in-betweenness. He defines culture in general 
as ‘both transnational and translational’ as a result of colonial histories of migration, making 
signifying processes increasingly complex.34 He also notes that ‘the margins of the nation 
displace the centre; the peoples of the periphery return to rewrite the history and fiction of 
the metropolis’.35 Researching East European narratives of Europe is a way to trace precisely 
such multilevel interactions between centres and peripheries.
One symbolic form that in a particularly fascinating way identifies people is the narrative: 
the telling of stories. Storytelling has for quite a while now been a central keyword not only 
in social and cultural theory but also in various branding and policy discourses. This has 
even provoked a backlash, as some neo-materialist theories have tried to escape the spirals of 
narrative and look for other ways to analyse discourses. However, it remains stubbornly central 
to cultural processes and therefore also to cultural research. This is especially true for Europe, 
which is very much a product of narration about its fateful past and open-ended future.
Narratives are not all there is, but they are indeed a basic way of making sense of a person 
and community. Narration and identity are intrinsically interrelated, as narratives are integral 
to the formation of identities.36 Collective as well as individual identities are construed 
through narrative acts. A basic condition of making sense of a person or community is 
that it is grasped in a narrative, relating it to a past and a future, and embedding it in a 
sociocultural web. Identities develop by the mediation of symbolic expressions forming 
narratives in words, images or sounds.37 Narratives may be fragmented, jarred, discordant 
and incoherent, but they nonetheless enable signifying acts that produce webs of meaning 
that suggest some kind of identity for an individual or collective actor. 
There are various ways to define the relation between discourse and narrative, but one 
option is to see narrative as a particular kind of discourse. In a very general sense, a discourse 
may be defined as a dialogically interwoven course of signifying acts or a conversation of 
voices where symbolic units are lined up into utterances.38 Within this most heterogeneous 
dialogic flow, some textual units can form logical arguments or expressive performances, 
while some form temporal sequences that likewise tell temporally ordered stories – narrations.
While other modes of symbolic representation may offer still shots of identity positions, 
frozen into a fixed image of some kind, narratives add a temporal element of development and 
historical change. Lotman has described the symbol as serving as ‘a condensed programme for 
the creative process’, and the ‘subsequent development of a plot’ as ‘the unfolding of a symbol’s 
hidden possibilities’.39 ‘The essence of plot lies in selecting the events, which are the discrete units of 
plot, then giving them meaning and a temporal or causal or some other ordering’.40 Narratives 
of identity are therefore particularly useful for understanding how identities are understood 
as transient and flexible processes, not just as fixed positions. It is certainly the case that Europe 
is emphatically in process rather than a frozen entity, and it is therefore useful to select narratives 
as a focus instead of flags, coins other more static modes of symbolic representation.41
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Narratives construct a symbolic universe, an inhabitable textual world with which one 
may identify in order to understand oneself better. The interpretation of such narratives 
of Europe offers clues to the main ways in which Europe is today constructed. Lotman has 
emphasized how narratives give meaning to existence: ‘By creating plot-texts humanity 
learnt to distinguish plots in life and in this way to make sense of life’.42 
Ricoeur has developed similar ideas further and argued for the key role of narratives in 
self-understanding: ‘To understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: 
from what it says, to what it talks about. […] The text speaks of a possible world and of a 
possible way of orientating oneself within it.’43 By following the ‘arrow’ of such narratives 
and reflecting upon where they point to, Europeans can get a richer sense of themselves 
and their collective trajectories. Narratives take part in constructing human lives, and ‘the 
sense or the significance of a narrative stems from the intersection of the world of the text 
and the world of the reader’.44 By ‘applying to ourselves the plots that we have received from 
our culture and of trying on the different roles assumed by the favourite characters of the 
stories most dear to us […] we attempt to obtain a narrative understanding of ourselves’. 
Such narrative identity is ‘a self instructed by cultural symbols, the first among which are the 
narratives handed down in our literary tradition. And these narratives give us a unity which 
is not substantial but narrative’.45 
This is not only true of individual subjects but also of social collectives. ‘We can speak 
of the self-constancy of a community, just as we spoke of it as applied to an individual 
subject. Individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives 
that become for them their actual history’.46 Narratives and identities thus have a very strong 
bond. Hence, narratives of Europe are not just secondary elaborations of a pre-existing 
entity: rather than being produced by Europe, such narratives are the most central cultural 
processes through which Europe is produced!
Ricoeur distinguishes between ‘two main uses of the concept of identity: identity as 
sameness (Latin: idem; English: same; German: gleich) and identity as selfhood (Latin: ipse; 
English: self; German: Selbst)’.47 While sameness includes aspects such as numerical identity 
(in contrast to plurality), extreme resemblance (contrary to difference), uninterrupted 
continuity (in contrast to discontinuity) and permanence in time (contrary to diversity), the 
narrative identity of selfhood is a kind of ongoing project. It is the second sense of identity – 
as selfhood – that is of key interest in this context, where Europe appears not as anything 
already given or fixed in sameness but as a project in process. Narratives are necessary tools 
for identifying (individual and collective) subjects: 
[T]he self does not know itself immediately, but only indirectly by the detour of the 
cultural signs of all sorts which are articulated on the symbolic mediations which always 
already articulate action and, among them, the narratives of everyday life. Narrative 
mediation underlines this remarkable characteristic of self-knowledge – that it is self-
interpretation. The appropriation of the identity of the fictional character by the reader 
is one of its forms.48
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Ricoeur’s article ‘Narrative Time’ offers a complex philosophical argument against ‘anti-
narrativist epistemologists and structuralist literary critics’ for having ‘overlooked the 
temporal complexity of the narrative matrix constituted by the plot’.49 In contrast to formalist 
and structuralist models, Ricoeur always emphasizes ‘production, construction, dynamism’ 
and defends ‘the primacy of the activity that produces plots in relation to every sort of static 
structure’.50 His three-level model of mimesis1 or prefiguration (the proto-narrative structure 
of life itself), mimesis2 or configuration (the work of composing textual narratives) and 
mimesis3 or refiguration (the interpretation of narratives) expresses this processual 
perspective.51 The following narrative studies do not strictly apply these terms but they also 
strive not to lock narratives into fixed structures; instead, they follow their historical 
development as a result of complex forms of social interaction and cultural dialogue.
What narratives add on top of what other modes of symbolic representation offer is thus a 
way of signifying transformation and change, making time meaningful. Ricoeur consistently 
stresses this point: ‘I take temporality to be that structure of existence that reaches language 
in narrativity and narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as its ultimate 
referent’.52 What is ultimately at stake is ‘the temporal character of human experience. The 
world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world. […] [T]ime becomes 
human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, 
in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience’.53 
Ricoeur’s hypothesis is ‘that temporality cannot be spoken of in the direct discourse of 
phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the indirect discourse of narration’.54 
Working with mediating tools such as clocks, calendars and chronicles, narratives help 
culturalize temporality by bridging cosmological and experiential time in a similar manner 
as they assist people in inhabiting places, and thus culturalizing spatiality by linking 
geometrical to subjective space.55
Peter Brooks likewise underlines this ‘dynamic aspect of narrative’: ‘the activity of 
shaping’, which he calls ‘plotting’, through which stories ‘come to be ordered in significant 
form’.56 He also links narrative to temporality: ‘Narrative is one of the large categories or 
systems of understanding that we use in our negotiations with reality, specifically, in the case 
of narrative, with the problem of temporality: man’s time-boundedness, his consciousness 
of existence within the limits of mortality’.57 His psychoanalytically oriented narrative 
interpretations strongly link temporality to mortality: ‘If the motor of narrative is desire, 
totalizing, building ever-larger units of meaning, the ultimate determinants of meaning lie 
at the end, and narrative desire is ultimately, inexorably, desire for the end’.58 However, this 
understanding is one-sided and needs to be supplemented with the other side of narrative: 
Ricoeur’s emphasis on its creative capacity for shaping new possible worlds and giving birth 
to new adventures, new lives.
William Labov has defined narrative as a peculiar communicative technique to report 
a sequence of past events, retelling them in a similar order as they are remembered to 
have happened.59 Description and narrative are, according to Tzvetan Todorov, two 
different modes of discourse or of fiction, where ‘narrative requires the unfolding of an 
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action, change, difference’, presupposing another kind of temporality than description.60 
Narratives may include descriptions, but descriptions alone are not enough to constitute 
a narrative. Narrative combines two main principles: succession and transformation.61 It 
presents some kind of linear ordering that is not simply a succession of individual events 
but represents someone or something undergoing a transformation from one position or 
situation to another. 
This means that narrative cannot be reduced just to temporality. It must also have 
other components, including the identification of a subject, an actor or a kind of character 
described by some means and then undergoes a process of change. Additionally, narrative 
is usually not merely this transformation process but a representation of such a process 
through various means of storytelling that make it possible to temporarily identify with that 
subject position and follow its transformation so to speak from within. 
Studying Narrativity
To highlight the main dimensions of European identification thus requires a close study of 
key forms of narrative. There are many excellent examples of such research, particularly 
focusing on Eastern Europe. However, much of this research takes the concept of narrative 
for granted without explicitly specifying in any greater detail its core elements and 
dimensions. Often different narrative types are identified, labelled and mapped as they 
appear in various discourses, but without any clear account of the interpretive method 
used.62 Heidi Armbruster, Craig Rollo and Ulrike H. Meinhof recount such narratives 
collected by interviewing different citizens; Kuus distinguishes between identity narratives 
(of civilization, sovereignty and security) among Estonians; and Anssi Paasi discusses spatial 
aspects of European images and identity narratives – but none makes quite clear what 
constitutes a narrative and how to analyse it.63 
In their 1991 study of Yugoslavian TV news, Sabina Mihelj, Veronika Bajt and Miloš 
Pankov go further in this direction, as they examine how narratives construct an implied 
audience, key actors and dramatic structure; use deictic expressions, narrative voice 
and focalization and achieve different levels of narrative coherence.64 In an interview 
study of US Americans, Hungarians and Russians talking about East–West relations, 
Attila Melegh also specifies an interpretive method aiming to reconstruct narrated life 
stories.65 Still, much more can be said about how to map the dimensions and elements 
of such identifying narratives. Before outlining the specific narrative fields examined in 
the following chapters, some words, therefore, on how to approach narrative analysis, 
serving as a methodological reflection but not as a rigid model to be slavishly followed 
in each study.
As a symbolic mode of representation, narrative is the outcome of a cultural work, a 
meaning-making human activity. Gérard Genette has suggested useful concepts for this 
process, where a story is ‘the signified or narrative content’; a narrative is ‘the signifier, 
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statement, discourse or narrative text itself ’, and narrating is ‘the producing narrative action 
and, by extension, the whole of the real or fictional situation in which that action takes 
place’.66 It is the practice of narrating as a dynamic act that constructs narratives and thereby 
understands series of events (that would otherwise be unlinked fragments) as stories. As 
Ricoeur has stressed, all human life and identity are potentially narrative, and narrating 
practice can therefore make stories out of any experiential event, as there is a double affinity 
between texts and meaningful action, in that texts are in key respects dynamic action, while 
human acts, in turn, have text-like qualities and can thus be narrated.67 As Marie-Laure 
Ryan argues, only some artefacts are deliberately constructed and normally understood 
and used as narratives, but all life, including images or music, can evoke a story and hence 
possess some degree of narrativity. The degree of narrativity is to some extent bound to 
which medium a text belongs to, and different theorists tend either to see it as an exclusively 
verbal phenomenon or as medium independent.68
In any case, narratives have a double bridging capacity. On one hand, playing with voices 
in narrating acts bridges the gap between self and other, by linking individuals to sociality, 
through constructions of identity and difference. On the other hand, the temporal process 
of narrating bridges the gap between past and present as the core mode of memory and 
historical consciousness.69 Ricoeur strengthens the deep temporal dimension of narrativity 
in response to the a-chronological models of anti-narrative structuralism. He starts by 
describing the phenomenology of the act of following a story:
Let us say that a story describes a series of actions and experiences made by a number 
of characters, whether real or imaginary. These characters are represented either in 
situations that change or as they relate to changes to which they then react. These changes, 
in turn, reveal hidden aspects of the situation and of the characters and engender a new 
predicament that calls for thinking, action, or both. The answer to this predicament 
advances the story to its conclusion.
Following a story, correlatively, is understanding the successive actions, thoughts, and 
feelings in question insofar as they present a certain directedness.70
Ricoeur then mentions several ways in which structuralist narratologists have disregarded 
key features of how narrativity and temporality are mutually implicated. For instance, he 
identifies a commonly neglected ‘fundamental feature of a narrative’s temporal dialectic’, 
which ‘characterizes the plot as such, that is, as the objective correlate of the act of following 
a story’:71
[E]very narrative combines two dimensions in various proportions, one chronological 
and the other nonchronological. The first may be called the episodic dimension, which 
characterizes the story as made out of events. The second is the configurational dimension, 
according to which the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events.72
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Anti-narrativist writers overlook the latter dimension, as they reduce narratives to just 
sequences of isolated events: ‘they do not see that the humblest narrative is always more 
than a chronological series of events and that in turn the configurational dimension cannot 
overcome the episodic dimension without suppressing the narrative itself ’.73 Ricoeur then 
reflects upon the role of memory, recollection and repetition in shaping temporality into 
something much more complex than just a linear succession from past to present to future, 
and narrative likewise into more than a linear progression from beginning to end.
Narration or storytelling is a mode of representation that thus through plotting (or 
emplotment) creates narratives that signify stories. Narratives represent and construct 
temporal processes by describing ‘a series of actions and experiences made by a number of 
characters’ in situations of change and action that ‘reveal hidden aspects of the situation and 
of the characters’. Narratives have an ‘episodic dimension’ by consisting of a series of events, 
and a ‘configurational dimension’, as ‘the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered 
events’.74 In this way, narratives construct dynamic meanings and identities for individuals 
or collectives by having a temporal structure of beginning, progression and end, with main 
actors, problems and solutions. 
The degree of narrativity differs between media genres. Narrative structures may be more 
easily discernible in verbal, literary and dramatic genres, but there may well be temporal 
sequencing in music and images as well. The narrative mode privileges the temporal 
sequencing of actions and events, but the composition work of narratives also makes room 
for the spatial simultaneity of complex multiplicities.75 Narratives can take many shapes, 
making use not only of spoken and written language but also of musical and pictorial forms.
There are in all parts of human life always at the very minimum some elements of 
narrativity, at least as an inherent possibility. Most literary works are clearly narrative, often 
combining narratives on several different levels, from small stories and dialogues to the whole 
structure of a poem or a novel. In visual arts, narratives may sometimes be rudimentary 
in the artworks but then often instead spun around them in the interpretive discourses 
of artists, curators, reviewers and art publics. In music, narratives are presented in song 
lyrics but also in narrative musical structures – and here I disagree with Ryan’s position.76 
In philosophical and political discourses, micronarratives will be found as elements of 
arguments with a descriptive or prescriptive rather than narrative overall character. 
Todorov and Genette distinguish between three key parameters that together constitute 
narrative: (1) From where does the story come, what is its point of view, aspect or voice, who 
speaks in reality and in the story itself? (2) What time or tense does a narrative produce 
through the order and speed of its events? Selection, reordering, repetition, condensation 
and dispersal are compositional methods that both distort events and are simultaneously 
necessary for them to become intelligible; (3) What is the mood of a narrative, its type of 
discourse? For instance, showing by mimetic imitation or telling by diegetic narration.77 
Genette makes the observation that ‘tense and mood both operate at the level of connections 
between story and narrative, while voice designates the connections between both narrating 
and narrative and narrating and story’.78 Ryan has formulated three slightly different 
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conditions of representation that a text must fulfil in order to qualify as a narrative: 
(1) creating a world populated by characters and objects; (2) recounting a series of 
unique events or actions that change this world and hence create temporality and history; 
(3) reconstructing ‘an interpretive network of goals, plans, causal relations, and psychological 
motivations around the narrated events’, giving them the character of a coherent and 
meaningful plot.79
Based on such ideas, we developed a model with four dimensions or key features to be 
considered when analysing and interpreting individual narratives as symbolic representations 
of temporal processes of transformation:
1. Set-up: who and where? Narratives represent a world populated by characters and objects 
given identifying characteristics and roles. These are normally made clear only through 
the narration itself, but, for instance, in theatre or cinema, the setting and characters are 
sometimes presented in the beginning so as to establish the main characteristics of the 
world of the narrative. There is first of all a narrator, but precisely who is that narrating 
voice? As for the world constructed as the context of the story, what kind of universe is 
this? And which characters (people, categories, objects) populate that narrated world? 
On this level, one may also identify the intended or implied audience of the story told: to 
whom it is primarily directed. In this particular case, the focus is on the place of Europe 
in each narrative: as subject or object in the narrated discourse, friend or enemy, actor 
or context, memory or dream.
2. Process: what and when? Since all narratives both are and represent temporal sequences, 
diachronic ordering is central to this analysis. The narratively constructed world 
goes through a transformation by way of a series of events shaping a temporal flow, a 
(hi)story. What is the dramatic structure, the timeline, the main events and the story 
told? How are past, present and future linked? This process may be mapped in three 
steps: Beginning: which are the mutual relations and main conflicts between actors 
in the narrated world? Time: in which order, speed and constellation does the story 
develop? Which central events and actions take place, and in which temporal order are 
they organized? How is the narrative started, unfolded and concluded? End: what result 
is depicted – is it happy or evil, same or different? However, while all narratives have 
a temporal direction and processual character, some are more open-ended, resisting 
any identification of a clear beginning or end. The analysis must therefore in each case 
first also assess the degree and kind of narrative coherence. This is of course always 
a particularly central dimension of narrative analysis, and the following studies will 
primarily look for and analyse significant stories told of Europe: whether they depict 
decay or progress, crisis or stability. Previous research indicates a kind of master 
narrative of resurrection: a widespread millenarian story of Europe having a glorious 
past, followed by tragic catastrophes (internal division, hostility and disastrous wars), 
but now regaining peace, unity and greatness, or in other cases nourishing a dream for 
such resurrection as an urgent task for the future. This temporal curve of development 
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is central to the founding myths of the EU and will presumably be strongly present in 
East European contexts as well, but the question is how its processual details vary or if 
there are different and competing storylines in some of these cultural fields.80
3. Mode: how? Which genre (journalism, art, music, etc.) and symbolic mode (verbal, 
visual, musical, etc.) is (or are) the basic one(s)? A painting or a sculpture offers other 
ways of narrating than a song or a news item. The narrative form (showing/telling, 
linear/nonlinear, explicit/implicit narrativity, etc.) is dependent on the genre and 
symbolic mode used. What is the attitude of the narrator and the author? Is there, for 
instance, an element of critique or apologetics, tragedy or comedy, irony or play? It is a 
particular challenge to interpret satirical or ironic narratives since they tend to produce 
ambiguous stories that allow for double and often-contradictory identifications. 
4. Meaning: why? What meanings are narratively constructed, and how are various actors 
identified by being linked to certain specific values and spheres of meaning? How does 
the story configure characters and sequences of events and link them into a narrative 
whole that opens up dimensions of meaning? In this summarizing dimension, the 
previous ones can be combined, with a focus on their signifying effects. How is Europe 
identified and given meaning by different narratives? What does Europe signify in them? 
Narratives are never found in splendid isolation. Like all cultural phenomena, they are 
always contextually positioned in larger webs of signification and can only be interpreted by 
immersing oneself in the ongoing conflicts of interpretation in which they occur.81 They are 
intertwined with other narratives that they might integrate as starting points or elements 
within themselves, or perhaps speak against in open opposition or implicit contrasting. 
Single narratives are therefore always enmeshed in internarrative rhizomatic networks, 
making it necessary to interpret them by contextualization and comparisons with other 
narratives to which they point through shifting means.82 This is of course true of narratives 
of Europe, which, for instance, are co-determined by their relations to comparable narratives 
of other continents and of individual nations.
The dimensions of set-up, process, mode and meaning should however not force every 
narrative analysis into a formalistic straitjacket but only be used when they seem fruitful. 
Instead of binding the analysis to strict models and frameworks, it is more rewarding to 
make flexible use of those elements that seem particularly relevant to a given textual material. 
Traditional narratology distinguishes between the plot (or sujet), the order in which 
the story is told, and the fable (fabula), the sequence of events the text is understood as 
constructing. If the research focuses on the fable dimension, the investigated plots (for 
instance different stories told in news media, art, music, etc.) are merely means of access 
to the fable (here: the underlying (hi-)story of Europe). One might rephrase this in other 
terms by stating that the focus is then on the signified narrative content rather than the 
signifying narrative form of each story. The aim is to reconstruct the narratives of Europe 
at the level of what various discourses signify (from philosophy to pop music): on how 
Europe’s historical process of becoming and progressing is constructed. The formal aspects 
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of those images, sounds or stories interpreted must of course be carefully scrutinized, but 
with the aim to find out what kind of narrative content they convey. This implies that it is 
less important how narrative various texts are as such; more important are the stories about 
Europe that they seem to keep alive. An artwork may itself have a rather static shape but can 
still instantly associate with a complex narrative like a myth or a fictional story. Less relevant 
then are those clearly narrative stories where Europe may figure as a reference but does not 
receive any particular narrative development.
Mapping and analysing various narratives in their discursive settings are an interpretive 
effort demanding a series of contextualizations that serve as moments of explanation to 
reach a deeper understanding in a hermeneutic spiral movement. It is based on a close 
analysis of each narrative and adds a widening set of contexts to enrich the clouds of meaning 
identified in that narrative. A simple model distinguishes three main axes of interpretation:
a. Textual analysis. First, interpretation of the narrative in question is based on hermeneutical 
spiral movements between its various levels: the (graphic or phonetic) materiality of its 
signifying elements, the (syntactic) form relations of their combination, the (semantic) 
meanings they induce among interpretive communities and the (pragmatic) uses to 
which they are put in various contexts. The level of meaning has priority when it comes 
to understanding narratives of identification. However, the other levels must also be 
taken seriously in a hermeneutical circle that integrates micro-textual elements and 
macro-contextual settings in a complex arc of interpretation.
b. Historical development. This interpretive work is never fixed to a specific point in time 
but can continue indefinitely by following a narrative through history. Going back to 
the archaeology of production, one may discern how narratives have been motivated by 
their tellers or regulators, including politicians, journalists, authors, artists, musicians, 
designers, publishers, etc. These narratives span the wider social settings and historical 
contexts in which they have been invented and told, extending from authorial intentions 
to the overarching ‘structures of feeling’ of a whole epoch.83 These are never in a position 
to guarantee the definite ‘truth’ of any reading but can still give important clues to how 
narratives signify. However, in the opposite temporal direction towards the teleology 
of reception, one should also acknowledge how narratives are used and understood by 
various audiences and citizens, for instance in public criticism or social media, i.e. in 
their reception process or Wirkungsgeschichte.84
c. Intertextual comparisons. Identities are always formed together with differences in a complex 
game of similarity and diversity. The interpretation of identifying narratives is therefore 
finally also enriched by studying how they relate to other narratives, including in this case 
other narratives of Europe (both of the same genre type and in other genres and media) as 
well as comparable narratives of other communities (other continents, nations, etc.). 
Moving spirally between these contextualizing levels and dimensions makes it possible to better 
understand how different narratives identify Europe as a concept or community in process.




Shifting combinations of these four key dimensions (set-up, process, mode and meaning) 
and three axes of contextualizing interpretation (textual analysis, historical development 
and intertextual comparisons) have been put to work in the ‘Narratives of Europe’ research 
project, resulting in six different studies of how Europe has since 1989 been narrated in its 
eastern ‘periphery’. Any such study will necessarily also itself construct a new (meta)
narrative of the collective it studies (here Europe), proposing based on multifarious 
interpretations a more complex internarrative understanding of how it is told and thus 
identified. Combining such different studies into an integral whole will offer a complex draft 
for how to better understand and renarrate the unfinished process of becoming to which 
each identifying narrative testifies. Such research reconstructs narrating processes going on 
in various genres of discourse, adding its own new cross-reading to the heterological 
polyphony of identifying narrating that is for Europe today an emphatically undecided 
quest. In this volume, six spheres of narration are investigated. 
A. First, in ‘Europe as Identity and Ideal: Reading Barroso’s “New Narrative” Heretically 
alongside Hegel, Husserl and Patočka’, Carl Cederberg traces the philosophical roots of the 
discourse of European identity. Beginning with Barroso and the EC Cultural Committee, 
he outlines a recurrent trope of Europe as the specific cradle of universal philosophical 
thought, with Hegel and Husserl as important contributors. His focus is then on the 
Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka, who, leaning on Plato, redefined Europe as care for 
the soul. Patočka’s heretic ideas, in turn, influenced recent political discourses, not least 
through Charta 77 and Václav Havel. Cederberg critically scrutinizes this legacy of thought, 
acknowledging how Patočka transcends Hegel and Husserl but also remains caught in a 
problematic identification of identity and ideal: of existing European institutions and the 
universal ideals that must remain a goal rather than anything already accomplished.
B. Second, Stefan Jonsson in ‘Clashing Internationalisms: East European Narratives of 
West European Integration’ discusses how in the 1950s European unification was in Soviet 
and East German works on international geopolitics critically reinterpreted as motivated by 
a secret colonialist agenda. In official Western narratives, this agenda has been systematically 
repressed in favour of regarding today’s EU solely as a benevolent peace project. This critical 
counter-narrative tells a radically different and less heroic story about Europe than most 
of those found and discussed in the other chapters, which is important to unveil in this 
context today, as it has repercussions in current European discourses on both sides of the 
EU–Russian border.
C. Third, in ‘Narratives of War: Representations of Europe in News Media of Ukraine, 
Russia and Poland during Euromaidan’, Roman Horbyk shows how politics and journalism 
in these three strategically chosen countries together form ideas of Europe. Political news 
reporting in leading daily and weekly journals link political institutions to street politics, 
and selected examples from popular media and user-generated content serve to enrich 
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this analysis. Horbyk distinguishes clearly different modes of narrating Europe in these 
countries, developed in a complex interplay between centres and peripheries. Whereas 
the Russian media tend to focus on Europe’s internal crisis, their Ukrainian counterpart 
thematizes Europe symbolically as a set of values and goals, and the Polish news media more 
specifically deal with internal EU institutional procedures.
D. Fourth, ‘Narrating Protest: Silenced Stories of Europe in Occupy Stockholm and 
Occupy Latvia’, written by Anne Kaun, focuses on social movements, in particular the 
major narratives of the Occupy movement in Sweden and Latvia, among activists and the 
mainstream news media. The most striking result is the apparent absence of a European 
narrative in how mainstream news media tell the stories of these movements. Although 
supranational European institutions and representatives have been major players in the 
financial crisis that led to the emergence of the Occupy movement, they remain in the 
background of how the movement is framed in the stories, particularly in the news. There was 
a remarkable disconnection between narratives among activists and in the news. The chapter 
asks whether the absence of a European perspective in these mainstream media discourses 
of Occupy is an expression of the continued democratic deficit of the EU or due to the 
particular character of the Occupy movement. 
E. Fifth, in the chapter ‘The Resilience of the Periphery: Narrating Europe through 
Curatorial Strategies’, Katarina Wadstein MacLeod deals with visual art, focusing on four 
projects presenting art from Eastern Europe in exhibitions and books between 2009 and 
2011. One striking aspect of this analysis is that these art projects, while often inspired by 
a wish to deconstruct the division between East and West, in effect tend to reinforce it by 
cementing Eastern Europe’s cultural otherness. Despite all efforts to avoid dualist thinking, 
these curatorial practices have great difficulty escaping the image of Europe as divided 
into two halves. Another theme relates to the element of nostalgia that stubbornly appears 
when art exhibitions narrate European history. The chapter shows how multiple power 
structures are involved when Eastern Europe is represented as a periphery in relation to an 
imagined but also tangibly real Western centre to which oppositional Eastern voices tend 
to appeal. Institutional strategies of marketing certain art as East European expand the 
concept of Europe but simultaneously cement its bifurcation and the cultural otherness of 
its eastern half. 
F. Finally, Johan Fornäs in ‘Euro-Visions: East European Narratives in Televised Popular 
Music’ studies how Europe has been narrated in finals and songs from Eastern Europe in the 
Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). This contest is full of narratives of Europe, which with closer 
inspection turn out to be variants of the same master narrative of Europe as resurrecting from 
past self-inflicted catastrophes. It is the same grand narrative that dominates the narratives 
of leading European institutions, including the EC Cultural Committee mentioned above. 
Some East European songs add freedom from oppression to peace after war as a leading 
value, but otherwise the main story is surprisingly constant, hinting at the persistence of 
this narrative.




Readers who first wish to read the empirical analyses may save the following last pages of 
this introduction and return to them afterwards, to get a summary of the results. Since 
others may like to already now at the beginning get a glimpse of what is to be expected, let 
me provide such a brief conclusion already here and now, offering a comparative overview 
to those readers who then want to move freely around among the following chapters.
We have no pretensions to offer any comprehensive, ‘full’ picture, as there could always be 
added other genres or fields of discourse, such as for instance maps, school books or literary 
genres. Yet, taken together, the six chapters confirm some general conclusions: (1) dominant 
European narratives in the West tend to be important also in Eastern Europe; (2) a number 
of key narratives of Europe criss-cross between locations and between cultural fields; and 
(3) there is a mix of continuity and change. Comparisons can be made between discourse 
fields as well as between subregions in each of the four main narrative dimensions defined 
above. Further details and nuances are presented in the individual chapters; here just a few 
general traits will be suggested.
1. Set-up. It is no mere coincidence that printed versions of Shakespeare plays start with 
information on who will act and where the action takes place. Any narrative in some 
way indicates its main actors and the context or stage for the narrated events. The 
narratives studied here place Europe in shifting positions or roles: sometimes as the 
narrating voice itself, the world in which the story takes place, one of its characters or its 
implied addressee. Several narrations analysed here have a rather complex and multiple 
mode of narration. For instance, news articles have individual authors, but not only 
editorials can be read as institutional expressions of the newspaper that publishes them; 
artworks are statements by artists, but when selected for exhibitions or catalogues, they 
also form curatorial statements; and ESC songs as well as finals combine a wide range 
of narrators, from singers and their personae to authors and composers to television 
producers and other actors in the two main cultural industries involved (television and 
popular music). 
  In these case studies, narrators are usually defined as Europeans or at least wishing 
to identify with Europe. From philosophy to Eurovision, Europe often appears as a 
‘we’ – a shared community or public to which the individual narrating author and/
or performer belongs. Europe could also be the addressee (‘you’) of the narration, for 
example in ESC calls for Europe to come together and make peace – or else a third-
person actor in the form of institutions whose history and destiny are described in 
critical treatises or artworks. 
  In the Occupy movements, Europe appeared as a more general location and 
territorial context for the narration. Although activists linked the economic crisis to the 
European level by identifying concrete policies and austerity measures as root causes 
of growing inequality, the mainstream media did not contextualize the movement in 
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the same way. Rather than considering their real motivations for occupying spaces in 
Stockholm and holding online discussions and protests in Latvia that largely concerned 
the European financial crisis, the mainstream media discourse emphasized the US 
American roots of the movement and its unsuitability for the European context. This 
created a stark contrast in narratives between the activists and the news media that 
reduced the potential European reach of the movement.
  The continent is often depicted as a supranational unit consisting of clearly distinct 
national parts but also forming a collective totality that is, in turn, part of the global or 
universal humanity. Most of these discourses strive to represent a pluralizing diversity, 
evoking the European motto ‘united in diversity’. However, this does not always succeed: 
instead, the totalizing uniformity of ‘we are one’ tends to sneak in even where it is clearly 
unintended. In particular, the stereotypical dualism of the East–West dichotomy is often 
reproduced at the same time as it is criticized.85 Across cultural spheres and discourse 
fields, the Russian media often seem to reproduce the strict East–West divide – 
as do in another way the visual art discourses discussed here. In many instances, ESC 
songs focus on peace and unity across difference, though, for instance, the Lithuanian 
group InCulto also gave particular attention to the East–West dichotomy found in 
the art exhibitions. As usual, these stereotypical dualisms tend to unduly homogenize 
each of the two main poles (East and West), neglecting their internal differences while 
exaggerating their mutual contrasts so as to depict them as each other’s opposites, and 
with a hierarchical element of regarding the East as inferior to the West in various ways 
(less developed and civilized, poorer or more suffering). 
  This risk for critics to in the end reproduce and reinforce precisely those 
dichotomous divisions they set out to deconstruct is also relevant to this book. Already 
formulating the task as listening to peripheral voices implies the existence of such a 
divide. However, in a situation where the European discourse has for such a long time 
been dominated by West European voices centred around Brussels, it is important to 
provide a counterpoint by listening to other less heard voices. This book is therefore 
not the final word but rather a strategic move in a transitional period, aiming at 
contributing to the dissolution of those same dualisms that it scrutinizes. One might 
in a similar spirit say that what Patočka most of all added to the discourse on Europe 
from his experience as a citizen of Eastern Europe was an acute awareness of the need 
to overcome the East–West divide. 
2. Process. The form of the story told suggest a sequence of events, identifying what happens 
and when or in which order the events take place. In most of these cases, a dominant 
story is what has been described as the grand narrative of Europe, according to which 
Europe has first flourished as a classical cradle of reason, civilization and culture, then 
descended into years and centuries of internal strife and self-annihilation until the 
recent or current era has given birth to new hopes of peaceful unification. Emphasis and 
details may shift, but this grand narrative of resurrection from self-inflicted destruction 
is not only central to the EU institutions but also echoes in much art and popular music. 
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  The long-past golden age is often identified with classical Greek antiquity but may 
also refer to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, where allegedly leading European 
values such as citizen rights were developed and formulated. The intermediate period of 
catastrophic fall and suffering mostly focuses on the great wars of the twentieth century, 
including the Holocaust and other experiences of mass destruction. It also includes at 
least certain negative aspects of colonialism, though even some voices that prefer not to 
be accused of Eurocentric and xenophobic racism tend to acknowledge specific positive 
values in the allegedly modernizing and globalizing effects of the voyages of discovery 
and international trade that European colonialism too supported. Hopes for future 
resurrection go way back in history; however, in current discourses, they are mainly 
located in two stages: at the end of World War II and then at the post-1989 reunification 
of Europe’s two halves, which is also the main factor behind this book.
  Political journalism mostly focuses on current events pointing to urgent crises 
that have to be solved. Philosophical discourse usually takes a much longer historical 
perspective but also tends to dramatize the contemporary situation in terms of a quest 
that Europeans and/or humanity at large have to pursue in order to secure survival 
and prosperity. The artworks discussed here likewise focus on current problems but 
place them in a historical perspective, whereas the ESC contains more stories of hope, 
love and faith in Europe’s future. Notwithstanding, East European voices rarely depict 
Europe as just a success story since the complex experience of suffering and guilt is hard 
to avoid. 
3. Mode. Choices of symbolic mode, aesthetic genre and stylistic attitude are also of 
importance, answering to the question how a story is told. Each of the six discourse 
fields presented in these chapters represents a specific range of constraints and 
possibilities – affordances that enable or prioritize certain narratives while preventing 
or problematizing others. Mainstream narratives about Occupy focused on spectacles 
and violence while marginalizing the protests, hiding their relevance to European 
issues. While philosophy, the news media and international politics allow for discursive 
argumentation, music and arts contribute non-verbal and in many instances emotionally 
charged modes of expression. Voices of movements, visual arts and the ESC are more 
often than the others ironical, playing with double voices that destabilize signification. 
However, on closer scrutiny, only very few cases seem to very much use these means, 
as, for instance, most Eurovision songs on Europe are, with just one or two exceptions, 
performed in what appears to be a quite serious way.
4. Meaning. Interpretation makes it possible to discern what a story signifies. More 
specifically, the philosophical narratives analysed here tend to link Europeanness to 
universalist values of reason, justice, democracy, freedom, tolerance and care, and other 
chapters also exemplify how, for instance, the Ukrainian news media take such values 
extremely seriously. In addition, some popular songs such as the 2012 ESC hymn are 
linked to the justice and reason theme of the philosophical discourse. Contemporary 
Russian news journalism and the 1950s Soviet international politics discourse instead 
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talks about Europe’s imperial conspiracy or internal crisis and failure, where Europe 
is described as an aggressive imperialist project disguised in universalist terms and 
doomed to fail. This contrast is reminiscent of how Timothy Snyder has described 
the escalating clash between Putin’s idea of a US-led Western imperialist conspiracy, 
motivating Russia to extend and strengthen its own centralized Eurasian empire, and 
the Maidan idea of Europe as a free association of sovereign states based on vital civil 
societies.86 One conclusion of our studies is that Europe is in reality an ambivalent and 
contradictory combination of both these sides, and every effort to reduce it to either 
of them has dangerous implications. The different approaches to Europe narrated 
by Occupy activists and the mainstream news media showed that narratives are 
rarely univocal. Instead, they form sites of struggles about the authority in meaning 
production, which is also addressed in the chapter on art exhibitions, when discussing 
narrative resilience in the periphery. Likewise, Russian Eurasian counter-narratives to 
the Eurafrican visions, sometimes nourished by the European Economic Community, 
share a problematic hiding of geopolitical power struggles behind ideological debates 
between Communism (in the 1950s) or authoritarian nationalism on one hand and 
liberalism and capitalism on the other. While Europe certainly needs to interact and 
communicate with other world regions – Asia as well as Africa – the colonial–imperialist 
mode of this interaction needs to be ruthlessly criticized.
  Other narratives, for instance in the arts, also discuss the limitations and 
contradictions of Europe, not by comparing with an external ideal (Russia) but in 
modes of precisely such immanent critique, based on contrasting given promises (high 
moral values, human rights, freedoms, welfare and soft power) to realities (postcolonial 
inequalities and social divides, greed and surveillance) and thus identifying Europe’s 
internal contradiction rather than reducing it to any coherent totality. Distinguishing 
these two aspects seems crucial: Europe as an ideal anchored in a set of universal values 
must be separated from Europe as an actually existing institutional identity. Moreover, 
just like Patočka, the EC’s ‘new narrative’ tends to erase the tension between these two 
aspects in a highly problematic way.
  No summary can do justice to the complexity and wealth of narratives encountered 
in these six studies. Listening to the East European voices thematizing Europe’s trajectory 
from history to future offers rich material for self-reflexive critical reflection, which in 
any case may in light of the following chapters be seen as one of the key capacities that 
Europeans eagerly exercise.
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  (Transcription note by Roman Horbyk:) The subject of Eastern Europe, with its plenty 
of languages not always using Latin graphic, has naturally led to the problem of rendering 
proper names, literal quotations, transcriptions, etc. in English, in particular of those 
originating from writing traditions based on Cyrillic alphabets. As our book is directed to a 
wider academic audience, oftentimes without extensive area expertise, the use of phonetic 
transcriptions (very precise yet complex for non-specialists) that are found in linguistic 
literature was considered too ambitious an enterprise for our specific purpose, although 
we do not doubt the overall preferability of such precise transcriptions. For more or less 
the same reason, the more widely used Library of Congress system was discussed as an 
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option but eventually discarded. We believe that we made the right choice to opt for the 
BGN/PCGN system developed decades ago by two specialized institutions, the US Board on 
Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official 
Use, as the most intuitive and time-tried system. It has a long tradition of international 
use and is adopted by many official institutions and international media (such as BBC). 
It would be one of the most familiar systems to a general leader. It also is more relevant 
in the European context, which is reflected in the system being recommended by Oxford 
Style Manual and used by Oxford University Press. The PGN/PCGN system was used as it 
stands on the website http://libraries.ucsd.edu/bib/fed/USBGN_romanization.pdf. For the 
same guiding principle of simplicity and the possibility of intuitive reading by non-experts, 
we have made a few simplifications to this system. One was a simplified transliteration of 
‘-ий’ in the endings of Ukrainian surnames and adjectives (Khmelnytsky) to avoid a rather 
clumsy and confusing ‘-yy’ (Khmelnytskyy); likewise, the Russian ‘-ый’ adjectives were 
dealt with as ‘-y’. For similar reasons, it was decided to sacrifice the sign of softness, rendered 
under this system as [’], as well the Ukrainian apostrophe and the Russian hardness sign 
(both transliterated as [”]). The proper names that relate to multiple or ambiguous national 
and cultural contexts (i.e., figures who could be alternatively thought of as representatives 
of one of the cultures (Ukrainian/Russian) or having mixed background (the notable 
Polish/Ukrainian/Russian contexts of Kazimierz Malewicz/Kazymyr Malevych/Kazimir 
Malevich), the more widespread Romanization was preferred to less known alternatives 
for the convenience of the reader, even at the expense of complexity and recognition of 
hybridity. The exception was also made for the proper names that came to be known in 
another transcription (Verka Serduchka). Naturally, these remarks do not concern the 
names and direct untranslated quotations from Slavonic and other languages that use Latin 
graphic where diacritics and language-specific letters were fully preserved: Žižek, Ciążyński, 
etc.
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The particularity of Europe, one could say, paraphrasing what Paul Valéry said about the French, is its claim to universality.1 This is often taken further so that there would be an ‘idea of Europe’, meaning, more or less, universality. Here I will question the notion of 
such an ‘idea of Europe’, looking first at how this idea is put to political use, and then at its 
philosophical underpinnings from the European philosophical tradition. I take as my starting 
point president of the European Commission (EC) José Manuel Durão Barroso’s call for a 
‘New narrative for Europe’ and discuss the response to this call from the EC’s selected cultural 
committee of artists, scientists and intellectuals. I will then show how the resulting narrative is 
not really new – it is the grand narrative of Europe, perfected by European philosophers such 
as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Edmund Husserl. From the vantage point of their 
narratives of Europe, I will present how the idea of Europe was reflected upon by the Czech 
dissident philosopher Jan Patočka, who on one hand preserves the notion of Europe as care for 
the soul, and on the other hand claims that we have entered the epoch of Post-Europe. This 
European care for the soul is thus no longer actively lived, but a notion that Europeans still 
must try to understand through what Patočka presents as a ‘heretical’ philosophy of history.
Barroso and the Cultural Committee: A New Narrative for Europe!
‘A new narrative for Europe’, this is what Barroso called for in various public addresses in 
2013–2014, in Brussels, Warsaw, Milan and Berlin.2 In these speeches, the president of the 
EC prompted intellectuals, scientists and artists for a new narrative in order to ‘breathe life 
in the European spirit’. When searching beyond the mere enthusiasm and grand rhetoric of 
these speeches, what emerges as Barroso’s leading conviction is that Europe is, and should 
be, driven by a humanist telos, which these narratives should convey. In the Milan speech, 
Barroso specifies that ‘[a]t the core of the European vision is the human dignity of every 
human being’.3 So then, while it is in some sense a call for a new narrative, its crucial features 
were perhaps already written. The reasons for requesting a strengthened humanist narrative 
for Europe are apparent: nationalism and racism have been growing stronger in recent years, 
and the nationalists are most often also Eurosceptics.
Following Barroso’s call, the commission selected a cultural committee consisting of 
16 artists, intellectuals and scientists (comprising, among others, the Icelandic artist Olafur 
Eliasson, the Spanish sculptor Cristina Iglesias, the Hungarian writer György Konrád and 
the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas) to answer Barroso’s call for a new narrative for Europe. 
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On 1 March 2014, they responded with a document, ‘The Mind and Body of Europe’, which 
later that year formed the centrepiece of a book (covering also some of the other events 
around the call for a new narrative) published under the same name by Europa Nostra, the 
organization for the preservation of European cultural heritage.4 In this answer, a short text 
with artistic aspirations, the writers play with the idea of Europe as an organism of mind and 
body. One of the first paragraphs reads:
Europe is a state of mind formed and fostered by its spiritual, philosophical, artistic and 
scientific inheritance, and driven by the lessons of history. It must also now become a 
genuine and effective political body that has the ability and sensibility to rise to all the 
challenges and difficulties that European citizens are facing today and will face tomorrow. 
From youth unemployment to climate change, from immigration to data security, the list 
is long, and the urgency is even greater.5
This small paragraph in a way mirrors the construction of the whole text: from Europe as a 
state of mind to the modern history of Europe to the present political body of Europe. After 
a brief introduction, six such short paragraphs follow (the paragraph just quoted being the 
first of those), each starting with the phrase ‘Europe is a state of mind’ in italics. Monotony 
gives a certain rhythmic, maybe organic, sense – perhaps we are sensing the breath of the 
European spirit? After this comes a second part dealing with the historical events of modern 
Europe: the end of the war, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the recent economic crisis. The 
last part of the text comprises four paragraphs, including the phrase ‘Europe as a political 
body’, declaring that European institutions need the sciences, the arts and cultural heritage 
in order to thrive, that is, to embody Europe as a state of mind. The rhythmical construction, 
which loses some of its impetus in the end, gives a sense of a spirit blowing life breath by 
breath into a slumbering, and perhaps even crippled, giant of a body.
Europe is a state of mind, they claim, shared by people throughout the continent, but also 
by many outside who adhere to those same ideals of the sciences and the arts. Yet even if it 
is not stated, it is clear from the sense of urgency of the text that Europe as a political body 
has not reached its full potential. Its potential is what it in a sense really is: its essence. The 
second of the paragraphs on ‘Europe as a state of mind’ reads:
Europe is a state of mind that goes beyond a grouping of Nation States, an internal 
market and the geographical contours of a continent. Europe is a moral and political 
responsibility, which must be carried out, not only by institutions and politicians, 
but by each and every European. Europe is a source of inspiration from the past, it is 
emancipation in the present, and an aspiration towards a sustainable future. Europe is an 
identity, an idea, an ideal.6
The next paragraph adds that the ‘identity, idea and ideal’ of Europe are ‘rooted in its shared 
values of peace, freedom, democracy and rule of law’. An identity is normally not the same 
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as an ideal. What we are, and what we should be, or desire to be, are different things. If we 
were what we should be already, it would be strange to think of it as an ideal. The reader 
might at this point wonder whether all the horrors once instigated by today’s nations of 
Europe are to be forgotten. In passing, however, the authors mention that much of the 
prosperity was built on war and colonial conquest. But this still seems a matter of the past 
since they say that now in the modern era, ‘Europe’s state of mind matured and found a 
balance’. It is the political body that is being criticized between the lines for lagging behind. 
Be that as it may, ‘Europe’ remains the name of the project of universality, universal human 
rights and culture.
Is it really possible, however, to think of the events of colonialism and enslavement as 
a history past? Their repercussions in the contemporary world are undeniable. They have 
helped shape a world of huge differences, of which Western Europe and the European Union 
(EU) have become one of the richest and most peaceful parts. Not surprisingly, many people 
from poorer and war-ridden regions to the east and south of Europe seek refuge here. 
According to the International Organization for Migration, in 2014 alone, 3279 refugees 
drowned in the Mediterranean on their way to the EU; many of those who manage to arrive 
are forced to reside illegally in extreme poverty or are sent back to the dangers they were 
fleeing.7 Here we see the rift between the ‘identity and ideal of Europe’, seemingly unnoticed 
by the cultural committee in its response to President Barroso discussed above. 
For someone like myself, more at home in the history of philosophy than in political 
rhetoric, these notions of an ideal coming to maturity as ‘unity in diversity’, of a spirit 
looming over or uniting the minds of Europe, being fulfilled at a certain point in time, are 
redolent of Hegel, while the idea of a community of minds sharing the idea that anyone 
can become universal and therefore European is reminiscent of Edmund Husserl. Indeed, 
to say that these political declarations are reminiscent of these thinkers is too weak. Hegel 
and Husserl made important contributions to originally thinking these thoughts, setting the 
stage for this ‘new’ narrative of Europe. Before I turn to Jan Patočka’s more unknown and 
critical thoughts on the notion of Europe, I will present the general framework of these two 
thinkers. 
The attentive reader will already have noticed my critical attitude towards the 
romantic historization of Europe and might ask why it is necessary to turn to these 
thinkers, who are admittedly long since dead. Disregarding them is the standard option. 
Since Hegel’s and Husserl’s Eurocentrisms seem even stronger than that of Barroso and 
his cultural committee, why not just leave these old thinkers be, and focus on a future 
for Europe? What makes Hegel and Husserl interesting in this context is that they 
introduced the notion of Europe as a philosophical concept, used to understand the 
seeming paradox of a people who hold universality as their particularity. They try to 
think the history of the universal. Where the ‘new narrative’ unproblematically assumes 
and accepts that universality is a European property, Hegel and Husserl tried to think 
how it was possible that the universal would have a particular origin, and they did this 
under the name of Europe.
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Hegel’s Philosophy of History
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) makes Europe into a philosophical idea. 
This takes place in a certain philosophical context as the expression of the historical self-
reflection of human reason. Arguably, this historical self-reflection starts out as a 
continuation of Immanuel Kant’s Copernican revolution, which entailed viewing reality 
as always already structured by the categories of the subject. To convey René Descartes’s 
rationalist intuitions, yet answering David Hume’s sceptic questions, Kant describes the 
perceived reality as permeated by the structures of reason, for it is as structured by our 
rationality that we perceive it as rational. This means that what was earlier thought of as 
ideas or essences independent of the subject are now seen as categories of human 
understanding. It is thus our construction that makes the laws of logic, mathematics and 
physics valid for our understanding. Yet, Kant holds, the categories of reason and 
understanding are universal and unconditional. Any rational creature must (qua rational) 
perceive and understand the world according to these laws and categories of reason. Kant 
differentiates between the empirical human being and transcendental reason. I, as an 
individual (empirical) person, may think this or that, perceive this or that and thus have 
an individual and specific content to my cognitive-perceptive grasp of the world, but the 
structures of thought and perception remain the same for all rational beings. The historical 
period in which Kant is writing, the Enlightenment, is, in his eyes, the movement in 
which rational beings start making use of their own reason. But this does not mean that 
Kant sees reason and understanding as in any way a creation of European Enlightenment. 
Rather, it is a universal human possibility, finding a particular expression in a specific 
point in time. Kant sees a particular opening in his own time but does not hold that this 
was not possible in other times as well: the universality of reason, according to Kant, 
transcends history.
For Hegel, responding to Kant, this universality of reason cannot be a mere ahistorical 
given. It is a historically attained position; rationality produces itself historically. For Hegel, 
there is thus a certain historical narrative inherent in rationality. But even though this in a 
sense contextualizes reason, Hegel, in no way, gives up the universal claims of philosophy. 
On the contrary, since Hegel demonstrates how universal reason unfolds through history, 
he thereby shows rationality in its historical concretion. It is the nature of rationality 
to provide grounds for thinking, and Hegel’s exposition of European thought purports 
to give the historical ground for rationality itself. The growth of European civilization 
corresponds to a stage of maturity of human rationality. Philosophy moves along with 
the development of humanity through history. It is the ‘grand narrative’ (Lyotard) if there 
ever was one.
Note that European philosophy was not always historically self-reflexive. Aristotle often 
starts his studies by constructing a theme using the statements of previous philosophers 
and scientists. Moreover, Socrates and Plato formulated the first universal claims of 
philosophy in response to the tendency of travelling historians and sophists to relativize 
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morality and reason and declare it to be entirely dependent on position and on culture. But 
even if Plato, Aristotle and Kant sensitively develop conceptions of their own historical 
role in relation to their predecessors, it is only with Hegel that philosophy reflects upon 
the historicity of rationality as such. It was Hegel’s attempt to think a history of reason 
that made possible a philosophical reflection on the role of Europe in the historical 
development of universal rationality. 
Hegel is the philosopher who first attempted to make philosophy into a narrative 
interwoven with the development of history. He argues that philosophy, in order to 
understand its aspiration to the absolute, must also understand its own philosophical and 
historical path to this understanding. In various texts and lectures – most famously, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807 – he describes different stages of humanity’s 
understanding of itself, ordered according to their levels of self-transparency. Even if these 
stages are logically ordered, they are also filled with content. They express an individual 
development of maturity but also the birth of European thought and civilization as aspiring 
to become the ultimately universal thought. It is as if the geopolitical colonization of the 
world had an ideal parallel. Hegel understands the development of universal reason as 
unfolding in the history of European civilization.
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, originally held between 1822 and 1830, 
Hegel focuses on describing a unified history of the world. It is not only history, however, 
writes Hegel in his introduction – it is the philosophy of history: ‘the thoughtful 
consideration’ of history.8 This, Hegel notes, must be differentiated from (1) original 
history, the history told by the ones who experienced the events themselves, or are 
reporting the stories of eyewitnesses, without adding their own reflections. Hegel 
considers the first Greek historians, such as Thucydides and Herodotus, to belong to 
this category. This is, in turn, dissimilar from (2) reflecting history. This history brings 
together different epochs into a unified story, creates an overview, makes compilations, 
highlights nuances and contextualizes. This is what modern historians generally do. The 
ultimate genre of history is, as already stated, (3) philosophical history. This is the most 
refined form of history, which more than the other forms produces that which historians 
promise to give: what has actually taken place. But what actually has taken place is not 
immediately there – it must be constructed and assembled to form a unity, appropriated 
to the movement of concepts out of a manifold of scattered facts. Philosophical history 
brings reason to these facts. It operates from the ‘conviction and intuition […] that the 
history of the world […] presents us with a rational process’.9 In these lectures, Hegel asks 
his audience to listen with the conviction that he, the philosophical historian, already 
has ‘traversed the entire field’ of world history and can therefore present this thesis as a 
result.10 Hegel likens this conviction to the belief in providence, ‘for Divine Providence 
is Wisdom, endowed with an infinite Power, which realizes its aim, viz., the absolute 
rational and final goal of the world; design of the World. Reason is Thought conditioning 
itself with perfect freedom’.11 But it differs from an abstract belief in providence, for it 
must rationally understand the ways of providence in history. In other words, it is not 
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the faith in a ‘divine plan’ that we humble beings are unable to understand – for Hegel, it 
is merely a prejudice that reason would not be able to understand God. ‘In the Christian 
religion God has revealed Himself – that is, he has given us to understand what He is; so 
that He is no longer a concealed or secret existence. And this possibility of knowing Him, 
thus afforded us, renders such knowledge a duty. God wishes no narrow-hearted souls 
or empty heads for his children’.12 This makes Hegel’s philosophical history a theodicy, 
inasmuch as it justifies God by reconciling evil with the thinking spirit. But it is not like 
Leibniz’s abstract and metaphysical promise: the notion of the best of possible worlds. 
Hegel’s philosophical history promises to show step by step how rational Spirit unfolds 
through history. Whatever atrocities were done in the name of progress, they are justified 
by their contributions to progress. 
Barroso’s plea for a new narrative in order to ‘breathe life in the spirit of Europe’ is in a 
sense completely rational in a Hegelian perspective – but also totally unnecessary. Spirit 
unfolds by its self-narration. The story of world history is that of the unfolding of Spirit. 
Unlike matter, it is the nature of Spirit to have its substance in itself. The difference between 
matter and Spirit is that the latter cannot become the object of knowledge of something other 
than itself, whereas the former can only be known by something other, namely Spirit. This 
makes self-consciousness the distinctive mark of Spirit. This mark is there, already in the 
beginning of history, like the seed holding the whole nature of the tree in itself. Therefore, 
Hegel can see the seeds of Europe already in ‘the Orientals’:
The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit – Man as such – is free; and 
because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free. But on 
this very account, the freedom of that one is only caprice; ferocity – brutal recklessness 
of passion, or a mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of 
Nature – mere caprice like the former. − That one is therefore only a Despot; not a free 
man. The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they 
were free; but they, and the Romans likewise, knew only that some are free – not man 
as such […]. The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to 
attain the consciousness that man, as man, is free: that it is the freedom of Spirit which 
constitutes its essence.13
Thus, world history unfolds as a greater consciousness of the freedom of Spirit, which at the 
same time is an increased real political freedom. Hegel views history as moving across the 
earth, moving as the sun from east to west: In Asia, the dawn of history emerges, 
the beginning of everything; Europe is where history really happens; America is the land of 
the future. The American natives are, in Hegel’s eyes, useless to the movement of history; 
hence, America can be seen as pure future, an entirely new continent to cultivate and 
explore. Africa, on the other hand, serves the role of providing Europe with slaves. Within 
this historical dialectics of Hegel, morality and reason are not only regarded as taking place 
here and now but are also to be viewed in the context of their historical progress, their part 
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in the completion of Spirit. This makes Hegel accept slavery (‘in and for itself […] an 
injustice’) as part of an ‘education’ of the Africans, whose fate is actually improved by being 
taken into slavery in America.14 Here Hegel repeats an ancient trope, the idea of natural 
slavery introduced by Aristotle in the Politics. Aristotle held that some people were natural 
slaves, some natural masters, which meant that the slaves benefited from being part of the 
master’s ergon, the work performed by the slaves. Hegel adds a pedagogical and historical 
dimension to this idea – only from coming into contact with Europeans, be it through 
slavery, can Africans grow to their full human potential.
Europe is the continent of Spirit, says Hegel. When comparing the progress of China 
and Europe, he does so most often to counter Europeans who are excited by how advanced 
Chinese science is. With examples from different areas such as mathematics, astronomy 
and inventions, he seeks to show how the Chinese have made some important discoveries 
ahead of the Europeans but have never known what to do with them. It is as if the Chinese 
discoveries did not have the context of a fertile Spirit to give them their destined effect. For 
example, the Chinese may have discovered gunpowder, yet it was the Jesuits who had to cast 
the cannons for them. 
But even if the European Spirit implies progress, this does not prevent it from being, in 
some minor respects, a disadvantage. So for example in the making of porcelain:
[T]he Europeans, just because of their intelligence, have not yet been able to imitate the 
superficial and perfectly natural cleverness of the Chinese. Their preparation of varnishes – 
their working of metals, and especially their art of casting them extremely thin – their 
porcelain manufacture and many other things, have not yet been completely mastered by 
Europeans.15
Thus, the Chinese way of making porcelain is described as a natural, almost animal, skill. 
Europeans cannot make porcelain like the Chinese, just as they never could make honey or 
build beehives like the bees. The Chinese, unlike bees, can be educated; Europe and the 
Europeans appear as a blessing to the world, to which they teach humanity.
What does this have to do with Barroso and his cultural committee? Certainly, Hegel’s 
explicit subordination of everything non-European is on the surface quite different from 
the narrative requested and received by Barroso. But there are also interesting similarities. 
In both accounts, Europe is culture and humanity. The reality of colonialization and 
slavery is not denied, but they are not seen as part of its essential idea, even though 
they contributed to spreading the idea of Europe, helping Europe to become what it 
is. They become part of a maturing process. Hegel believed that the formation of the 
Prussia in which he lived was the utmost formation of Spirit, Spirit coming to itself, and 
accepted the historical costs of this effort. In the text of the cultural committee cited 
above, it is Europe, in the shape of the EU, which is described as having matured and 
now being ready to come to itself: the ideal coming to the identity of Europe, the identity 
approaching the ideal.
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Husserl: Europe as the Community of the Universal
Another voice can be added to the narrative of Europe. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), 
founder of the philosophical school of phenomenology, in 1936 wrote The Crisis of the 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.16 As the title suggests, Husserl finds 
modern science, and indeed modern civilization, to be in crisis. He sees contemporary 
positivist attempts to base science on biological or psychological facts as utterly failed. The 
phenomenological foundation of science instead investigates the original givenness of 
meaning, the phenomenality of things as they appear in different aspects of our lifeworld. In 
this way, the preconditions of meaning can be examined in ever-new layers of meaning, 
corresponding to ever-new structures of a transcendental subject. Unlike Kantian 
transcendentalism, Husserlian phenomenology views itself as a never-ending project of the 
foundation. Crisis stands out in Husserl’s production, for here this project of the foundation 
of meaning takes a historical turn. Husserl wants to show the historical genesis of scientific 
rationality. Much as in Hegel’s critique of Kant, Europe comes into play for Husserl as a 
concept capturing the historical genesis of modern rationality, which in his earlier philosophy 
had been given a more static description.
For Husserl, the essence of European culture lies in the idea of the universal around which 
Europe has been united since the advent of Greek philosophy and mathematics. Europe is 
the philosophic-scientific community, upholding the idea of universality and of a universal 
humanity. In Crisis, Husserl outlines a history of science, from Greece to Galileo to the 
present. He provides a genealogy of universalism, showing how the notion of the universal, 
the idea of reason and the emergence of the universal human being are parts of an event – 
be it an event stretching over 2000 years. For Husserl, the advent of universality, reason and 
humanity coincides with the history of Europe. Where other cultures can be described, it is 
in order to show that they are limited to a certain world view. With Europe, the beginning 
of a universal culture takes place. Europe is of course a culture among others, which can be 
viewed as any other culture, but it is at the same time, according to Husserl, a culture that 
has made the universal to its essence. Unlike Hegel, Husserl does not really take political 
history and analysis of power into account. His interest in Europe is purely an interest in a 
certain community focused on the universal. Europe is the continent of universal science, 
of philosophers, who are ‘the functionaries of mankind’.17 Even though the universal project 
commenced in Europe, this universality can be shared by all. In a much-quoted sentence, 
blind to its own ethnocentrism, Husserl describes that ‘in this broad sense, even the Papuan 
is a man and not a beast’.18 
I think that the reason why this sentence has become so much quoted is that it rather 
effectively shows how aggressive the generosity of universalism can be. The question is: 
what differentiates this statement from the generosity that animates Barroso’s cultural 
committee when describing Europe as a project of universalism that can be shared beyond 
the continent?
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Patočka: Europe as Care for the Soul
Jan Patočka (1907–1977) is perhaps best known as a Czechoslovakian dissident and one of 
the founders of Charta 77. As a philosopher, he made his name as a phenomenologist, an 
inspiring interpreter of both Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. He developed their 
thoughts independently, sometimes under the label of an ‘asubjective phenomenology’. His 
style of writing is often complex, presenting his philosophy hidden in interpretations of 
other philosophers and narratives of political and intellectual history. The title of his most 
famous work, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, published in 1975, in many 
respects, summarizes this philosophical approach, thinking history and its philosophy 
anew.19 Another way to summarize his multifaceted philosophical oeuvre would be to 
capture it in his rather idiosyncratic thesis: the essence of Europe is the Platonic notion of 
the care of the soul. This thesis, encompassing his metaphysical, political, psychological and 
historical philosophy, is what must be understood in what follows. Is this not an odd thesis? 
Does it not mix categories? Why should an ethical practice capture the essence of a continent? 
Another question may pose itself: if the grand narrative is already provided by giants 
such as Hegel and Husserl, why should we listen to this backwater Czech philosopher? 
Zygmunt Bauman ends one of his texts on Europe as follows, ‘It is Central Europe’s memory 
that illuminates Europe’s future. Can you imagine a centrality more central than that?’20 
Bauman finds that it is in the paradoxically diasporic centre of Europe, with its memory of 
fresh wounds and crossed identities, that Europe still has a meaning. My interest in Patočka 
comes from his taking on these grand narratives of Europe, neither disregarding them nor 
simply accepting them point blank, suggesting a different way to approach the question of 
Europe. Perhaps something can indeed be learned by juxtaposing the political declarations 
discussed above with these classical thinkers on Europe, alongside with Patočka’s heretical 
thoughts, keeping in mind the context of the political dissident?
He first addresses the topic of Europe in an essay from 1936, ‘Masaryk’s and Husserl’s 
Conception of the Spiritual Crisis of European Humanity’.21 There, as a young writer, he 
examines the differing approaches of Husserl and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937) 
to what they conceive as the European crisis. Masaryk was the pro-Habsburgian who came 
to be a Czech nationalist, the philosopher who became the father of the nation, the first 
president of Czechoslovakia. Patočka notes that both Husserl and Masaryk find Europe to 
be in the age of a crisis, rooted in the problem of modern subjectivism. But where Masaryk 
just thinks that we need to find our way back to the objective order of things (moral values, 
divine order), Husserl sees subjectivism as a worldview from which there is no return. 
Indeed, Husserl deepens the Kantian perspective on how the world is always given for a 
subject, providing a more flexible structure for constituting the givenness of the world. 
These reflections still lead, however, to a transcendental subject, giving the conditions of 
possibility for there being a subject, and at the same time for a world to be given. Even if 
Patočka does not take up arms with the great Masaryk, his future work on the question 
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of Europe was clearly to take Husserl as a starting point. Also for Patočka, Europe is tied 
to the question of subjectivity. Patočka’s effort in this early review lies in emphasizing – 
perhaps with even more precision than Husserl himself – how Husserl’s Crisis positions 
phenomenology in a global narrative of European culture. The following year he wrote a 
review in German on Husserl’s Crisis, where he establishes this further:
With the Platonic beginning, a totally new principle has thus appeared: turning life 
towards the essentials, establishing science in a general sense, thinking that human 
matters can be improved based on knowledge about them, the great teleological thought 
of West European culture, to which Husserl finally also connects, and of which he is, I 
think, the last original and utterly dedicated servant.22 
Even if Husserl, like everyone else, sees the dawn of European thought in Greek philosophy, 
he puts no great effort into reading these inaugurating texts. Patočka, however, does. This 
becomes a lifelong occupation for him, culminating in Plato and Europe, a posthumously 
published book containing lectures held in his friends’ homes in the late 1970s while he was 
barred from university.23 In these lectures, he repeats Husserl’s idea that Europe is in a crisis, 
and that the solution to this problem somehow must be connected to a deepened 
understanding of subjectivity. However, subjectivity is not understood from the template of 
Husserl’s transcendental subject, but from what Patočka calls ‘the soul’, and from Plato’s idea 
of philosophy as care for this soul. The first lecture ends, ‘Can the care of the soul, which is 
the fundamental heritage of Europe, still speak to us today? Speak to us, who need to find 
something to lean on in this common agreement about decline, in this weakness, in this 
consent to the fall’.24
What is care for the soul? Care for the soul (ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς) or care for the self 
(ἐπιμέλεια ἑαουτοῦ) as Plato also sometimes wrote, is philosophy seen as an activity.25 
Philosophy is the activity of bettering oneself and one’s fellow human beings through the 
examination of life and its preconditions. This must not be understood as the self-centred or 
quietist preoccupation in the ivory tower, but as the philosopher’s active participation in the 
polis. The soul is always understood as a relation, and the philosopher’s care for his own and 
his fellow citizens’ at the same time through his critical questioning. The care for the soul is 
also existential (concerning the individuals’ relation to themselves), metaphysical (regarding 
the relation to that which is, to being and cosmos) and political (pertaining to the relation 
to others in the polis). The quest for self-examination is expanded by the turn to the ideas. 
The knowledge of the ideas is a necessity for knowing and bettering ourselves. Patočka here 
comes close to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s ‘Socratic’ reading of Plato and Wolfgang Wieland’s 
reading according to which the insight into the ideas only shows itself in practice.26 This 
view on philosophy was in a sense overshadowed by the later Platonic school’s ontological 
focus and by the legacy of Aristotelean metaphysics. It was preserved, however, in the Stoic 
tradition and plays a somewhat hidden role in western academic philosophy, even if, for 
example, the mystic tradition and later the existential tradition can be said to be following 
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this lead. Twentieth-century writers such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot made this 
tradition known again to a wider philosophical community.27 
Husserl in one sense takes over this Platonic heritage, but he does so after the subjectivist 
turns of Descartes and Kant. Husserl’s project no longer understands itself as a philosophical 
care of the self, but as a transcendental philosophy of the subject. Wherein lies the difference 
if it is not merely a difference of words? Husserl’s project is a project of foundation where the 
philosopher assumes the responsibility to make sense of the scientific character of science, 
and where science and rationality are assumed to be the core of European thought. This, 
for Patočka, is a too narrow understanding of the core of European thought. The care of the 
self is the attempt to live a life that can be justified. Science is but a part of life, and scientific 
rationality but a part of what it means to live in truth. To reinterpret the Husserlian project 
as being in the tradition of the care of the self, Patočka reinterprets phenomenology. 
Phenomenology is the attempt to understand things from their manifestation rather than 
from a pregiven idea about their essence. That for which the things manifest themselves, 
Husserl named the subject, the ego or the I. To avoid the idea of foundation encumbering 
Husserlian phenomenology, and to reconnect to the Platonic care for the soul, Patočka 
replaces the notion of subject with that of the soul; hence, the ‘asubjective phenomenology’. 
It is not a mere change of terminology; whereas the Husserlian subject is not in the world 
but a pole of the world for which the world manifests itself, the soul is that for which the 
things manifest themselves, yet it is seen as part of the larger structure of the world. The 
manifestation of things as they are is truth, and the soul is thus ‘what is capable of truth 
within man’.28 
From this follows, ‘Care of the soul is fundamentally care that follows from the proximity 
of man to manifesting, to the phenomenon as such, to the manifesting of the world in its 
whole, that occurs within man, with man’.29 To exist as a soul is to relate to the phenomenon 
that shows itself. This can be done in different ways: ‘On the basis that he stands between 
phenomenon and mere existence, man can either capitulate and degenerate into mere 
existence, or he can only then realize himself as a being of truth, a being of phenomenon’.30 
Like most of Patočka’s texts, this is far from political in any clear sense. Yet the notion of 
the care of the soul as living in truth is a buzzword for that time, and in this context signals 
defiance of the Czechoslovakian authorities. It became a key concept for co-founder of 
Charta 77 and future president Václav Havel, whom we will return to below.
Care for the soul is not merely Husserlianism with a Platonic jargon. Patočka wants to 
make a distinction. Phenomenology in his version no longer teaches about the subject 
but about the manifestation of existence.31 Patočka counters the argument that Husserl 
means the same thing, that the subject is nothing but this manifestation. Still, he says, the 
formulation leads to ‘a definitive existent’ – the transcendental subject. Instead, Patočka 
wants to return to what he finds to be Plato’s original question: what is the manifestation, 
the ‘showing’ itself, manifestation ‘in its pure structure’? ‘Subjectivity itself has to show itself 
as something manifesting itself, as a part of a deeper structure, as a certain possibility, which 
is outlined in this structure and indicated as its component part’.32 
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These are tricky passages indeed. Patočka on the one hand wants to focus attention 
on philosophy as a care for the soul, and on the other hand, he wants to pronounce 
a phenomenological philosophy without the subject – in other texts, he calls this an 
asubjective philosophy. Husserl’s conception of the subject as transcendental consciousness 
often misleads, with phenomena thought of as ideas for consciousness, which, according to 
Patočka, is not conducive to the notion of a care for the soul. 
Now – Patočka reminds – the problem stated in the beginning was how to understand 
our situation with the help of philosophy. The next question is then: how can philosophy 
provide an orientation? Towards the ideas, and away from the merely phenomenal, one 
might expect a Platonist to say. But no, Patočka is concerned with ‘that second Platonic act – 
the return back to the cave’.33 Or rather the two movements, out of the cave and back into 
the cave, are really one: the act of philosophizing within the cave.
Patočka anticipates an impatient interruption: Why talk about myths like that of the 
cave? Does it not take us away from philosophy’s real task of clarification, which Patočka 
should be practicing? And what is philosophy? Myths like that of the cave only create 
an image of philosophy as all important, but is that not exactly a myth in itself? Patočka 
counters, myths that contextualize philosophy are founding features not only of the 
tradition of philosophy but also of European civilization as a whole. To argue for this, 
Patočka needs to spell out what he means by myth. He does not mean myth in the sense it 
is often used: as uncritically accepted ideas, such as the ‘myth of uninterrupted progress’. 
These are myths seen from the viewpoint of a self-sufficient rationalism. What Patočka 
understands as myth is not a stage once overcome in thought. It is ‘something without 
which man can hardly live […]. Real myth is truthful’.34 Or perhaps he should have said, it 
is that which lets truth and falseness appear as such. Myth is how the lifeworld articulates 
itself, or reveals itself to us in our culture.35 Greek philosophy must be understood from 
its ‘mythical framework’ – how it conceives ‘human revealedness’. Greek philosophy arises 
from this experience of revealedness, from the human situation of living ‘within the 
revealedness of the whole’.36 
What does this mean? My interpretation of these sometimes rather fragmentary lecture 
comments is that Greek philosophy does not work based on ontological presumptions 
that distance it from its world of myth. Myth provides a background, a history, whereas 
philosophy appears in the possibility to consciously reflect on this mythical background 
in the present. This is how Patočka reads the idea held by Plato as well as by Aristotle 
that amazement (θαυμάζειν) is at the origin of philosophy.37 Philosophy is amazed by 
manifestation and wants to reveal it in its existence and structure. Philosophy sees not 
only what shows itself but also that it shows itself, and from this proceeds the amazement. 
The ground where it stands, in Greek philosophy, is myth. For Patočka’s critical reading of 
Husserl, Greek philosophy proves an important asset since its turn towards the phenomena 
is not one towards the subject. Greek philosophy is concerned with the soul as a domain 
within a domain larger than the soul, a domain not of the property of the soul but that 
of the Gods. Emphasizing and retaining this structure do not imply that Patočka tries to 
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return us to a divine mythology, recreating the structure of presubjective experience in 
new mythological terms. The idea is merely to show that the manifestation of the world in 
the soul takes place in a larger structure in which the soul is rooted, rather than being its 
transcendental foundation (Husserl). 
This provides a background for his reading of Democritus and Plato. According to 
Democritean atomism, man is initially not in truth. But the philosopher can cut through 
the appearances and perceive the world as it is, in its ontological constitution: the world 
as consisting of pure matter, of atoms. The soul also comprises atoms, according to this 
doctrine. Remember, Patočka’s interest lies in the care for the soul – for Democritus, 
the care of the soul is not interesting for the sake of the soul but for the sake of the 
divine, the eternal. This is materialism at its origin, even though Democritus refers to 
the divine as that which gives meaning to the philosophical practice. For Plato, however, 
the insight into the ideas and the practically wise life form are always considered linked 
to each other: 
In Plato, we do not care about the soul so that we might penetrate right into the ultimate 
reasons, to the first causes of everything, and to look into the essence of things. This was 
Democritus’s purpose. To the contrary, we know the world because through this we want 
to care for the soul.38
The Democritean care for the soul is a great influence for mechanism and for an objectivist 
worldview – Patočka talks of it as a rival to Plato’s care for the soul, with strands continuing 
into the Enlightenment. In a sense, Husserl’s scientism and his notion of a transcendental 
subject appear to Patočka as a concession to Democriteanism – the objectifying tendency of 
knowledge gets the upper hand of the project of the care for the soul.
What then is the specifically Platonic (Socratic) legacy?:
Socrates leaves a heritage. Socrates did not help himself, but he helps others. In what way 
can a philosopher who is in such dire straits help others? In a philosophical way, through 
the outline of a city, where the philosopher can live, where the man who is to care for 
the soul can live, the man who is to care for the soul can live, the man who is to carry 
out the philosophical thought that it is necessary to live and think on the basis of insight 
[nahlédnuti], nothing else but that.39
This should not be misunderstood as a self-glorification of the philosophy professor. To 
understand the philosopher’s role here, one must avoid the image of a certain member of the 
philosophical faculty. Neither Patočka nor Plato had a particular profession in mind, but the 
human possibility of leading one’s life in search of truth. The philosopher is a certain human 
possibility, the example being Socrates. By acting as a philosopher, striving for wisdom is in 
his relation to himself, the polis and the cosmos, Socrates is not only the true philosopher 
but also the true statesman, and the true human being, living the best possible life.
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Philosophical Activism: The Legacy of Charta 77
What role did the political context around Patočka play in his interpretation of Plato? 
Patočka was silenced by the authorities, and so he published exclusively in the samizdat 
underground press and only gave talks in private. There is even an uncanny correspondence 
between the Socratic ideal he advocates and his own work as a political dissident: a signer of 
Charta 77, dying in 1977 from a heart attack during a police interrogation.
Charta 77 was established as a protest against the Czechoslovak government imprisoning 
intellectuals and artists, insisting that the government uphold the human rights it had 
acknowledged by signing the Helsinki Agreement. In ‘What We Can and Cannot Expect 
from Charta 77’ (written just before his interrogation and untimely death), Patočka urges his 
fellow citizens to be brave and speak out against violations of human rights, reminding that 
‘submissiveness has never led to relaxations, only to greater severity40’. He finds that Charta 
77 has already had some effect. The cornerstone of Charta 77 lies in its call to speak out 
freely; to live as if the human rights formally ratified by the Czechoslovak government were 
also actually valid – the call to live a moral life despite state repression. Charta 77 becomes 
in a sense Patočka’s attempt to give expression to the care for the soul in a political act: ‘Clear 
conscience and decency have proved to be also a powerful factor of political reality’.41 In this 
text, he refers to Charta 77 as an attempt to ‘strengthen legality’.42 The whole document can 
be read as an effort to take part in effecting what his philosophico-historical writings have 
claimed possible; that the care of the soul not only is an idea but also a historical reality in 
the sense that it exerts real historical power. He can be said to have been right in that the 
Warsaw Pact dissolved a little more than a decade later, even if historians disagree over the 
extent to which the dissident movements were influential and to what degree it was the state 
Communist systems going bankrupt. Whatever the causes were, the legacy of 1989 also 
shows the ambiguity of historical causality. In many narrations of post-1989 events, Eastern 
Europe then became a part of Europe. It was invited into Europe, or reunited with Europe. 
Considering all of Patočka’s writings on Europe, and his insistence that Czech culture open 
up to European universalism, did the event of 1989 not fulfil the dissident’s wildest dreams?43 
However, when reflecting on the concept of Europe, it became more and more necessary 
for Patočka to emphasize that Europe as the project of the soul did not correspond to the 
Europe presented to him in contemporary history. I think Patočka could have regarded 
the present EU referring to itself as Europe in the same way as some Orthodox Jews look 
upon the modern state of Israel. Only the temporality is reversed. While they refuse to 
recognize the state of Israel since it can only exist after the Messiah’s arrival (Israel does not 
yet exist), Patočka could not recognize the present EU as Europe since it no longer relates to 
the project of the care of the soul (Europe no longer exists). 
And how would Patočka have viewed the turn of 1989? Even if he was a dissident in 
the Czechoslovak Republic, one should not immediately assume that this made him an 
advocate of capitalism, or that he would have approved of the neo-liberal policies to come. 
For the most part, his philosophy did not relate to contemporary politics. As for a deeper 
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historico-political analysis, he sees capitalism as moving hand in hand with the loss of the 
tradition of the Platonic care of the soul:
Only the metaphysics of mechanism made possible the typical social phenomena of 
modern times, specifically modern capitalism, growing out of an equally extreme 
objective stance towards human affairs, subjecting human conditions to an equally law-
like calculus and working directly with a mechanical model of human relations.44
It is one of life’s ironies that the great admirer of Patočka and co-founder of Charta 77, 
Václav Havel, became president of Czechoslovakia in 1989 (and then in 1992 of the Czech 
Republic), and during his presidency, implemented one of the harshest and quickest neo-
liberal shock therapies ever. Patočka was no critic of socialism; his political activism focused 
on human rights issues only. In ‘The Philosophy of Czech History’, a lecture held in 1969 at 
the Academy of Socialists, Patočka speaks of Czech culture as inherently democratic, placing 
the Czechs naturally in the socialist bloc. Equally naturally, he remarks, is that the Czechs, 
within this bloc, are particularly insistent on their democratic rights.45
When deciding on how to interpret Patočka’s legacy, Havel becomes interesting on a 
further note. On human rights, Patočka wrote in a credo for Charta 77: 
The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even states, even 
society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment: that they recognize 
something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on 
them, sacred, inviolable, and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule of law 
they seek to express recognition.46
The purpose of Charta 77, Patočka writes, is to remind of a higher authority than the state: 
a person’s moral consciousness.
These words were written in the particular context of Czechoslovakian dissidence. 
However, when Václav Havel, more than 20 years later, defended the NATO (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization) bombings of Yugoslavia in 1999, he leans on a very similar argument. 
In his argumentation, Havel, now ex-president of the Czech Republic, speaks about the 
human consciousness as ‘the ambassador of eternity’. He repeatedly refers to human rights 
as transcending the rights of the state. However, Havel gives this a much more metaphysical 
foundation than Patočka. The final justification is, says Havel, that ‘while the state is a human 
creation, human beings are the creation of God’.47 
However one may feel about these bombings, they are not the core issue here. Nor 
is it about Christianity or about the acceptance of transcendence. Interestingly, in his 
introduction to his translation of Patočka’s Plato and Europe, Petr Lom perceives the 
work to be ‘a challenge to secularism’, expressing the ‘humble awareness that humankind 
is neither the master nor perhaps even the sole custodian of the universe’.48 With these 
words, Lom is clearly intimating a secret Christian message in Patočka’s work. But as 
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will be seen, Patočka has a much more historical and distanced interest in Christianity. 
Indeed, Lom’s conception of Patočka’s religiosity would rather describe what Patočka in 
the first heretical essay conceives as prehistoric culture, where ‘[h]umans are not in the 
center of the world. […] Only in reference to what transcends them are humans given 
their place’.49
The key issue is how transcendence is used in an argument. If we support a bombing by 
saying that human beings are the creation of God, we have left philosophy as the care of the 
soul and critical self-examination far behind. Of course, the roles of the intellectual dissidents 
and (ex-)presidents are different, and in political action, the critical self-examination must 
at some point come to a pause. But when the defence of war acts is crowned with the support 
of a transcendent being, there is a high risk that the political agency becomes unreceptive to 
critical questioning. ‘Nobiscum deus!’ ‘Gott mit uns!’ ‘God (is) with us!’ were battle cries of 
many versions of European imperialist warfare. 
How then is philosophy to deal with that which transcends human affairs? Even if 
Patočka does not claim that God justifies his argument, he could not have denied that 
the same structure pervades his text on Charta 77; only that moral conscience takes the 
place of divinity. In Plato and Europe, Patočka discusses the notion of transcendence, 
arguing that at the heart of philosophy as care of the soul, it ‘tries to negotiate with that 
which rejects every philosophy’, discussing it in the name of something that philosophy 
helped conceptually to formulate such as the absolute.50 Hence, even if philosophy 
concedes to existing transcendent ideals, these ideals were formulated, at least partly, in 
the tradition of philosophy, giving philosophy a key role in its interpretation. This is not 
only a historical obligation. If philosophy is care for the soul, it is a care that negotiates 
this tension between allowing the transcendent to be transcendent and realizing that the 
transcendent needs to be formulated and interpreted anew. This is a role of his heretic 
philosophy of history: not to negate the transcendental but to probe it historically, to 
study its appearance through history.
Patočka’s Heretical Philosophy of History: Post-Europe
This is the reason that Patočka endeavours in the dubious discipline of a philosophical 
genealogy of Europe. He told the story of Europe while living in a bifurcated Europe. 
Czechoslovakia was part of the eastern bloc, a satellite of the Soviet empire, visualizing itself 
not through stories told of Europe of the past but of the future Communist era. And as one 
could read in, for example, an East German Lexikon der Antike, Plato was ‘the founder of 
objective idealism’ and the ‘main representative of the ideology of slave holders’. The GDR 
(German Democratic Republic) author goes on to write, ‘After the rise of Marxist philosophy, 
reactionary bourgeois philosophers used motives from the doctrine of ideas in order to fight 
against Materialism. This occurred […] primarily in the yet today influential movement of 
phenomenology (Husserl)’.51
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These formulations may today cause some amusement, and probably did so in the days 
of their initial reception, even if the humour was darker at that time. Yet it is clear that a 
phenomenologically inspired study of the identity of Europe, building on Plato, the founder 
of the slave-owner ideology and idealism, was seen as a reactionary attack on the materialist 
doctrine, and not an innocent endeavour. As we saw, his later translator Petr Lom interpreted 
Patočka’s philosophy as a religious critique of materialism. And yet even on the surface of 
his thought, he positions himself as a heretic. What are we to understand by his entitling 
his most famous collection of essays Heretical Essays? In the obvious account of Patočka as 
the Czech dissident, Patočka’s heresy consists in his opposition to the historical doctrine of 
dialectical materialism. 
Ivan Chvatík reads this heresy in relation to Patočka’s use of Christianity as a ‘non-
Christian reflection’ of Christianity, ‘thinking Christianity to its end’, ‘taking leave of any 
idea of God as warrant of a totality of meaning’.52 In Chvatík’s view, Patočka’s heresy signals 
his non-Christian rethinking of the Christian legacy, a third form of heresy. A fourth can 
be added: Patočka reads the history of Europe in another way than the master philosophers 
Hegel and Husserl (and Heidegger). 
In my view, Patočka deliberately chooses the ambiguous figure of heresy because he 
intends to be heretical in all of the above senses. In a more general sense, heresy as such 
may be seen as a central tool for a philosophical historian. In the footsteps of Hegel, Patočka 
writes a philosophical history that unlike Hegel’s is devoid of the idea of a quasi-providential 
rationality leading human history. 
For the historically heretic thought of Patočka, Christianity can only be interesting insofar 
as it is a development of the European tradition of the care of the soul. This is found, for 
example, in his late essay ‘Europe and the European Heritage until the End of the Nineteenth 
Century’ (1975). Here Patočka leans on the analyses of major occidental thinkers in order 
to reconstruct an efficient narrative of the history of Europe. He takes as his starting point 
an interesting observation made by Hegel, who had seen Christianity as the ‘Foundation of 
a State’. Nations at war were all of a sudden united in one State, the Holy Roman Empire. Of 
course, there is no such thing as a European state in Hegel’s time or in Patočka’s time:
Europe is not a state, though once it had been one. Europe here means western Europe, 
united once by the crusades against the Islamic world (though, in the Third Crusade, 
also against Byzantium). Though it was war that forged and hardened European unity 
sufficiently that a sense of it persisted, even in the age of European particularism and 
disintegration into sovereign modern States.53
Patočka, who here effectively traces the division into Western and Eastern Europe as well as 
the one between Europe and the Islamic world, agrees with Hegel that European unity had 
a primarily spiritual foundation. But the spiritual unity rested on a political struggle; it was 
dependent on the crusades. It is important to see that what Patočka intends here is spirituality 
in a wider sense (not Lom’s pious Christianity): Patočka is commenting on Hegel, for whom 
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Geist refers to the shared movement of self-reflection. The core of European self-reflection 
is for Patočka Plato’s care of the soul.
After Plato, this spiritual essence of Europe is passed along through new layers of culture. 
Thus, interpreting the works of Seneca and Cicero, Patočka sees the ideals of the care of 
the soul as safeguarded among the intellectual elites of the Roman Empire. The care now 
extends to a care for the legal system. And later, in the Christian Sacrum Imperium, this 
expands to include much broader parts of the population, providing the effect of both 
discipline and inner depth. This continues the tradition of the care of the soul in a new 
form. ‘The care for the soul’, he says, ‘is thus what gave rise to Europe – this thesis we can 
hold without exaggeration’.54
But sixteenth-century Europe enters a crisis: ‘Not the care for the soul, the care to be, 
but the care to have, care for the external world and its conquest, becomes the dominant 
concern’.55 This changes all spheres of the world: politics, business, religion and science. 
Capitalism becomes the ideology that most expresses this concern with ‘having’. And 
Bacon is the thinker best conveying this new spiritual orientation: knowledge is power, and 
only efficient knowledge is real knowledge. Interestingly, and probably under the influence 
of Adorno and Horkheimer and that of Heidegger, Patočka views the Enlightenment 
as mainly in line with this decay of Europe, with an instrumentalizing view of nature, 
including human nature.56
Patočka’s notion of post-Europe implies his view of contemporary society, a society 
where this idea of the care of the soul no longer can be seen to be instantiated in society. 
The concept also expresses a certain irony: The universalization promised by Europe, 
harboured in the very idea of Europe is what in the end-effect made it possible for Europe’s 
dominance to be broken. In a late unfinished work written in German, ‘Europa und Nach-
Europa: Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistige Probleme’/Europe and Post-Europe: 
The Post-European Epoch and Its Spiritual Problems, he elaborates on the loss of Europe. 
Since ‘Europe’ is such a loose concept, he starts out by justifying his particular genre of 
philosophical history:
The following attempt will probably appear unhistorical to the historians, as random 
historical events to the philosophers, and both would complain and hold it to be a mere 
construction. The risk is worth taking, since the objective is to show problems obscured 
by our most immediate difficulties; to dismantle that which is near and make visible that 
which is far away, one needs construction – sometimes even destruction.57
The philosophical quality here lies, I dare infer, in a particular narrative that focuses on a 
philosophical concept as it unfolds in history. Europe is an idea tied to the principle of 
caring for the soul. The story Patočka tells is the attempt to make this idea plausible. But 
philosophy shall not feed mere stories, as is known already since Plato, who explicitly pitted 
philosophy against the narratives of epic poets, rhetors, sophists and historians. Patočka 
seems to anticipate this objection: ‘Philosophical-scientific thought, original and founded in 
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praxis, is no naked and pure vision, but a path from which it goes astray every time it seeks 
a metaphysical finalization [Festlegung]’.58 Here is again the motif of heresy, the necessity of 
heresy against metaphysical finalizations (Democriteanism), thus distancing himself from 
the Husserlian transcendental subject or the Hegelian idea.
But metaphysical finalizations are not only a fault of the idealists; it might well be 
directed also at a Marxist-Leninist view of history. Patočka’s account of Europe is certainly 
not a material history in the normal sense. In the fifth heretical essay, he states, ‘[H]istory 
is foremost a history of the soul’.59 The reference to the soul does not mean that Patočka 
intends to study only the development of the human psyche of individuals. Rather, it is a 
critique of such understandings of material history that neglect the interior development 
of the soul, which is the real matter of history. ‘For that reason, history is almost from the 
beginning accompanied by reflection on history’.60 
Although his approach may seem to be a very idealist account of the history of Europe, 
Patočka does not want to give precedence to ‘real’ or ‘ideal’ factors. His point is not that ideal 
factors were more important in Europe. Patočka does not contest a ‘materialist’ account of 
history; he agrees that the centre of focus for a historical investigation must be power, which 
is, however, not only an economic and objective but also a subjective, or rather ‘collective-
subjective’, phenomenon. This means that history must mainly be a political history, taking 
into account the role and view of the political subject:
European history distinguishes itself in that ‘here the attempt was from the beginning 
made to form the reality at hand, i.e. the appearing [erscheinende] reality through insight 
into the structure of Nature, Soul, Society – that is, through reflection’.61 Patočka’s elegant 
wording describes European history as marked by activism. He presents this as a variation 
of Husserl’s thesis that Europe is a culture of rationality but in fact goes beyond Husserl 
and ends in an understanding much closer to that of Heidegger. The difference being, 
however, that Patočka does not interpret this activism as decadence, as a crisis in itself. 
Patočka starts with the readings of Auguste Comte and Geoffrey Barraclough.62 Comte’s 
idea of a progression from a religious to a metaphysical to a positive worldview is rather 
swiftly dismissed, as Patočka notes that Comte does not try to give any account of the 
meaning of a concept like metaphysics. Instead, Patočka focuses on a critique of Barraclough, 
a historian he generally finds to be overly pessimistic about the European situation.
Barraclough writes that the world’s power centre has left Europe. This was true already 
in the 1960s, and Patočka agrees with the diagnosis but finds Barraclough’s description 
naive in three ways: (1) in a sense, Barraclough presupposes the world to be already 
totally Europeanized, reading, for example, the revolution in China as a modernization 
in the sense of a Europeanization. Patočka asks whether one cannot see a ‘Chinaization 
of certain European cultural elements’ in the Chinese adaptation of Marxism. The idea of 
a unified humanity is European, and it is a typically European blindness to overlook the 
cultural differences; (2) Barraclough uses European historical measures to describe the 
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non-European cultures as if they do not develop on their own accord; and (3) he fails to 
really grasp today’s situation since he cannot see what is slipping away from Europe.63
This critique of Barraclough works excellently as a critique of Husserl – and of Barroso’s 
cultural committee. If universality is talked about in a distinctly European tone, how can 
Europeans simply assume that the Chinese (or the Papuans for that matter) have adopted 
the same universalism?
Patočka sees the world as facing an extreme threat of a lack of resources. He believes 
neither in the Marxist (‘radical-revolutionary’) nor in the liberal (‘empirical-contemporary’) 
analyses of the situation. ‘They cannot really grasp what the reality of post-Europe is about, 
since they are too submerged in European conceptual schemes to find a distance to the 
phenomenon of Europe’.64 Patočka adds to the demise. For example, when commenting 
on an exhibition of contemporary American art, he finds that the element of subjectivism 
that had marked European modern art is gone; there is ‘no attempt of making the invisible 
visible’ since ‘one captures the manifestations of the general intention immediately’. ‘The 
“Decline of the West” of which [this work] speaks is no longer a pessimist prediction, based 
on assumptions of the periodical development of civilizations, but an empirical fact, which 
our work will attempt to explain by means of a historical analysis of ideas’.65
Conclusion: Separating the Identity and the Idea of Europe
Already Hegel and Husserl saw the notion of universality as a historical result, a result of 
human efforts. Even if the community aspect is more emphasized in Husserl, in both cases 
there is a belief in a singular path towards the universal.
Far from the peaceful process visualized in Husserl’s work, and not at all the unitary 
system implied by Hegel, Patočka stresses the constant struggle and renegotiation of the 
universal. This is what he calls ‘care for the soul’. Like Husserl, he chooses to tie this to 
Europe as a philosophical concept, a choice that must now be seen as problematic as it 
retains the confusion of identity and ideal. 
Does all of this have anything to do with Barroso and his Europhoric artists and 
intellectuals? To Patočka, our time was a post-European time. In a sense, this implies that he 
divorces idea and identity; that identity with which we are living in no longer corresponds 
to the idea of Europe. The cluster of institutions today identified by the name of Europe has 
only a historical connection to what he discusses as the idea of Europe. Patočka, however, 
retains a notion of Europe as an idea, Europe as care for the soul. At least in the present 
conjuncture, it seems to me necessary to go even further, and that it would be in the spirit of 
Patočka to do so. Europe needs to be disconnected from the notion of universality and from 
Patočka’s own idea of care for the soul. This does not mean that the idea of the universal 
and the notion of care for the soul need not be ideals for Europe, or that Europe as a project 
should be abandoned. On the contrary, it is necessary in order for the universal values to 
function as an active ideal for Europe. 
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This recalls Plato’s concept of the χωρισμός (chorismos), the separation between the ideas and 
that which they are ideas of. To talk at all about a just person or a just polis requires a notion 
of justice, which has often been seen as creating a gap between the ideal and the sensible. This 
might have been a too far-reaching interpretation of Plato. An idea is that from which something 
becomes understandable as that which it is, and from which the qualities of what is discussed 
can be judged. But things encountered in the world are what they are to a certain extent: they are, 
for example, big or small, good or bad, depending on what they are compared with. The function 
of the ideas is to help us judge things; to see things from the viewpoint of the idea. In order for 
this, there must be a separation (χωρισμός) between the ideas and the sensible things. 
Socrates did not criticize Athens by saying that it did not fulfil the idea of Athens. His 
criticism was based on the fact that it did not correspond to the ideals of a just politeia 
described in the Republic. To criticize the present state of affairs, he conceived the ideal 
politeia. Yet the ideal politeia was based on the common notions of justice shared by the 
dialogue partners of Socrates, and refined through the investigative dialogue. In a similar 
way, in his writings for Charta 77, Patočka did not suggest new ideals for Czechoslovakian 
citizens but demanded that the human rights contained in the Helsinki Agreement signed 
by the Czechoslovak government be respected. 
The fates of Socrates and Patočka show that questioning the moral standards of those in 
power is not always a safe practice. But even if not ideal, the EU is a rather safe place for 
intellectuals and artists. Hence, one could hope for more heresy, as well as for an emphasis 
on the difference between the European idea of universality and Europe as a current 
political actor. For this reason, it is better not to talk of Europe as harbouring the idea of 
universality, and not to confuse ideal with identity. Or to put it otherwise, in order for the 
idea of universality to be Europe’s ideal, it cannot be thought of as constituting its identity.
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Two Europes
In a pioneering work from 1961, Finnish political scientist Klaus Törnudd examined the 
ideological and political motives behind the Soviet Union’s aversion to West European 
regional cooperation.1 Törnudd diagnosed Soviet responses to virtually all integration 
efforts in the non-Communist part of the continent, from the interwar period and the 
immediate aftermath of World War II (the European Congress took place in 1948 and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] was founded in 1949) to the establishment in 
1957 of the European Economic Community (EEC; today’s European Union [EU]). He 
found that Moscow interpreted all the reasons that West European leaders advanced for 
European unity and integration as signs of aversion and conflict. For instance, if European 
leaders hailed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – launched 
on 9 May 1950 by French foreign minister Robert Schuman and formally established with 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris a year later – as a step towards inter-European reconciliation 
and peace, Soviet commentators saw it as a scheme for the rearmament of France and West 
Germany and hence as an act of aggression.2
Törnudd was discouraged by the incompatibility between the views of European 
integration disseminated in the two parts of the divided continent. His conclusion, in 
the very last sentence of his book, speaks for itself: ‘The basic difficulty is that there is no 
agreement even as to what exactly is reality’.3
If there were two Europes at this period in time – and few would deny that this was the 
case – this also meant that they did not agree on the same ‘reality’. European integration 
had entirely different meanings on the two sides of the divide. That is to say, there existed 
at this point in history two fairly well-defined geopolitical narratives about the future of 
Europe. The first one projected a common socialist future that would be realized when the 
Western working classes overthrew capitalism in their respective countries and gradually, or 
through sudden revolutionary action, built a society modelled on the at-the-time apparently 
successful Soviet system. The second narrative projected a continuation of an allegedly 
progressive history of political emancipation and capitalist industrialization and trade, 
which would little by little bring to all Europeans the prosperity and welfare enabled by 
West Europe’s economic and cultural dynamism.
Interestingly, these geopolitical narratives also entailed two opposing versions of 
the global future and Europe’s contribution to it; this is what my title evokes as ‘clashing 
internationalisms’. According to the first, the socialist states of Eastern Europe would help 
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dismantle an allegedly evil system of imperialist exploitation and colonial oppression, and 
instead institute socialism on a global scale. According to the other narrative, Western 
civilization would soon come into its own, shed its parochialisms and racist prejudices and 
bring ‘social and economic development’ to the poor populations of what was now called 
the Third World.4
For a long time, these two narratives mutually reinforced each other in the sense that 
the stronger one of them appeared, the easier it was for the other one to justify itself as 
indispensable to the protection of human civilization against the dangers of its evil 
opponent, and vice versa. The antagonism between these geopolitical narratives was, of 
course, conditioned by two opposed ideologies – for lack of space, I will call them Marxist-
Leninism and liberalism. This ideological antagonism, in turn, is generally referred to as a 
feature of the cold war. Sometimes it is even seen as one of the causes of the cold war as such.
The Function of Geopolitical Narratives
This chapter aims to explore Soviet and East German geopolitical narratives about West 
European integration at the formative moment of the EU, that is to say, when the organization 
was founded in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. This objective is relevant for at 
least two reasons that also help situate the present chapter in relation to other contributions 
in this collection. First, by looking at two contradictory geopolitical narratives of Europe – 
in their most intense and extreme forms, as it were – my chapter contributes to an 
understanding of the contents, forms, functions and effects of such narratives. Second, and 
as I shall contend in detail below, my objective offers access to historical arguments and 
disputes that still today, tacitly or openly, inform Russian and East European assessments of 
European integration, and this regardless of whether these assessments are dismissive of or 
enthusiastic about the EU. As I will show, both these reasons hinge to no small extent on the 
perceived global role and colonial agenda of the (West) European integration project at the 
time of its foundation.
My empirical material consists of significant analyses from Moscow, all of them found in 
official and quasi-official publications. Above all, I will discuss a text by the Russian expert 
on European affairs and international economics Georgiy Skorov. Published shortly after 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome, this text presents a comprehensive analysis of the EEC’s 
colonial agenda from a Soviet point of view. I will also refer to material from the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), mainly the newspaper Neues Deutschland, mouthpiece of the 
ruling party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, but also books and pamphlets 
published in the GDR that dealt with the EEC shortly after its foundation.5 As we shall see, 
the GDR material is largely derivative of the Soviet discourse, and at the same time, and 
for obvious reasons, focused more on the EEC’s implications for the division of Germany. 
It should also be said that my GDR sources are of a more journalistic kind and hence less 
authoritative than the Moscow sources as regards the official stance of the East European 
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bloc vis-à-vis West European integration. This mirrors the actual situation at the time in the 
sense that it was Moscow that set out the terms of the debate.6
In saying that I am examining geopolitical narratives, I must underline that I am not 
focusing on the political history and foreign policy of either the EEC or the Soviet Union 
and its satellite states. Obviously, my remarks are informed by cold war history and politics, 
but my contribution does not fall within that field of research but rather within that of 
critical cultural studies, or what may be termed ‘ideology critique’. Hence, I am concerned 
with geopolitical narratives in the strict sense. Such narratives may be defined as derivatives, 
interpretations, mediations or popularizations of geopolitical analysis and doctrine. I will 
thus be dealing with narratives that serve to define the very meaning of Europe by relating 
it to a global constellation of power. More specifically, I will analyse two narrative ways of 
‘signifying Europe’ with reference to the force field of geopolitics.7
Of course, these two narratives were not the only ones on offer in public debate and 
political analysis of international relations and geopolitics. They were the dominant ones, 
comparable to what narratology and narrative analysis conceive of as ‘master narratives’, 
which are characterized by their ability to structure reality through their often compelling 
simplicity.8 Although it is true, for instance, that Polish and Yugoslav analyses of West 
European integration did not fully conform to Moscow’s perspective, and although it is 
also true that not even Moscow’s view of European integration was monolithic, immutable 
or unburdened by contradictions, it remains incontestable that – as geopolitical frames of 
understanding global power relations – the two narratives that I will be dealing with were 
the ones that carried political and ideological agency. A much more simple way of putting 
this is to say that geopolitical narratives are by nature totalizing, sucking up the lives and 
deaths of human populations, as well as all cultural and political differences, into a set of 
abstractions and generalities that aspire to explain the very course of human history, and 
thereby also – as I will return to at the end – to govern history. 
This perspective necessitates a note on the general relationship between geopolitics and 
European integration. For it may be said that European integration was from its very outset, 
as it took shape after World War I, a geopolitical project. This is also the way in which the 
earliest advocates of pan-European collaboration viewed the matter. Reflecting both the 
aggressive lust for imperial expansion and the nervous obsession with Europe’s uncertain 
fate in a new global situation after 1918, geopolitical science in its original sense was a theory 
that envisioned the world order as a struggle between various polities.9 It saw states as 
dynamic and transmutable, owning specific quantities of energy and vitality often measured 
in population and production figures, which were subsequently translated into territorial 
reach. The ‘vital force’ of a certain polity would thus also determine what ‘space’ or ‘scale’ it 
needed to adequately develop its capacities. In geopolitical theory, political boundaries were 
unfixed and turned into elastic demarcations, shrinking or expanding depending on the 
force of a particular state and on the counter-force exerted by its neighbours and enemies.
The outcome of World War I, with the imperial expansion of Europe’s nation states 
curbed by the emergence of new global powers to the east and the west, made European 
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debate and politics ripe for geopolitical speculations and calculations as to the future of 
the comparatively small and fragmented European states, which now had to look for new 
ways of ensuring the development and progress of their populations and economies. In this 
perspective, the integration of Europe’s productive capacities was imperative. This is how 
political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, the inventor of the concept of geopolitics, described the 
dire situation of Europe in 1914: 
The European federation has not yet been seriously placed on the agenda, but it carries 
an old legacy; and what used to be a vague idea is now emerging as a necessity in the 
interest of Europe’s self-preservation. Only through union [or amalgamation] can the 
present European states remain resistant to their rapidly growing adversaries, which 
already count their territories in two-figure millions and their populations in three-
figure millions while they at the same time are self-sufficient in food production. We 
can already witness the shadows of the American, Russian and Yellow perils being cast 
over our continent. Thus, has Europe come under pressure that in due time will win out 
over the mighty facts and traditions that still split Europe into several sovereign small 
parts.10 
As outlined by Kjellén, the European integration project was justified by references to 
internal dysfunctions as well as to a number of external pressures, one of these being the 
‘Russian peril’. Several other statements from the same period also call Russia and the ‘East’ 
or the ‘Orient’ the great opponent, in the face of which Europeans must either unite or 
perish. Kjellén’s statement too reveals how geopolitical narratives function. Basing 
themselves on an algebra of power that correlates the inherent capacities and means of 
production of a specific community (its vital force) to the territory and resources under its 
command (its scale), such narratives delineate a history of political and civilizational 
expansion and integration or one of decline and disintegration. Often such narratives also 
come with this or that exhortation and legitimation regarding the necessity of holding on to, 
consolidating or conquering territories and resources.
Now, the statements I will discuss in order to reveal an East European geopolitical 
narrative about West European integration function in comparable ways. They recognize 
the inherent capacity of West European capitalism to expand across new markets and find 
new margins of profit through more efficient forms of labour exploitation and resource 
extraction. However, they also identify the limitations and contradictions of that expansion, 
which will eventually lead to the downfall of capitalism as such and of the states and classes 
that have benefitted from it.
This also goes to say that geopolitical narratives are typically stories about struggle, usually 
of a heroic kind. They portray a protagonist locked in zero-sum games for scale, reach, space, 
resources, dominance and hegemony. Since such phenomena also appear to be what ignites 
historical conflicts of various kinds, geopolitical narratives are often confused with political 
history in general. Yet political history – at least in the more stringent and nuanced form 
07510_Ch03_p063-092.indd   68 4/4/17   5:53 PM
Clashing Internationalisms
69
that we should expect from it – can have no such clear-cut protagonists and antagonists as 
geopolitical narratives do. This difference is fundamental, which, of course, does not prevent 
history writing from frequently assuming the form of geopolitical narratives; thereby 
revealing a taking of sides or a willingness to serve or justify this or that historical subject 
or geopolitical agent. Historical accounts of European integration offer rich illustrations of 
such amalgams of a heroic geopolitical narrative mode and a more rigorous historiography. 
That this is the case should not surprise anyone, for just as conventional history tends to 
legitimize power, historical accounts of European integration normally take for granted, as 
an article of faith, the existence of a progressive historical agent called Europe. In the case 
of Kjellén’s early geopolitical theory, this agent vies for its survival as a sustainable political 
community against ‘the American, Russian and Yellow perils’. Similarly, a specifically heroic 
‘European subject’ figures as a protagonist in former president of the European Commission 
Manuel Barroso’s call in 2012 for a ‘new narrative for Europe’, which immediately activated 
the geopolitical dimensions involved in a European project that celebrates its ability to 
impose its soft civilizing power on the rest of the world.
West European Integration and Soviet Internationalism in the Hour of Suez
Even just a quick glance at the historical material reveals that geopolitical competitiveness 
was at the fore in the debate surrounding the foundation of the EEC. Again, European 
integration was here explicitly asserted as a way of withstanding external ‘perils’. The Suez 
crisis in 1956 offers an instructive example. It cast West European integration as a polarizing 
venture in relation to a set of clearly identified antagonists, the Soviet Union being the most 
serious of these.11
In July 1956, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had nationalized the Suez Canal 
Company, until then controlled by the UK and France, who, in late October and early 
November, along with Israel responded to the nationalization with a military invasion. 
The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, threatened with war if the attack was not halted. The 
US president, Dwight Eisenhower, for his part, was furious because his allies had planned 
the attack on Egypt without his knowledge. Taking it as a ‘personal slap in the face’, the 
Eisenhower administration immediately demanded a ceasefire while at the same time 
throwing the UK into a severe financial crisis.12 
But the UK, and especially France, insisted on teaching the uppity Nasser a lesson. 
For many, a new world war seemed to be looming. On 5 November, Moscow dispatched 
telegrams to US, French and UK leaders, and in the evening a threatening message was 
publicly transmitted in a Moscow broadcast by the Soviet prime minister, Nikolay Bulganin, 
to his UK counterpart, Anthony Eden: ‘In what position would Britain have found herself 
had it been attacked by more powerful states possessing all kinds of modern weapons of 
destruction? […] We are full of determination to crush the aggressor and re-establish peace 
in the East by using force’.13
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The message gained credibility and incited fear due to simultaneous developments in 
Hungary, where, only days before, the Red Army had intervened and brutally suppressed 
uprisings in Budapest in ways that made the Soviet threat real to all West European leaders. 
At this critical juncture, the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, decided to ignore 
the German Social Democrats’ strong admonition to the contrary and go on a long-planned 
visit to Paris to sort out outstanding matters in the ongoing negotiations on the EEC with 
France’s prime minister, Guy Mollet. As Adenauer’s train arrived at Paris’s Gare de l’Est 
on the morning of 6 November, a large crowd welcomed him. He was given a salute by 
honorary guards, and national anthems were played.14 The symbolic message to the world 
was unmistakable: for the sake of European unity and Europe’s geopolitical interests, West 
Germany rallied to the support of France’s campaign in Egypt.
But it was for naught. The same night Anthony Eden phoned Mollet, informing 
him that he was forced to bow to US pressures and that the UK agreed to a ceasefire. 
Mollet was floored. In the history books, the Suez crisis has sometimes been described 
as a second Waterloo, this time not only for France but also for the UK and for colonial 
Western Europe as a whole. The crisis confirmed that the global balance of power had 
fundamentally shifted.
After Mollet hung up, Adenauer, who was present in the room, tried to comfort his 
friend, saying:
France and England will never be powers comparable to the US and the Soviet Union. 
Nor will Germany. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the 
world; that is to unite to make Europe. England is not ripe for it but the affair of Suez 
will help to prepare her spirits for it. We have no time to waste: Europe will be your 
revenge.15 
‘Europe’ as a means of revenge? On this night in Paris, in light of the events in Budapest and 
even more of the unfolding European defeat in Suez, the basic understanding between 
Mollet and Adenauer was further solidified. Four months later, the EEC, the foundation of 
today’s EU, was established with the signing of the Treaty of Rome.
It was the pact between Adenauer and Mollet that enabled and formed the basis of the 
EEC and the Treaty of Rome. But the question remained whether the EEC would have been 
created without Nasser, or at least without the alternative future advocated by him and the 
anti-colonial movements of pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism. These movements, which 
from now on could count on Soviet backing, had links to the independence struggle in 
Algeria and had assumed leading roles in the so-called Bandung group, through which 
newly independent Third World countries demanded their right to choose their own 
political path.
To prevent this future from materializing, the statesmen of Western Europe realized that 
they had to join forces and promote European unity so as to facilitate the establishment 
of common European institutions and actions on the world stage. All of the actions and 
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decisions surrounding the creation of the EEC in the 1950s had a geopolitical undertone: 
Europe could regain its global influence only if it chose to unite.
When the EEC was formed, it was not due to a desire for peace. If peace and security 
had been the primary goal of European leaders, then NATO would have been sufficient, an 
alliance that since the late 1940s, and especially since the entry of West Germany in the mid-
1950s, had given West European states the best guarantee possible against war between and 
among them. The threat was now the Soviet Union and, by extension, all those nations that 
risked falling under the thrall of Moscow, the anti-colonial independence movements and 
various charismatic and more and more globally recognized leaders, such as Nasser, Ahmed 
Ben Bella, Kwame Nkrumah, Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno and Patrice Lumumba, to mention 
but a few. Indeed, the outcome of the Suez crisis was a triumph for Khrushchev, who had 
gambled successfully with the nuclear threat. 
Four years after the crisis, speaking in the UN General Assembly, Khruschev again 
lectured Western politicians and diplomats on the lessons of Suez and anti-colonialism: 
‘We must take a shovel and dig a deep grave, and bury colonialism as deep as we can, 
and drive in a stake so that this evil may never be reborn.’16 Apparently, the Soviet Union 
was by now ready to champion the self-determination of the peoples of the Third World 
still under Western colonial dominance or in the process of liberating themselves from 
it. Under Khrushchev’s leadership and after, the Soviet Union cultivated new allies 
in the Third World. Soviet leaders displayed strong support for Third World regional 
cooperation. They backed Lumumba and Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism as well as the 
Bandung initiative’s anti-colonial efforts, not to mention the Kremlin’s predilection for 
Cuba’s regional initiatives after Castro’s revolutionary takeover. The Soviet Union also 
built a new Friendship University in Moscow to bring in talents from Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East.17 One kind of regional cooperation met with Moscow’s strong aversion, 
however – the West European kind.
This hostility was unmistakable in early 1957, when it became clear that negotiations 
between France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands would 
result in the establishment of a new West European organization, the EEC. Mainly geared 
towards economic cooperation, the EEC also had strong political, cultural and geopolitical 
dimensions. Moreover, its sister organization, the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), was tasked with coordinating the development of nuclear energy among the six 
member states. In January 1957 (the treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom were signed 
in Rome on 25 March), the party magazine Novoye Vremya (New Times) published a series 
of commentaries on the EEC. As one author wrote:
It is a tangle of contradictions, economic absurdities, fond hopes and fantasy. It is a 
cumbersome and unwieldy undertaking inspired by a feeling of despair in a situation 
charged with economic troubles, by attempts to tone down the resentment against 
imperialist adventurism. Measured against economic and political realities, it makes no 
sense.18
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Soviet commentary in the winter and spring of 1957 greatly emphasized that the EEC was 
both inadequate to its tasks and destructive for the world. The organization would aggravate 
capital–labour conflicts within the six founding states, place the participating countries 
under the dominance of West German industry and business circles, enable West German 
militarization and prolong West Europe’s imperial dominance in Africa and elsewhere. 
Borisov stated in an article:
The realization of this plan is connected with the efforts to strengthen the military 
imperialistic bloc of the western countries. This bloc is directed against the camp of peace 
and democracy, against the vital interests of the labour movement, against the struggle of 
national liberation in the colonies and dependent countries.19
Throughout 1956 and 1957, the Soviet political and economic press were filled with 
commentaries on Euratom and the EEC, the latter being commonly understood, just as in 
West Europe, as standing on two legs: the common market or customs union, and the so-
called Eurafrica plan, which entailed the integration of the colonies for the stated purpose of 
improving their economic and social development.20 The most authoritative Soviet reactions 
came from the foreign ministry, published in Pravda on 17 March 1957, and from the 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Soviet Academy 
of Sciences, published in June and August of that same year by the journal Kommunist and 
subsequently disseminated in West European languages.21
Lenin versus Coudenhove-Kalergi
Before examining these statements, however, we should recall that the Soviet government 
already had a well-developed standpoint – and narrative – on European integration under 
the conditions of capitalism. This was the Leninist doctrine on the ‘United States of Europe’, 
which Lenin had formulated in 1915, a year into World War I. Referring to the war, which 
many saw as the ultimate breakdown ensuing from the senseless competition between 
Europe’s imperial states, Lenin drew the following conclusion: ‘From the standpoint of the 
economic conditions of imperialism – i.e., the export of capital and the division of the world 
by the “advanced” and “civilised” colonial powers – a United States of Europe, under 
capitalism, is either impossible or reactionary’.22
That such a union was unsustainable, and hence in the long run impossible, as Lenin 
put it, was because capitalism entailed an ever-fiercer competition between the capitalist 
trusts of Europe’s imperial states, and this would eventually lead to a struggle to the death 
for new markets and resources between these states. In the short run, however, some basis 
for European unity could be established through a settled agreement on how to carve up 
the non-capitalist world and prevent it from falling under the influence of non-European 
powers; this, then, was the scenario that Lenin designated ‘reactionary’. As Lenin argued, a 
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‘United States of Europe under capitalism is tantamount to an agreement on the partition of 
colonies’. He went on to explain: 
Of course, temporary agreements are possible between capitalists and between states. In 
this sense a United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the European 
capitalists […] but to what end? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in 
Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty against Japan and America, who have been 
badly done out of their share by the present partition of colonies, and the increase of whose 
might during the last fifty years has been immeasurably more rapid than that of backward 
and monarchist Europe, now turning senile. Compared with the US, Europe as a whole 
denotes economic stagnation. On the present economic basis, i.e., under capitalism, a 
United States of Europe would signify an organisation of reaction to retard America’s 
more rapid development. The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was 
associated only with Europe alone have gone forever.23 
Lenin went on to contrast this option to the prospect of a truly global integration. He argued 
that a United States of the World, but ‘not of Europe alone’, would be possible, although the 
notion itself was redundant since it would amount to the same thing as socialism.24
Now the global situation after World War I seemed to confirm Lenin’s 1915 analysis at 
least in part. A fatigued and crisis-ridden Europe had to face the prospect of its diminishing 
global significance compared to the rising powers: the US and the new Soviet Union. In 
this situation, Kjellén’s geopolitical prognosis gained relevance, and European leaders and 
thinkers placed European integration, a United States of Europe, high on the agenda. The 
Italian geopolitical theorist Paolo d’Agostini Orsini di Camerota asserted that Europe had 
become old and in desperate need of injections of fresh energy and blood.25 European 
integration thus found its real support only after the spiritual shock, economic collapse 
and political destruction inflicted by the Great War. In this post-catastrophic atmosphere 
of anxiety and pessimism, where nationalist hubris was defeated and imperial Europe was 
perceived as being in decline, the grand geopolitical narrative of European integration took 
shape. ‘Europe no longer rules in the world’, wrote Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset 
in 1929.26 As the demographer Lothrop Stoddard stated in his influential 1922 (and 1935) 
work, World War I and the ensuing reorganization of world politics amounted to a collapse 
of the political universe, which ‘in one cataclysmic event’ had lost the sun around which the 
planets moved in cosmic harmony. That sun was the ‘European comity of nations’, now being 
replaced by terrifying geopolitical processes that the title of Stoddard’s book summed up as 
The Rising Tide of Colour Against White World-Supremacy.27 A number of European thinkers 
of the interwar period – from Oswald Spengler and Martin Heidegger to Edmund Husserl 
and Paul Valéry – expounded similar views. They were reflected in policy proposals and 
political initiatives that aimed to save the position of Europe and the white race by reigniting 
its dynamism and bolstering its growth through a more thorough integration of the resources 
under its control. If this did not happen, there would be disintegration and destruction.
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The most influential of these proposals for European integration was presented by 
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in his 1923 pamphlet, Paneuropa. This booklet launched 
his Pan-European Union movement, which was to gather both sizeable and influential 
intellectual and political support from the best and the brightest of his generation, 
including Nobel laureates Albert Einstein, Gerhart Hauptmann, Selma Lagerlöf, Thomas 
Mann, Nathan Söderblom, as well as statesmen like Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, 
Ignaz Seipel, Karl Renner, Joseph Caillaux and Aristide Briand. For Walter Lipgens, the 
leading scholar on the history of European integration, Paneuropa was by far the most 
important of the many proposals for European collaboration of the 1920s. Moreover, this 
pamphlet largely mirrored the world view of internationalists and liberal progressives of 
the era.28
According to the Pan-European movement, a united Europe was paramount for political 
reasons, or simply to prevent a repetition of World War I. This was the argument for peace. 
Or as Coudenhove-Kalergi proclaimed: ‘The alternatives today are clear: Pan-Europe or 
war!’29 A united Europe was desirable also for cultural reasons, as history seemed to indicate 
that Europe made up some sort of civilizational unity. ‘Pan-Europe should be the political 
expression of the European cultural community’, Coudenhove-Kalergi explained. All the 
‘linguistic nations’ of Europe would be gathered into ‘one single racial nation’, just as the 
pan-Hellenic movement in ancient times brought together the city-based polities of Greece 
‘into one great nation for all Hellenics’. Pan-Europe’s self-proclaimed ‘cultural aim’ was thus 
‘the self-knowledge of the European race as an occidental nation’.30
Perhaps most important, the Pan-European movement put forward a third, economic 
argument for continental integration. The organization’s economic programme, authored by 
the economist Otto Deutsch, listed three imminent threats to the European economy: ‘the 
danger of a collapse of all industries’ without close access to raw materials; ‘the danger of a 
complete impoverishment of the European population because of increasing unemployment, 
decreasing production, capital export and indebtedness’; and ‘the danger that the European 
economy in general will become completely dependent on North American capital’. As a 
remedy, Deutsch outlined an economic programme that would abolish trade barriers and 
economic imbalances such as those caused by the reparations forced on Germany by the 
Treaty of Versailles. The programme also proposed a planned economy as well as a thorough 
‘Taylorization of the European industrial totality’.31 However, this would not suffice to 
catch up with the rapidly growing US and Soviet economies. These countries enjoyed the 
advantage of organizing their economies on a continental scale, thus making them self-
sufficient for most raw materials and providing greater markets for the sale of their products. 
Accordingly, the Pan-European economic zone suggested by Deutsch also presupposed, as 
‘an indispensable supplement’, ‘the communal exploitation of the Pan-European colonies 
from an economic viewpoint’.32
Gradually, then, the economic perspective became a geopolitical one that touched 
on the sensitive issue as to whether Europe would ever again attain its global influence. 
In this context, the African continent was seen as a necessary condition for economic 
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recovery and also as a sufficient reason for European unification. The Pan-European 
strategy designated Africa ‘Europe’s plantation’, a reservoir of agricultural produce, 
subsoil mineral resources and hydroelectric power. Coudenhove-Kalergi certainly spoke 
for the majority of Europe’s political and intellectual elite when he in 1929 pushed for a 
Pan-European colonial management of Africa and recounted what Africa offered: ‘Africa 
could provide Europe with raw materials for its industry, nutrition for its population, 
land for its overpopulation, labour for its unemployed, and markets for its products’.33 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s arguments for assimilating Africa converged into one big argument 
for the unification of Europe. The common or synergetic exploitation of Africa was so 
unquestionably attractive and beneficial that it constituted in itself a reason for European 
states to make common cause. A geopolitical calculation based on two symbiotic 
benefits emerged: the new geopolitical sphere of a united Europe would be sustainable 
and prosperous thanks to its incorporation of Africa, and correspondingly, the bonds 
between once-antagonistic European states would be strengthened by the shared goal of 
developing Africa. As Coudenhove-Kalergi proclaimed: ‘The African problem thus brings 
us back to Europe. Africa cannot be made available if Europe does not unite’.34 In short, 
Europe’s unification would start off in Africa. The joint European colonization of Africa 
was highlighted in Article 13 of the draft of a Pan-European pact of 1930 as one of the 
organization’s defining priorities: ‘All European citizens shall enjoy equal economic rights 
in the tropical colonies of Africa’.35
If all this served to confirm Lenin’s analysis – ‘The United States of Europe under 
capitalism is tantamount to an agreement on the partition of colonies’ – it was, of course, 
ironic that European integration would find another major raison d’être in the undisguised 
fear of Lenin’s own Russia (now the Soviet Union), which by this time had become capitalist 
Europe’s worst danger. Indeed, the Pan-European organization as a whole was from its 
very beginning marked by Russia’s geopolitical pressure. ‘The whole European question 
culminates in the Russian problem’, stated Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923:
The main goal of European politics must be to prevent a Russian invasion. There is only 
one way to avoid this: the unification of Europe. […] Europe’s only prudent politics is to 
follow a politics of peace – but also to insure itself against all eventualities. Such insurance 
can be successfully attained only through the shared responsibility of all European states 
for the Russian–European border; through a Pan-European defence pact against the 
Russian peril.36
The same tenor characterized all other major interwar proposals for European integration. 
They were modelled on a geopolitical analysis that drew a divide between a Eurafrican 
sphere containing West Europe and Africa, and a Eurasian sphere dominated by Soviet 
Russia. Given the anti-Russian and anti-Soviet edge of the pan-European organization 
and similar proposals, it is not surprising that it was severely criticized by Moscow. When 
Maksim Litvinov, the people’s commissar for foreign affairs, addressed the League of 
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Nations in 1931, he noted that European integration plans obviously were not based on 
geographical location but applied only to states with a specific ‘social and political system’. 
He added that it was ‘incomprehensible and surprising that a group of European states 
should arrogate to themselves the right to decide on the admission or non-admission of 
another group of European states into a community which claims the title “Pan-
European”’.37
Interwar European integration plans thus tended to include colonial Africa but to exclude 
Russia.38 At the same time, the necessity of including and exploiting Africa and of showing 
a unified front against the Soviet Union was itself presented as an argument for European 
integration. Both of these geopolitical issues – ‘Eurafricanism’ and ‘anti-Sovietism’ – 
were components of the Pan-European organization’s make-up. They would turn out to 
be unexpectedly persistent as efforts to secure imperial control of Africa and to protect 
Western Europe from Russia would be part of propositions for European integration also 
after World War II. It is no surprise, then, that both Africa and Russia feature strongly in 
the rhetoric and negotiations discourse surrounding the establishment of the EEC.
The observations I have made above seem to support a conclusion made some forty years 
ago by political scientist Mathias Mossberg. Focusing on Soviet reactions to the EEC, he 
underlined that the Soviet leaders had reasons to perceive the EEC as a hostile organization 
which would entrench cold war antagonisms on European territory: 
Given the background that one of the main aims of earlier European integration efforts 
was to strengthen West Europe against the Soviet Union, that the West had been unwilling 
to recognize the Soviet Union as part of Europe and that the Soviet Union had been 
excluded from certain international organizations that are European in orientation, it is 
almost inconceivable that the Soviet Union could have welcomed the founding of the EEC 
as a positive occurrence in the international arena. The political nature of the EEC was 
not to be mistaken, and it was absolutely clear that the West regarded the establishment of 
the EEC and EURATOM as a crowning achievement of earlier integration efforts, which 
to varying degrees had been directed against the Soviet Union.39
‘A Policy to Divide Europe’: Moscow Responds to the EEC
The detour via Lenin’s theory of imperialism and the interwar blueprints for a unification of 
Europe with African support helps us understand the geopolitical narrative about the EEC 
disseminated in the Soviet Union and East Europe in the late 1950s. Here it is appropriate to 
begin with an analysis by IMEMO, under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, published in June 
1957. The authors first identify the initiators behind the Treaty of Rome: 
The agreements on the Common Market (with ‘Eurafrica’) and ‘Euratom’, therefore, 
mean, in essence, an agreement among monopoly capitalists to form even more 
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powerful cartels, conglomerates and trusts of banking and industry in the six states 
concerned. The governments have ratified these agreements; however, they do in no 
way benefit the interests of the people’s majority. The people have not even been asked 
about their opinion. Modern monopoly capitalism, which dominates the state, has 
established the ‘Common Market’, ‘Euratom’, and, for a more extended reach, ‘Eurafrica’ 
according to the interests of the monopolies; these are also the main organizing agents 
of ‘Little Europe’.40 
The analysis then moves to the motives and aims of these initiators, stating that they conform 
to the characteristics of imperialism: ‘the shared incorporation of export markets and raw 
material sources; the creation of zones of influence for capital investments, the partitioning 
of the world; the strengthening of the class interests of the exploiter, the protection of supra-
state capital that does not recognize any homeland’.41
It is not impossible, the report asserts, that the EEC may boost production and 
trade in certain sectors. However, it does not correspond to the ‘needs of the West 
European people, and also not to the strong national hopes of the African people’.42 At 
the end of the day, it will only lead to ‘an increasingly uneven development of capitalist 
countries and the dependency of a number of European states on the US, and in 
the long run also on West Germany’. It will hence have a destructive impact on international 
economic relations. 
As should be clear, the text develops Lenin’s argument on the reactionary character 
of any integration of imperial European states. The report specifies the structural 
contradictions that will be deepened because of the EEC: contradictions among the six 
member states of ‘Little Europe’ as regards market policies, financial policy, currency 
policy and agriculture; contradictions between the EEC and the US, between the EEC 
and the UK with its Commonwealth, and between the EEC member states and the rest of 
the world. The efforts of the ‘monopolists of the member states of the Rome agreement 
to partition export markets, sources of raw materials and zones for capital investments 
amongst themselves’ are the main thread connecting these contradictions.43
The institute’s report concludes that the Common Market, Eurafrica and Euratom have 
brought the contradictions in the imperial world economy close to a tipping point. On the 
one hand, there is now the geopolitical alternative embodied by the EEC, ‘the imperialist 
path of violence, despotism, coercion, inequality, subordination of the people through 
other states, exploitation of economically less developed countries. It leads to an economic, 
political and national repression of the people’. On the other hand, there is the socialist path – 
‘of economic cooperation between people on the basis of equal rights and voluntarism, 
the path of equality and mutual assistance. It leads to economic prosperity, economic 
rapprochement of peoples and states, to the consolidation of the political autonomy and 
national independence of all countries’.44
It is hard to find a more clear-cut formulation of the contrasting alternatives as seen 
from the Soviet point of view. Far more than being just propaganda, these two alternatives 
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constitute what I have called geopolitical narratives. These narratives in turn guide a set of 
concluding proposals for the future of European integration: 
–  No ‘Common Market’ of the six countries, which serves military-strategic aims, 
but economic cooperation of an inclusive European kind in order to strengthen 
international security.
 –  No ‘Euratom’ with the view of a nuclear war, but far-reaching international collaboration 
for the peaceful employment of nuclear energy and a ban on nuclear arms.
–  No ‘Eurafrica’, which is directed against peoples of colonial and dependent countries, 
but collaboration with less developed countries on the basis of equal rights and 
mutual assistance.45
This analysis by IMEMO, usually referred to as the 17 Theses (as opposed to the 32 Theses on 
the EEC published five years later), amounted to a quasi-official codification of the Soviet 
Union’s attitude towards the EEC at this point in history. The overarching conception of the 
17 Theses is that, again, the EEC and Euratom are intended as bulwarks against Soviet and 
East European influence. This point was also made clear already by the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry in March 1957:
It should be perfectly clear that the creation of a common market is one more link in the 
policy of dividing Europe, the ‘positions of strength’ and cold war policy. The common 
market project is intimately associated with the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the West 
European military alliance. […] All the talk about it being a purely economic venture 
cannot conceal its military aspect, or the fact that it is spearheaded against the Soviet 
Union and other Socialist countries.46
In his 1972 analysis of Soviet attitudes towards the EEC, Mathias Mossberg distinguished 
nine main arguments.47 The first one has already been mentioned: (1) the West European 
integration project is, as a whole, intended to alienate the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is 
argued (2) that the EEC and Euratom will strengthen the position of West Germany in 
Europe, and potentially lead to renewed German expansionism. Two additional arguments 
follow from this: (3) that the EEC and Euratom increase insecurity and the risk of war, and 
(4) that national autonomy will decrease to the benefit of West Europe’s really big political 
and economic players. To these political arguments are then added a set of arguments 
motivated by an economic logic but with political overtones. For one thing, (5) the 
contradictions and conflicts between West Europe’s national economies and nationally 
based industries will not diminish but rather increase because of the EEC. This will then 
contribute to (6) a weakened position of the national working classes vis-à-vis supranational 
capital; the exploitation of the proletariat will thus increase. But it will also entail (7) greater 
difficulties for small business and agriculture in their respective home countries. Finally, the 
EEC has two major disadvantages on the world economic scale: (8) the EEC’s association of 
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the member states’ colonial countries and territories under the Eurafrican regime entails an 
emerging neocolonial exploitation of the peoples of the Third World; this also contributes to 
(9) a partitioning of Europe and the world into separate zones of interests and trading blocks 
that will impede economic growth and a rational management of the world economy. 
‘The Rome Conspiracy’: East German Reactions
Similar arguments reappear in East German accounts. ‘What is lurking behind the Common 
Market?’ asked Fritz Gluth in a major analysis in Neues Deutschland on 29 January 1957. His 
answer was twofold: a US government eager to consolidate West Europe against Soviet and 
socialist influence, thus bolstering the strategic interests already invested in NATO, and 
West German business and political interests anxious to once again attain a dominating 
position in Europe, this time not by going to war but by trading and investing and to that 
end securing for itself the necessary fields of expansion in France and Italy as well as in 
France’s and Belgium’s African colonies (the oil and mining resources in French North 
Africa were particularly attractive). Gluth also remarked that the EEC and Eurafrica project 
would prevent efforts to bridge the cold war divide and prohibit the independence of the 
colonized peoples.48 According to his analysis, the EEC would simply aggravate a series of 
conflicts on the three levels: nationally, it was the conflict between capital and labour, the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat; regionally and continentally, it would increase tensions 
between West and East Europe; and globally, it would prevent the struggle of the peoples of 
the Third World against colonialism from reaching a peaceful settlement. Gluth, therefore, 
concluded:
[The Common Market] is part of the aggressive politics of integration that is directed 
against the socialist countries and also against the colonized peoples who are struggling 
for national sovereignty or are defending their sovereignty against imperialist assaults. 
Therefore, the project for a Common Market is not compatible with the peoples’ interest 
in peace and security.49
This criticism of the EEC was repeated almost daily in Neues Deutschland’s coverage of the 
EEC in the spring of 1957. The newspaper drummed home the message that West European 
integration was a scheme devised by the US government and West German capitalists in 
order to secure new markets and investment zones (‘Lebensraum’) for West Germany’s 
expanding banks and industry. Moreover, the new organization would only escalate the 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.
After the negotiations on the EEC and Euratom were successfully concluded in Paris 
on 21 February, Neues Deutschland carried a headline, apparently clarifying the matter: 
‘Atomrüstung und Kolonien’/‘Nuclear Armament and Colonies’. Again, it was asserted that 
the EEC expressed the lust for power of West German industrialists and their like-minded 
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partners in France and the Benelux. Such ambitions now played themselves out in an 
effort to gain European hegemony (with US support) and Europeanize colonialism to 
the benefit of German trade and production.50 These were also the main arguments in an 
editorial of 7 March that condemned the EEC and Euratom as ‘an act of betrayal against 
Germany and Europe’.51 Two weeks later, the day before the signing ceremonies in Rome, 
the newspaper spoke of a ‘conspiracy’ instigated by West German monopoly capital.52 At the 
same time, Neues Deutschland was closely covering the anti-colonial movements in Africa 
and elsewhere. At the beginning of March 1957, the newspaper carried a long article on 
Ghana, the first African state to proclaim independence from colonialism, and on Kwame 
Nkrumah’s plans for pan-African integration.53 
During the months following the foundation of the EEC, East Germany reshaped 
its foreign policy in relation to West Europe. A partially new geopolitical narrative 
was disseminated from Berlin just as from Moscow. It targeted West German major 
industry and business (‘monopoly capitalism’) in particular. In April 1957, the GDR 
Foreign Ministry issued an official communique to this effect, denouncing West 
Germany as a neocolonial state because of its participation in the EEC’s Eurafrican 
policy. It was asserted that West Germany, because of its participation in the EEC’s 
Eurafrican association regime, was now among the colonial powers supporting the 
general exploitation of the Third World as well as the colonial wars in which France, 
the UK, Portugal and the US were involved to wipe out resistance movements around 
the world.54
It may seem surprising that the colonial question played such an important role in 
East German criticisms of West European integration. Further examples of this are Jakov 
Etinger’s 1961 book, Bonn greift nach Afrika/Bonn Makes a Grab for Africa, published by 
Dietz in its series Wahrheiten über den deutschen Kolonialismus/Truths about German 
Imperialism, and Heinrich Schäfer’s Die Eurafrika-Konzeption in Aktion/The Eurafrica 
Concept in Action. The former contains an extremely detailed account of West Germany’s 
political, military and economic engagements in French Africa, whereas the latter 
is a doctoral thesis written in a more academic tone.55 The GDR focus on Africa and 
colonialism hence was not only the result of the Marxist-Leninist view that European 
integration was essentially an imperialist project. In its time, throughout the 1950s, it was 
clear to East and West Europeans alike that the colonial question was an integral part of 
West European integration. The association of the colonies with the Common Market was 
thus seen as one of the Treaty of Rome’s main features also in France, Belgium and other 
West European states; a fact forgotten today and virtually erased from contemporary 
scholarship on the history of the EU.56
The centrality of colonialism in the 1950s discussion on West European integration 
demonstrates as well the extent to which this discussion was steeped in geopolitical concerns. 
It explains too why it was often presented to the public – in East and West Europe alike – as 
a geopolitical narrative about Europe’s standing in the world economy and the global order 
of the future. 
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Eurafrica according to Skorov
Georgiy Skorov’s Кому нужна Еврафрика/Who Needs Eurafrica? is probably the most 
detailed analysis of its time of the colonial dimensions of the EEC and West European 
integration. Skorov spent his early career at the Institute of Economics (not to be confused 
with the previously mentioned Institute of World Economy and International Relations) at 
the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It was in this capacity that he wrote about the EEC’s colonial 
association regime.57 His brief book is a historically informed economic and political 
assessment of the EEC’s geopolitical viability. He first relates how the concept of the EEC – 
as a ‘third force’ between the two world powers – harks back to interwar imperial ideas of 
Eurafrica, such as Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European organization. After the Second 
World War, influential circles of monopoly capital in West Germany, France, Italy, the UK, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland supported the idea of Eurafrica, Skorov states. 
However, like many other commentators, he singles out West German monopoly capital as 
the strongest influence.
Skorov then goes on to explain why the idea of West European integration and Eurafrica 
became particularly urgent after the Second World War. The first reason was the weakening 
of European capital. A significantly stronger decline in Western Europe’s share in world 
capitalist production and world trade was in evidence. To counter this tendency, the 
customs zone instituted by the EEC as well as plans for a more rational exploitation of Africa 
by European capital were needed. The second reason was the ‘African awakening’. During 
1956–1957, the number of African states that gained national independence doubled, Skorov 
points out. The colonial powers were no longer able to suppress the national liberation 
movement in Africa on their own. To stop colonies from escaping their control, they were 
therefore willing to sacrifice part of their colonial holdings in order to preserve the whole. In 
Skorov’s view, this explains the increasing willingness to let previously monopolized spheres 
of colonization be ‘shared’ by several capitalist powers. 
The third reason for the intense integration efforts in West Europe after World War II, 
according to Skorov, was the Western European bourgeoisie’s desire to reduce its financial, 
economic and political dependence on the US. Increased extraction and exportation of 
materials and products from Africa would here help close Europe’s apparently otherwise 
chronic dollar deficit. Moreover, the Eurafrican plans were seen as a way of securing Africa 
as a European geopolitical sphere of influence, and thus prevent the US – as well as the 
Soviet Union – from gaining a foothold.
At the same time, however, Skorov notes that the Eurafrican plans were linked to US 
security concerns, in that it would provide NATO with a military base and a guided 
missile centre to be used in the event of a nuclear war. Skorov recounts the West European 
argument, to which especially French and West German leaders subscribed, that having 
military positions in Africa was more important than having them in Europe because 
African territory would be less vulnerable to air attacks and more difficult to reach for land-
based troops. 
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In the second part of his book, Skorov argues that the EEC may be viewed – and often 
views itself – as a step towards Eurafrica. That the initiative for the association of the African 
colonies with the Common Market came from the French testifies to the French financial 
oligarchy’s change of mind regarding the methods of exploiting its colonies. Economic and 
financial circles in France found it necessary to use the European integration project to save 
what remained of their colonial empire. For France, the balance between its imperial and 
European vocation was a delicate one. On the one hand, French supporters of European 
‘integration’ saw a need to transfer the territories of France to ‘Europe’ because otherwise 
it would lead to a weakening of their economic and political ties with the mother country. 
On the other hand, such a move could result in diminishing France’s position in its own 
empire, as other states would have equal rights to trade and invest in Africa. To manage this 
contradiction, France opened its overseas market to participants from ‘little Europe’, but only 
under certain conditions, the most important being a customs barrier protecting colonial 
imports from competition at world market prices. In Skorov’s view, this arrangement caused 
disagreements among supporters of European ‘integration’. In particular, the UK opposed 
the French initiative and instead wanted to expand the European markets for its industrial 
products by creating a free trade area. The French proposal thus made it impossible for 
the UK to participate in the Common Market. But other countries also expressed their 
dissatisfaction, which is why a compromise decision was taken to establish an interstate 
investment fund for overseas territories. 
Unlike the UK, West Germany was satisfied with this arrangement because, as Skorov 
states, it offered the country an opportunity – for the first time since it had lost its colonies 
after World War I – to expand on the African continent, which West Germany had pursued 
ever since the foundation of the ECSC and the Council of Europe, two organizations that 
had developed a similar Eurafrican agenda but had done little to further its realization.
But with the association of the colonies with the Common Market, a real path was 
opening itself up for West German capital to attain new possibilities of expansion. The same 
arrangement also enabled French interests to attain the capital they badly needed to sustain 
the viability of their colonial empire. According to Skorov, West Germany rejoiced at the 
prospect of gaining access to French Africa:
It is very close to fulfilling its cherished dream – to establish itself on the African continent. 
What Guy Mollet tried to picture in describing the EEC as ‘the great idea of the twentieth 
century’ was actually the implementation of Germany’s long-standing goal of putting the 
riches of the French African colonies into the possession of German or French–German 
(which makes no difference) trusts.58 
Skorov sums up his analysis by pointing to the main contradictions that have brought the 
project into being and that will also, according to his prediction, lay the foundation for 
further controversy within the EEC. He identifies three types of contradictions: (1) between 
the imperialist powers of Europe and the peoples of Africa; (2) between the various factions 
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of European monopoly capital; and (3) between capitalist Europe and the US. If these 
contradictions all followed from Skorov’s analysis of imperialism, heavily inflected by 
Lenin’s argument, but also more generally by a Marxist understanding of capitalist expansion, 
it appears that they were determined as well by a fourth contradiction, namely the geopolitical 
relationship between the EEC and the Soviet Union as such.
Skorov seems to regard the first contradiction as the most decisive one, for he ends his 
book by discussing the EEC’s Eurafrican dimension as perceived from an African perspective: 
‘What will Eurafrica bring to the African nations?’ In this context, Skorov observes that 
the Eurafrican project is promoted under the banners of ‘higher living standards, cultural 
progress, democracy boom and industrialization’.59 He also notes that it is often said to 
bring about a symbiosis between the continents. In 1950s French political vocabulary, 
Europe’s relations with Africa were also portrayed as one of ‘interdependence’, meaning that 
individual nations would have only stagnation and isolation to expect if they asserted their 
‘independence’ vis-à-vis other nations; the future was by necessity one in which all political 
units were ‘interdependent’.
Skorov rejects this as ‘nothing but demagogy’. In his conclusion, he again nails the 
decisive contradiction down that is buried in the EEC’s ‘offer’ of an association to its African 
‘partners’: 
Eurafrica poses a serious danger to all African nations, whether they are politically 
independent or still under colonial rule. The concept of ‘interdependence’ that underlies 
Eurafrica is nothing more than the strengthening of unequal relationships based on actual 
inequality. Since the case is ‘interdependence’ between industrially developed Europe 
and underdeveloped Africa, most of which is politically dependent, it inevitably turns 
into a form of submission of the weaker to the stronger, into modernized colonialism in 
disguise and perpetuates the oppressed state of Africans. There is no doubt whatsoever 
that ‘interdependence’ in the framework of Eurafrica is aimed at making it more difficult 
for the oppressed African nations to liberate themselves from colonialism and at plunging, 
this time in a roundabout way, already politically independent nations back into colonial 
slavery. Therefore, African nations in alliance with all progressive forces of the world 
stand against the imperialistic Eurafrica plans and for the elimination of colonialism in 
any form.60
It should be noted that Skorov’s analysis corresponds here to the programme to win Third 
World allies that Khrushchev launched at the time of the Suez crisis, which turned the Soviet 
leader into a champion of anti-colonial struggles in the Third World. It is no doubt against 
this background, too, that Skorov’s geopolitical narrative finds its immediate political 
function. In part, it intends to depict the EEC – and by extension non-socialist Europe as a 
whole – as the great antagonist to all groups and organizations working towards Third 
World liberation. However, if Skorov’s analysis is stripped of its Marxist-Leninist vocabulary 
and its contextually indispensable (this was Moscow 1957) predictions as to the historical 
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necessity of a socialist victory, it still stands as a fairly correct analysis of the historical 
background of the EEC’s colonial association regime. This brings me to the conclusive 
question about the lessons and contemporary relevance of the corpus of Soviet and GDR 
writings on European integration that I have discussed above. 
Conclusion
One striking feature of the geopolitical narratives about West European integration as told in 
East Europe is their strong focus on contradictions. This argumentative form is certainly 
indebted to a general Marxist-Hegelian methodology, which understands the historical 
process as driven by social struggles and economic contradictions. This is an attractive feature 
of the Soviet and GDR analysis, for, as Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek and others have pointed 
out more recently, the dialectic method itself forces the analyst to approach history as a 
constellation of oppositions rather than as a harmonious narrative whole and thereby makes 
him or her less likely to subscribe to political and ideological fabrications.61 The problem, of 
course, was that this dialectical gaze was so selectively outward looking, towards the Western 
opponent, and rarely allowed to detect the contradictions of the socialist narrative itself. This 
said, and given too that the contradictions Soviet and GDR writers identified in the EEC 
project were not resolved according to the predictions of Marxist-Leninist formulae, West 
European integration and the EU in particular have unquestionably been at least partially 
shaped by precisely those contradictions they identified at the end of the 1950s. For instance, 
it has been observed or argued that the early EEC pitted the interests of West European capital 
against those of its working classes, or that it served to consolidate European dominance in 
Africa, or that it contributed, at the time, to the cold war polarization of the European continent.
Perhaps needless to say, these contradictions are played down in West European 
geopolitical narratives about the same topics. Instead, a synthesis has often been held up as 
in sight, where the unification of Europe would be revealed as having been advantageous 
to all – without losers, as it were; or, in short, where the integration of Europe would be 
realized as a universally beneficial process for Europeans and others alike. 
This produces another interesting conclusion regarding the conflicting geopolitical 
narratives of European integration. While the East European analysis discussed here points 
to the particular geopolitical interests and historical contradictions that hide under the 
universalist rhetoric of the EEC and the West European integration project, it also presents – 
or even embodies – an alternative socialist path towards continental and global integration. 
This path then serves as a universalistic narrative in its own right, what Schäfer terms 
‘alternative politics’ (Alternativpolitik), or what the June 1957 issue of Kommunist described 
in more expansive terms as ‘the path of economic cooperation between people on the basis 
of equal rights and voluntarism, the path of equality and mutual assistance. It leads to 
economic prosperity, economic rapprochement of peoples and states, to the consolidation 
of the political autonomy and national independence of all countries’.62
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What stand before us in the case of these two geopolitical narratives, Eastern and Western, 
are thus two historiographical narratives, both of which present themselves as models for 
a ‘universal history’. Both rely on what I have called, in a different context, an ideology 
of universalism.63 By connecting the two together, by revealing how these East European 
analyses lay bare the EEC narrative’s weak points and by also recalling how a certain critique 
of the Communist system uncloaks the ways in which actually existing socialism was at best 
a caricature of the real thing, one can distinguish how a geopolitical narrative reveals the 
ideological contradictions of its opponent, and vice versa.
But here, and as a third conclusion, attention should be paid to the central importance of 
West Germany in all East European geopolitical narratives of West European integration. 
This is interesting, for it points to a crucial difference in relation to West European narratives 
of the EEC and the EU, which shows grosso modo that France was the main driver behind 
the integration process, with West German capital in a more supportive function.
This reflects the central position attributed to the divided Germany in post-war Europe, 
and in the East European perspective in particular. For the Soviet Union, the West German 
standpoint on economic cooperation and political integration was decisive – because 
it indicated whether West Germany could become expansionist and pose a new security 
threat, as it had done in the preceding world wars, and because it indicated the possibility of 
the Soviet Union winning over the German working class, and perhaps also the European 
proletariat as such, to the socialist camp. In this sense, a similar importance was attached to 
the Italian Communist Party, which the Soviet leadership addressed directly in an effort to 
influence its attitudes towards the EEC.64 This discourse thus exposes how the Soviet and 
GDR geopolitical narrative about European integration emerges as a crucial component of 
the build-up to the cold war ‘German crisis’ – symbolized by the Berlin Wall – just shortly 
after the polarizing event of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. With the EEC in place, 
and West Germany firmly in the opposite camp, no further reconciliation on the German 
question seemed possible.
After the fall of the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe, the dispute over 
Europe’s geopolitical position and role, especially in relation to the former African colonies, 
has apparently been settled in the West’s favour. Today few even remember that the EEC 
and the Eastern bloc had distinct and diametrically opposed ways of collaborating with the 
African countries and furthering their development. Moreover, it may be hard these days to 
understand the relevance of this opposition. Yet this history merits attention today, and this 
is the fourth major conclusion to be drawn from the geopolitical narratives about European 
integration in the 1950s that I have discussed. For this history offers a glance, from the 
wings of history as it were, of crucial but otherwise often-hidden geopolitical stakes in the 
European integration project. Today this reminder is timely, as very few commentators and 
researchers admit that the EEC, and subsequently the EU, was designed in response to a set 
of urgent geopolitical pressures and tendencies that constrained the West European states 
during the post–World War II period. This insight is particularly important now that the 
EU is again faced with geopolitical developments – in Ukraine, Israel, the Middle East, 
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North Africa and the Mediterranean area generally – that have prompted it to develop a 
foreign policy and global mission for the twenty-first century.65 The neglected sources I 
have discussed should therefore be seen as part of a broader analytic corpus in which some 
crucial aspects of a historical East European narrative about Europe’s calling and destiny can 
be traced. This narrative is indispensable to anyone seeking to understand how the EU is 
today perceived in various corners of the world, by its ‘partners’ or its ‘antagonists’.
Such a reflection might also provide an answer to the question as to why today’s ‘post-
Communist’ and ‘post-Soviet’ present remains haunted by the antagonistic narratives of 
the past, even if the antagonist itself has vanished. The Leninist narrative of socialism 
belongs to the dustbin of history, along with the Soviet Union itself. Could it not be 
reasonably expected, then, that the geopolitical narratives about Europe as told in the 
West and in the East are converging? Clearly, this is not happening. The Ukrainian crisis, 
to mention just the most obvious example, has not only propelled European states into 
a virtual arms race, but it has also polarized official political rhetoric about the aims and 
motives of European integration in a way unprecedented since World War II. Despite 
1989, despite the fall of Communism and all the enormous transformations in its wake, 
geopolitical narratives about Europe are apparently still afflicted by the after-effects of the 
cold war. 
There seems to broadly be two possible explanations for this state of affairs. Either 
the cold war past still weighs heavy on our geopolitical imagination. According to this 
explanation, we are even now busy working through a legacy marked by the struggle 
between two incompatible ideological forces that once vied for the support of all 
Europeans. It is certainly true that remnants of this ideological struggle can be detected 
in major East European narratives, which are sometimes lumped together as Ostalgie 
or melancholic valorizations of a Communist past. However, while it is correct that 
these narratives and sentiments to no small extent suffuse contemporary literature and 
popular culture, they hardly impact the political polarization between Russia and the EU 
at present. 
To understand this more proper political polarization, one should perhaps venture an 
alternative explanation according to which the narrative agon, which I have been dwelling 
on, does not primarily testify to any after-effects of the cold war. Instead, cold war ideology 
itself was an effect of a conflict between geopolitical ontologies of longer duration, which 
subtend incompatible narratives as to Europe’s and the EU’s place and mission in the world. 
It could be argued that in this perspective even though the past clash between socialist 
and capitalist systems, or between Communist and liberal ideologies, has ceased to be 
the main motor of Europe’s geopolitical landscape, its legacy still has repercussions in 
the contemporary situation, and these repercussions are now part of a more permanent 
conflict between the material interests of two geopolitical powers, which has largely lost 
its past ideological superstructure. The 1950s saw two overlapping but distinct oppositions 
relating to this topic. The first one was identified by Skorov, who described it as an emerging 
conflict between imperial capitalism and anti-colonial socialism. The second was the more 
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proper geopolitical conflict between the West European powers’ colonial ambitions and the 
Soviet Union’s global aspirations. Both powers tried to cover up these geopolitical ambitions 
underneath ideological defences for socialism and liberalism, respectively. Still, it is today 
telling that while these ideological differences tend to wane, the cold and hard conflicts of 
interest between Russia and the EU continue. 
In the Soviet relationship to West European integration, Eberhard Schulz wrote in 1975: 
‘one detects certain constants that have remained unchanged or essentially unchanged 
throughout Russian and Soviet history’.66 Among these constants, Schulz included Russia’s 
‘geographical position’, the ‘mentality of the Russian people’, a ‘demand for security’ 
(Sicherheitsbedürfnis) and a ‘missionary attitude’ (Sendungsbewußtsein) towards the 
surrounding world.67 Schulz’s brief catalogue of the unchanging geopolitical features and 
mental faculties that once determined Moscow’s responses to European integration is, of 
course, deeply problematical and hardly meaningful when taken as a description of life 
and politics. However, such a list of national and imperial traits becomes interesting once 
the question is asked whether it may not in fact be possible to draw up a corresponding 
list of ‘constants’ in West European perceptions of Russia that have remained essentially 
unchanged over the past centuries. For at this point, it turns out that these ‘constants’ 
are more properly to be seen as the generic themes of two dialectically intertwined but 
antagonistic narratives that address the geopolitical situation of Europe from opposite 
ends, as it were.
At this point, it is helpful to return to Klaus Törnudd’s remark on the difficulty of finding 
any ‘agreement even as to what exactly is reality’.68 If the understanding of reality is largely 
generated and consolidated by ways of narrating, as Ricoeur and others have argued, it 
may be asked whether there exists some deeper narrative or historiographical logic that 
explains why East and West Europe tend to become placeholders for conflicting visions of 
and attitudes towards European integration. Once the question is posed in such terms, it 
becomes clear that there is indeed a particular metahistorical narrative in which Europe 
occupies a pivotal place. This narrative is in some sense at one with the birth of geopolitical 
thinking as such, and it concerns the geopolitical struggle between what was previously seen 
as a conflict between Eurafrica and Eurasia: the former being the formation embraced by 
many West European leaders from the Berlin Congress of 1884–1885 to the foundation of the 
EEC in 1957; the latter, according to the work of Mark Bassin and others, being a formation 
promoted by Soviet and Russian foreign policy thinkers and political leaders from Czar 
Nicholas II to Vladimir Putin.69 That there is no ‘agreement’ as to the ‘reality’ of European 
integration is here a result of Europe attaining vastly different narrative articulations, and 
contradictory references, depending on whether it is placed within a Eurafrican or Eurasian 
frame of reference.
But here, finally, I must also note that there are, of course, more geopolitical narratives 
of Europe than the two discussed in this chapter. In Western, Eastern and Central Europe, 
alternative narratives about Europe’s geopolitical position and calling have been, and 
continue to be, invented and asserted – narratives that are more complex, compelling, 
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beautiful, intelligent and worthy of support. However, the two narratives I have discussed 
have during the century since World War I been historically the most powerful ones. Often 
they pull all alternative propositions about Europe into their respective orbits and distort 
or flatten them out in the process. Hence, the existential and political dilemma still facing 
Europe today: a choice between two narratives, neither of which one must believe in; a 
choice between two European futures that both must be rejected.
References
Bassin, Mark, Glebov, Sergey and Laruelle, Marlene (eds) (2015): Between Europe and Asia: 
The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism, Pittsburgh: The University of 
Pittsburgh Press.
Boettcher, Erik (ed.) (1963): Ostblock, EWG und Entwicklungsländer, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.
Bossuat, Gerard (1996): L’Europe des francais 1943–1959: La IVe republique aux sources de 
l’Europe communautaire, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne. 
Buckle, Desmond (1957): ‘Ghana – ein neuer Staat’, Neues Deutschland, 55: 5 March, p. 5.
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard ([1923] 1925): Paneuropa (2nd edn), Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag.
 (1927): ‘Alarm’, Paneuropa, 3: 4, pp. 1–5.
 (1928): ‘Die europäische Nationalbewegung’, Paneuropa, 4: 1, pp. 1–12.
 (1929): ‘Afrika’, Paneuropa, 5: 2, pp. 3–18.
 (1930): ‘Entwurf für einen Paneuropäischen Pakt’, Paneuropa, 6: 5, pp. 149–165.
D’Agostini Orsini di Camerota, Paolo (1934): Eurafrica: L’Africa per l’Europa, l’Europa per l’Africa, 
Rome: Paolo Cremonese.
Deutsch, Otto (1927): ‘Paneuropäisches Wirtschaftsprogram’, Paneuropa, 3: 1, pp. 7–17.
Dodds, Klaus and Atkinson, David (eds) (2009): Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical 
Thought, London: Routledge.
Escobar, Arturo ([1995] 2012): Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the 
Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Etinger, Jakov (1961): Bonn greift nach Afrika, Berlin: Dietz.
Fornäs, Johan (2012): Signifying Europe, Bristol: Intellect.
Fursenko, Aleksandr and Naftali, Timothy (2006): Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an 
American Adversary, New York: W. W. Norton. 
Gluth, Fritz (1957): ‘Was steckt hinter dem Gemeinsamen Markt?’ Neues Deutschland, 
29 January, p. 2. 
Hansen, Peo and Jonsson, Stefan (2013): ‘A Statue to Nasser? Eurafrica, the Colonial Roots of 
European Integration, and the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 24: 4, pp. 5–18.
 (2014): Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism, London: 
Bloomsbury.
 (2015): ‘EU Migration Policy Towards Africa: Demographic Logics and Colonial 
Legacies’, in Sandra Ponzanesi and Gianmaria Colpani (eds), Postcolonial Transitions in 
Europe: Contexts, Practices and Politics, London: Rowman & Littlefield.
07510_Ch03_p063-092.indd   88 4/4/17   5:53 PM
Clashing Internationalisms
89
Heffernan, Michael (2009): ‘Fin de siècle, fin du monde: On the Origins of European Geopolitics’, 
in Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (eds), Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical 
Thought, London: Routledge, pp. 27–51.
Institute of World Economy and International Relations, The Academy of Sciences of the Soviet 
Union (1957a): Die Integration Europas in der sowjetischen Kritik: Gemeinsamer Markt – 
Eurafrika – Euratom, 9, June, Hamburg: Deutsche Volkwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft, Report 
no. 64/65.
 (1957b): ‘Über die Gründung eines “Gemeinsamen Marktes” und des EURATOMs (17 
Thesen)’, in Hans Mayrzedt and Helmut Romé (eds) (1968), Die Westeuropäische Integration 
aus Osteuropäischer Sicht, Vienna: Joseph Laub. 
Jameson, Fredric (1981): The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
 (2009): Valences of the Dialectic, London: Verso.
Jonsson, Stefan (2010): ‘The Ideology of Universalism’, New Left Review, 63: May/June, 
pp. 115–126.
Kanet, Robert E. (ed.) (1987): The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Third World, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Khrushchev, Nikita (2007): Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 3: Statesman, 1953–1964 (ed. 
Sergei Khruschev; trans. George Shriver and Stephen Shenfield), University Park: Penn State 
University Press.
Kjellén, Rudolf (1914): Samtidens stormakter, vol. 1, Stockholm: Hugo Gebers förlag. 
Kyle, Keith (2003): Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (2nd edn), London: 
I.B. Tauris.
Lenin, Vladimir I. ([1915] 1974): ‘On the Slogan for a United States of Europe’, Collected Works, 
vol. 21, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pp. 339–343. 
Lipgens, Walter (1982): A History of European Integration, vol. 1, 1945–47: The Formation of the 
European Unity Movement, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Louis, William Roger and Owen, Roger (eds) (1989): Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, 
Oxford: Clarendon.
Mayrzedt, Hans and Romé, Helmut (eds) (1968): Die westeuropäische Integration aus 
osteuropäischer Sicht: Bibliographie, Dokumentation, Kommentar, Vienna: Laub.
Molchanov, Nikolay N. (1957): ‘Common Market Talk’, Novoye Vremya, 5, 31 January.
Mossberg, Mathias (1971): ‘Sovjetunionens inställning till EEC’, Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 74: 2, 
pp. 142–165.
Ortega y Gasset, José ([1929] 1957): The Revolt of the Masses, New York: Norton.
Pineau, Christian (1976): 1956/Suez, Paris: Editions Robert Laffont.
Sannwald, Rolf (1963): ‘Die Sowjetunion und die westeuropäische Integrationspolitik’, in 
Erik Boettcher (ed.), Ostblock, EWG und Entwicklungsländer, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 
pp. 80–114.
 (1968): ‘Die Sowjetischen Ansichten über die Europäische Integration’, in Hans 
Mayrzedt and Helmut Romé (eds), Die westeuropäische Integration aus osteuropäischer Sicht: 
Bibliographie, Dokumentation, Kommentar, Vienna: Laub, pp. 121–129.
07510_Ch03_p063-092.indd   89 4/4/17   5:53 PM
Europe Faces Europe
90
Schäfer, Heinrich (1964): Die Eurafrika-Konzeption in Aktion: Die Kolonialexpansion des 
Westdeutschen Monopolkapitals in die mit der EWG assoziierten Staaten Afrikas unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aspekten einer demokratischen Alternativpolitik, Berlin: 
Humboldt University.
Schultz, Eberhard (1975): Moskau und die Europäische Integration, Munich: Oldenbourg. 
Schwartz, Hans-Peter (1997): Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period 
of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, vol. 2, The Statesman, 1952–1967, Oxford: Berghahn.
Skorov, Georgiy (1957): Komu nuzhna Yevrafrika (Who Needs Eurafrica), Moscow: State 
Publishing House of Political Literature. Cited from unpublished English translation by 
Marina Tsareva.
Stoddard, Lothrop ([1922] 2003): The Rising Tide of Colour Against White World-Supremacy, 
Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.
 (1935): The Clashing Tides of Colour, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Törnudd, Klaus (1961): Soviet Attitudes Towards Non-military Regional Cooperation, Societas 
Scientiarum Fennica: Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum XVIII, 1; Copenhagen: 
Munksgaard. 
Vaisse, Maurice (1989): ‘France and the Suez Crisis’, in William Roger Louis and Roger Owen 
(eds), Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 131–143. 
Woytinski, Wladimir (1926): Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz 
Verlagsbuchandlung.
Zellentin, Gerda (1964): Die Kommunisten und die Einigung Europas, Frankfurt am Main: 
Athenäum Verlag.
Žižek, Slavoj (1993): Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology, Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
Notes
 1 This chapter could not have been written without substantial input from Peo Hansen, 
Linköping University. It reflects the joint research project on the history of European 
integration that we have been conducting over the past years, some of the results of which 
have been published in Hansen and Jonsson (2014). Unless otherwise noted, all translations 
are my own.
 2 Törnudd (1961: 131–140).
 3 Törnudd (1961: 267).
 4 Escobar ([1995] 2012).
 5 For previous analyses of this material, see Törnudd (1961); Sannwald (1963, 1968); Zellentin 
(1968); Mossberg (1972); Schultz (1975).
 6 See the remarks by Mayrzedt and Romé (1968: 7) in their early compilation of East European 
commentary on post-war West European integration.
 7 Fornäs (2012).
 8 On master narratives, see Jameson (1981: 17–101). 
 9 On the ambiguities of European geopolitics, see Heffernan (2009). 
07510_Ch03_p063-092.indd   90 4/4/17   5:53 PM
Clashing Internationalisms
91
10 Kjellén (1914: 194).
11 For a more-detailed account of the Suez crisis in the context of European integration, see 
Hansen and Jonsson (2013, 2014).
12 Vaisse (1989: 142).
13 Fursenko and Naftali (2006: 134).
14 Schwartz (1997: 242).
15 See French foreign minister Christian Pineau’s memoirs: Pineau (1976: 191). Also Bossuat 
(1996: 335). Translation from Kyle (2003: 467).
16 Khrushchev (2007: 893).
17 Fursenko and Naftali (2006: 292–322); Kanet (1987). 
18 Molchanov (1957: 9).
19 Cited in Törnudd (1961: 153); original in Russian. 
20 Mossberg (1971: 148–149).
21 For a bibliography of Soviet (and East European) reports and comments on the ECC, see 
Mayrzedt and Romé (1968: 13–42).
22 Lenin ([1915] 1974: 340).
23 Lenin ([1915] 1974: 341).
24 Lenin ([1915] 1974: 342).
25 Orsini di Camerota (1934: 4).
26 Ortega y Gasset ([1929] 1957: 129).
27 Stoddard ([1922] 2003: 198–221, 1935: 31–174).
28 Lipgens (1982: 38).
29 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1927: 1).
30 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1928: 8).
31 Deutsch (1927: 7).
32 Deutsch (1927: 8).
33 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1929: 3).
34 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1929: 18).
35 Coudenhove-Kalergi (1930: 149).
36 Coudenhove-Kalergi ([1923] 1925: 37–38).
37 Cited in Törnudd (1961: 78).
38 For an exception that included both Russia and the colonies as ‘indispensable’ to European 
integration, see Woytinski (1926).
39 Mossberg (1971: 48).
40 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 4–5).
41 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 6).
42 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 16).
43 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 35).
44 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 17).
45 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 48).
46 Novoye Vremya , no. 11, 1957, 20, quoted in Mossberg (1972: 149–150).
47 Mossberg (1972: 149–163).
48 Gluth (1957: 2).
07510_Ch03_p063-092.indd   91 4/4/17   5:53 PM
Europe Faces Europe
92
49 Gluth (1957: 2).
50 Neues Deutschland (no. 46, 22 February 1957, 2). 
51 Neues Deutschland (no. 57, 7 March 1957, 1).
52 Neues Deutschland (no. 72, 24 March 1957, 2).
53 Buckle (1957: 5).
54 Neues Deutschland (no. 87, 11 April 1957, 5).
55 Etinger (1961); Schäfer (1964).
56 On this point, see Hansen and Jonsson (2014).
57 Georgiy Yefimovich Skorov (1927–2011) graduated from the Institute of Foreign Trade in 
Moscow in 1949. Between 1953 and 1979, he was a researcher at the Institute of Economics. 
He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Economics in 1970. In 1979, he was appointed 
deputy director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies. Between 1961 and 1967, he 
worked in the UNESCO Secretariat in Paris. He published numerous works on the economic 
problems of the Asian and African developing countries. Among his last works were the 
articles  ‘Russia-EU: Issues of Strategic Partnership’ (2005) and ‘France-2006: Reform 
or Revolution’ (2006). His publication ‘Who Needs Eurafrica’ has been translated into 
English by Marina Tsareva for the purpose of this chapter and is cited from her translation 
manuscript, with page references to the corresponding Russian original. 
58 Skorov (1957: 22).
59 Skorov (1957: 38).
60 Skorov (1957: 44–45).
61 See, for instance, Jameson (2009); Žižek (1993).
62 Schäfer (1964: 290–301); Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1957a: 17).
63 Jonsson (2010).
64 Mossberg (1972: 149).
65 Hansen and Jonsson (2015).
66 Schultz (1975: 28–29).
67 Schultz (1975: 29–32).
68 Törnudd (1961: 267).
69 Bassin, Glebov and Laruelle (2015).
07510_Ch03_p063-092.indd   92 4/4/17   5:53 PM
Chapter 4
Narratives at War: Representations of Europe in News Media of 
Ukraine, Russia and Poland during Euromaidan
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One of the most contested narratives of Europe in recent times has centred around the so-called ‘Ukrainian crisis’. The meaning of the developments in and around Ukraine since 2013 may puzzle an outside observer. For some, it looks like a chance 
coincidence of circumstances, something that was not meant to happen and could and should 
have been avoided; a chain of unfortunate events that triggered other unfortunate events 
almost blindly, with both sides unleashing their unreasonable hatred and violence, enough to 
call it ‘an unnecessary war’. This is an absurdist reading of the conflict; its fatal weakness (and 
its only strength!) is its reliance solely on chaos as an explanation. From a diametrically 
opposed perspective, the conflict is a well-orchestrated and smoothly executed puppet drama 
whose real actors pull the strings from behind the curtain: the rebellious Russia rising against 
US and Western dominance, with a few oligarchs making money in the background. Fair 
enough, but this version more or less completely denies agency to both sides of the conflict. 
These two views are expected, yet epistemologically flawed, preliminary interpretations and 
have to give way to more sophisticated constructions. To comprehend and potentially solve 
the conflict, one has to understand its meaning.
The outline of the ‘Ukrainian crisis’ – or what should more properly be termed a 
Ukraine–Russia crisis or a Russo-Ukrainian war – begins in the first half of 2013, when the 
ruling Yanukovych administration intensified its contacts with Brussels, and the signing 
of the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the 
European Union (EU) and Ukraine was in sight. The agreement was, however, a product 
of the 2008–2013 negotiations and originated in the recognition of Ukraine’s European 
choice after the 2004 Orange Revolution. Russia first responded to the prospective finalized 
agreement with the so-called ‘trade war’ when, beginning in July 2013, it dramatically limited 
Ukrainian imports. After a period of nerve-racking negotiations with the EU, the Ukrainian 
government, under pressure from the Kremlin, decided to change its external policy 
overnight and in the late autumn of 2013 announced a reorientation to Russia. This was the 
decisive moment: with millions of Ukrainians protesting with European flags in the streets 
and the government unable to contain them regardless of the means used, Euromaidan – 
literally the ‘Eurosquare’ – became first an agora for the pro-European activists and citizens, 
and later their battlefield on which to fight the government, its repressive apparatus and 
satellite anti-European groups.
The growing protest tended to refocus attention on the internal social agenda. The 
battlefield only expanded when Russia annexed Crimea after the bloodstained fall of the 
ancien régime and later went on to support directly the irredentist rebellion of the Russian 
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nationalists in the easternmost regions of Ukraine. But the core of the clash did not go 
away, with the vortex of the conflict beginning to suck in new motives and meanings. In 
March 2015, then Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz admitted Ukraine was ‘really for the 
first time spilling blood for the European Union, or for the attempt to integrate with the 
European Union’.1 The people in Maidan were dying under European flags: why? For José 
Manuel Barroso and bureaucrats from rue de la Loi?2 For the institutions that many see as 
having most recently terrorized member states like Greece into submission? For benefits? 
Or for neo-liberal free trade, which so many in Europe, including many Greek anti-austerity 
protesters, are ready to die opposing?
A year after Maidan, the prominent Ukrainian writer Yuriy Andrukhovych wrote in his 
essay for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: ‘I have recently seen a TV report from Spain, where 
the farmers, annoyed by the EU trade sanctions against Russia causing them problems with 
selling their products – perhaps oranges – burned EU flags as a sign of protest. It was precisely 
with such flags that the murdered were enwrapped by our people in Maidan before putting 
the corpses in coffins’.3 This heart-stopping contrast and its depth of misunderstanding 
could be an answer, but I believe it has to be turned into a question of what the meaning of 
Europe was for those who fought for it, fought against it and for those who watched from 
afar with compassion or indifference.
The meaning of Europe will here be reconstructed by studying how the influential and 
popular Ukrainian media have represented Europe against the backdrop of corresponding 
media discourses in the region’s two other significant countries, namely Poland and Russia.4 
The main focus will be on Ukraine, but regional contexts frame the results for a number 
of reasons. First, the comparison helps qualify the interpretation of findings that might 
otherwise result in misleading conclusions. Second, looking at the Ukrainian material in 
isolation is much less productive, not because it is less interesting, but because Euromaidan 
transcended national borders and had regional consequences with global repercussions. It 
is only by comparison that the clashes of narratives about Europe and the stakes in these 
clashes reveal themselves; the analysis of these clashes seems to have the biggest explanatory 
potential in a war situation. Alongside Ukraine, Russia from the very beginning was an active 
agent in the conflict, with a great number of Russians undoubtedly emotionally involved, 
with either compassion or animosity, in the Ukrainian situation. Poland became an active 
supporter of Euromaidan and later Ukraine and has always been its major advocate in 
the EU.
Apart from their close interaction centred on Euromaidan, these three countries make 
an almost ideal case for comparison. With their intertwined histories and cultures, their 
political and social systems shared many common or similar features between 1945 and 
1989. However, their paths after the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union have 
taken different directions in policies, reforms and approaches to democratization and 
European integration; this also created dissimilar media systems. Their political relations 
with the EU correspondingly differ vastly. Poland enjoys an insider view from within the 
EU, whereas both Russia and Ukraine use an outsider optic but of two different kinds: for 
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Moscow, EU accession is not on the political agenda at all, while Kyiv has seen many U-turns 
on its long and winding road of European integration. At the same time, each of the troika 
prioritizes its relations with Europe and perceives the self-identification towards it as the key 
to defining one’s own place in the world, viz. Poland’s ideas of ‘the West’s betrayal’ or ‘coming 
back to Europe’, Ukraine’s Westernizing and nativist projects and Russian Eurasianism. All 
these similarities and differences provide a perfect background for finding parallels in the 
three countries’ media.
In this chapter, I will show how Europe was constructed in Ukrainian discourses as well as 
compare it with sometimes less detailed findings from Russia and Poland. These discourses 
inhabited different spaces: political and opinion pages in respectable newspapers, widely 
read blogs, web forums and street exhibitions showcasing political cartoons. Before delving 
into this material, I will focus on the historical narratives and overview what has already 
been written in academia on East European discussions about greater Europe. However, 
what all these previous inquiries leave unanswered is how Europe was depicted and viewed 
during Euromaidan in the press that seriously debated the events – the media outlets that 
can have the strongest influence on policymakers and the most active and empowered social 
classes. Equally neglected have been the ‘people’s’ perspective and more ordinary everyday 
discourses. Therefore, such research is of considerable importance as it not only explains to 
some degree the media’s place in the large-scale protests in Ukraine and the subsequent war 
with Russia but also puts it into a wider regional context and contrasts it with Russia, which 
has experienced neither European integration nor anti-government protests on such a scale. 
Moreover, it allows an understanding of what changes occur once a country becomes part 
of the EU, as in the Polish case.
The aim here is to find out what discourses on Europe have existed in Ukraine, Russia and 
Poland since the early stage of the Ukraine–Russia crisis. The most influential newspapers – 
read by decision makers and a sign of middle-class prestige – were selected for the initial 
stage of analysis. In Ukraine, these include Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, an influential liberal weekly 
broadsheet with ties to pro-European political forces; Segodnya, a popular tabloid daily owned 
by an oligarch from Donetsk, Rinat Akhmetov; and Korrespondent, a liberal weekly magazine 
associated with the values of objective reporting until it was sold right before Euromaidan to 
the company with links to the Yanukovych family (and with that Korrespondent lost much 
of its reputation). The Russian newspapers analysed here are the pro-Kremlin Izvestiya, the 
more balanced Kommersant (both dailies) and the strongly oppositional weekly Novaya 
Gazeta. The Polish media is represented by the liberal-left Gazeta Wyborcza, the centre-left 
Polityka and the more conservative and establishment-oriented Rzeczpospolita. On top of 
that, I have included a preliminary analysis of the prominent online blog platforms where 
opinion leaders set principal frames for narrating Europe, such as Ukraine’s most read blogs 
section at Ukrayinska Pravda, Russia’s Snob.ru and Natemat.pl in Poland.
The research was based on thematic coding, which Jensen summarized as ‘a loosely 
inductive categorization […] with reference to various concepts, headings, or themes’5; this is 
in fact one of the key stages of critical discourse analysis, especially in its discourse-historical 
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tradition, although the project was more driven by the concept of narrative than by that of 
discourse. The interaction with the material was guided by the moderately constructivist, 
post-positivist approach.6 Notably, the chosen method prioritizes ‘development of models 
and nonverbal tools as integral elements of a stepwise analytical procedure’ as well as 
‘place[s] special emphasis on “data display” in the form of figures and graphics as aids in 
interpretation’.7
My focus on differences and similarities will inevitably lead to allegations of selective 
attention to certain aspects or even essentialism. Such allegations would profoundly 
misperceive both my objective and my interaction with the material. By concentrating on 
different narratives told and retold in the studied media, I do not seek to undermine the 
possibilities for dialogue or for adding more boundaries to this deeply divided world, as it 
may seem to a reader with a particular perspective. But what I want to accomplish is drawing 
attention to the inherent and long-standing heterogeneity of the region, which far too often 
is represented in the West as something homogenous to the point of impenetrability, unfit 
for understanding and inherently problematic. If I have any agenda in this text, it is to help 
dismantle this generalizing scheme and demonstrate not only that Eastern Europe has its 
story about Europe but that it has many contrasting stories, told in different languages, from 
different cultures and historical backgrounds, by different voices with contrasting levels of 
volume and audibility, clashing, overlapping, seeking to cancel out and mute each other, 
each with universalist aspirations and programmes, mutually incompatible more likely than 
not, and all naturally and indigenously formed rather than parachuted in by some external 
force. Equally, this is far from the ‘clash-of-civilizations’ talk on ‘the West vs. the rest’, a rosy-
pink idealistic picture and the theorists’ sterile lab; observing discourses in their natural 
habitat has indeed something of the study of wildlife. It brings a lot of smells from the field, 
and you get mud on your shoes; in this specific case, in the times of violence and war, it is 
easy to find your fingers sticky with blood.
This leads to the question of my own perspective and position as regards the material. 
Almost needless to say, I see the knowledge generated by this study as positional, but that 
makes it no different as positional knowledge is the only possible one. The observer is part 
of the system they observe, an active part. Where is the position located, then, from which 
the voice of the author is speaking in this text? The position in which the author listened to 
other voices represented here. I would demarcate this place somewhere on the outskirts of 
Euromaidan, distanced from the violent mêlée but not any closer to the seemingly apolitical 
‘above-the-fight’ position.
For a long time during the protest, one of Euromaidan’s barricades was adorned with a 
large placard featuring the words of the US-Ukrainian linguist George Shevelov (1908–2002): 
‘the world will only accept us as modern’. As a man born in Kyiv some 30 years ago, I share 
these words as a motto with many young men and women of my generation. These words 
pretty much encapsulate my own position: there is an acute sense of my active presence in 
the world rather than in a narrow national or regional context (often seen as provincial). At 
the same time, it expresses an unwillingness to abandon one’s own identity after centuries 
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of peaceful and violent assimilation by many empires, as testified by virtually any book on 
Ukrainian history. And finally, there is a no less acute awareness that such acceptance is, and 
should only be, possible on rationalist, modern terms, which sets a progressive perspective 
that eschews all things backward, conservative, nostalgic or aggressively nationalist.
It is this perspective that also helps develop an optical system critical to my own bias. 
Whereas any observer inevitably taints the object of observation, there can be different 
degrees of intrusion as there are ways to reduce it. Also, equally important was preserving 
enough of the author in this study to make use of my sensitivity to nuances and contexts, 
something lauded by feminist ethnography, which inspired me to be open about my own 
presence in the study.
With that in mind, the stage is finally set for the theoretical perspective to emerge. 
This perspective oversees the landscape of the study with a Foucauldian gaze, although 
the initial impulse came from Habermas and his conceptualization of the ‘public sphere’,8 
and traces of this might be found in the final discussion. Still, rather than relying on the 
rational deliberative model, the narrative of Europe is seen as endowed with different power 
potential in the three countries under consideration, and discourse as such is seen as a 
function, manifestation and realization of power.
This Foucauldian framework provided a link to the methodological frame of discourse-
historical analysis.9 Pretty much the same perspective inspired by multimodal visual analysis 
(at the intersection of compositional and social modality) was applied to the pictures.10 Just 
as in discourse analysis, I looked for reflections of social organization and self-positioning in 
acts of pictorial rather than linguistic expression. I will mostly focus on cartoons and images 
generated and/or actively adopted (e.g. shared) by users. Such cartoons and images connote 
general ideas rather than denote specific situations, which corresponds to my intention to 
study the imaginary and abstract general ideas about Europe.
The analysis could also be supplemented with a linguistic apparatus. When delving into 
my material, I realized that the language dimension was a key element in these discourses. I, 
therefore, added the conceptualization of metaphor and Laclau’s concept of empty signifiers 
deriving from political theory. I will return to these concepts later on, where I discuss the 
respective findings. This was an encounter with the analysis of language and thus informed 
by linguistic theories that also left their imprint on the methodology.
‘Grasp What a Miserable Asian Thou Art’: A History of Europe’s Semantical 
Adventures in Ukraine
Today’s discursive constructions of Europe in Ukraine, as well as its two neighbours considered 
here, are the tip of the iceberg of different and interwoven histories. Kyiv Rus, a medieval feudal 
and commercial empire centred on Kyiv, received Christianity in ad 988 from Constantinople 
and was part of the West that ‘was considered to be the East in the eyes of the West and which 
on occasion did not consider itself to be a part of Europe’.11 However, large areas of Ukraine 
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were exposed to the influence of West European culture through Poland, which – originally 
baptized Roman Catholic – was always seen as belonging to the West by both Polish and 
Western sources until the Ottoman cultural influences moved it farther to the Orient in the 
European imaginary geography in the 1600s and 1700s.12 Whereas Western influences on Kyiv 
were mediated through either Byzantium or Poland, Moscow had been receiving them from 
Kyiv in doubly mediated form until the Petrine reforms.13 With the rise of Russia in the 1700s, 
it had immediate access to Western culture and technology for the first time, while short-lived 
independent Ukraine was partitioned between Russia and Poland, and the situation reversed: 
the West was now coming to the eastern half of Ukraine in Russian dress.
Early modern Ukraine was already aware of Europe as a concept. Moreover, it sought 
to position itself within Europe. In the decrees (universaly) by Bohdan Khmelnytsky 
(1595–1657), a Ukrainian hetman and the leader of an uprising that broke Ukraine away 
from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Europe is never mentioned (although he 
corresponded, alongside the Polish king, the Ottoman sultan and the Moscow tsar, in Latin 
with Hungarian and Swedish monarchs). Yet the chronicle by Samiylo Velychko (1670 to 
after 1728) attributes passionate speeches to this hetman, in all likelihood inventions of the 
writer, a member of the Ukrainian elite. In the speeches, the European realm, which focused 
on ‘the famed European rivers of Vistula and Oder’, is defined as a geographical denotation 
and the space where ‘the Ukrainian glory’ is spread as much as it is in the Asiatic lands, 
whose location is given as ‘lying across the Black Sea’.14 Furthermore, Velychko’s pseudo 
Khmelnytsky lays claim for Ukraine to the ad 476 takeover of Rome, which ‘can be named 
the mother of all European cities’, by suggesting a ‘Ruthenian’, ditto Ukrainian, identity for 
‘our ancestor’ Odoacer,15 a Germanic king whose assault is now widely used to mark the 
watershed between antiquity and the Middle Ages.
This speech is quoted verbatim in one of the foundational documents of Ukrainian 
nationalism, The History of the Rus (written between 1769 and 1809). The anonymous 
manuscript by a member of Ukraine’s old Cossack elite resurfaced in the late 1820s 
and became widely read among Ukrainian and Russian intelligentsia and nobility. It 
tremendously influenced those who developed a modern Ukrainian project, and through 
them it became part of the DNA of Ukrainian culture. Apart from this speech, the text 
mentions Europe well over a dozen times; there is a sensible perception of Europe, although 
many of the references concern wars between European countries. Europe is a geographical 
locus, a family of monarchies and monarchs indeed related between themselves, but also 
a gaze that observes the events and in front of whom the dramatic historical play unfolds. 
Like a person, Europe respects the Swedish king and is afraid of the Turks; in a few places, 
European courts speak to Khmelnytsky, the Ukrainian leader, directly on behalf of the entire 
community, expressing their common interest, for example in preventing Ukraine’s alliance 
with Moscow for fear of the disproportionate rise of Russia. Europe also acquires a meaning 
of ‘the civilisation per se’: describing the Cossack massacre of the Polish troops who attacked 
them despite the ceasefire, the author says: ‘their slaughter was cruel and ruthless like that of 
the filthy predators rather than European troops’.16
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The nineteenth-century rise of Ukrainian nationalism was linked first to pan-Slavism, 
with the St Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood tasked to reunite Slavonic lands into a loose 
federation, with Kyiv as its centre.17 The idea became increasingly objectionable, and 
Ukrainian nationalism later drifted towards socialism and merged with it in the political 
programmes of Mykhaylo Drahomanov (1841–1895) and Ivan Franko (1856–1916). Towards 
the late nineteenth century, Ukraine was often thought of not only as part of Europe but also 
as the most European part of the Russian Empire; still, the ambiguity of self-identification 
persisted until 1917.18 Sometimes it was coupled with a ruthless critique of the national self-
identity and the yearning for Europeanness expressed negatively through the rejection of 
Asia (later in the twentieth century, the Asiatic label was passed on to Russia as opposed to 
the idea of Ukraine as integrally European). In 1881, the writer Panteleymon Kulish (1819–
1897) addressed his fellow countrymen in his ‘To My Own People (on entrusting him the 
Ukrainian translation of Shakespeare’s works)’ as ‘Ye people sans reason, sans honour, sans 
respect’ and ‘Barbar’, and encouraged them thus:
Take this universal mirror, see thyself therein,
Grasp what a miserable Asian thou art,
Find no pride in thy fierce unrule,
Forget the filthy way of violence,
And return to the family of the cultured.
He also addressed Shakespeare – emblematic of the now-universal Western European 
culture – as ‘Homer of the modern world’ in a twin poem dedicated to the start of his 
translational work, begging to ‘Let us rid ourselves of barbarity in thy temple’.19
The next milestone in the history of the Ukrainian perception of Europe was after 
the 1917–1921 events, when the ambiguity in identifying as either European or Russian 
had catastrophic consequences for another short-lived independent Ukrainian state.20 In 
1920s Soviet Ukraine, a group of classically educated intellectuals and poets led by Mykola 
Zerov (1890–1937) called for a reorientation towards classical and modernist European 
culture in a tone subversive to the dominant political Bolshevik programme. They found 
an unexpected ally in Mykola Khvylovy (1893–1933), an ethnic Russian, and Ukrainian 
by choice, who was a passionate communist and follower of James Joyce’s writing. He 
preached a global revolution that would free the colonial nations and spoke of ‘the Asiatic 
renaissance’ a few decades before Frantz Fanon’s revolutionary writings and about ten years 
before Aimé Césaire invented the concept of ‘Négritude’. Situated between Europe and Asia, 
Ukraine seemed a natural platform to launch such a project, but this was prevented by its 
provincial condition caused by Russian imperialism, which was also omnipresent in the 
Soviet Union. Therefore, Khvylovy coined slogans like ‘Away from Moscow’ and ‘Towards 
the psychological Europe’.21 For him, Europe was associated with technical and cultural – 
civilizational – achievements that the proletariat had to inherit and develop rather than 
destroy. To be sure, such ideas did not serve the Soviet leadership well, and after a few 
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years of ceaseless public penance, Khvylovy lost faith in the left idea and committed suicide 
in 1933, probably affected by the experience of the Great Famine. A couple of years later, 
Zerov’s group almost entirely perished in the Gulag. For decades after the Stalinist purges, 
the discourse of Europe was hijacked by propaganda, and any other approach could only be 
practised in diasporic and underground circles.22 On the more popular level, Europe and 
the US started invading the Soviet Union in the form of pop culture and mass-produced 
quality goods, creating what Oleksandr Hrytsenko described as cargo cults.23 In the post-
Soviet environment, the ‘creolization’ of the imported Western-looking goods (so-called 
‘euro-things’: ‘euro-windows’, ‘euro-doors’, ‘euro-renovation’) gave them a new quality and 
fresh meaning, comparable to those in the aboriginal worship of foreign, typically Western, 
things. This melange of a consumerist cargo cult, the rediscovery of earlier discourses and 
the success of neighbouring Poland and other Central European countries created an urge 
for Ukraine to move towards Europe and to understand its own identity as European while 
not devoid of deficiencies; something that set the stage for Ukraine’s European choice, 
peaceful between 2004 and 2013, and then militant.
Ola Hnatiuk has pinpointed the Westernization and Europeanization project as one of 
the key identity-building projects in Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s, competing against the 
Soviet and the nativist ones.24 Faced with the lack of a unifying national project, Ukraine as 
a ‘nationalizing state’ opted for this Europeanization, reaffirming its European identity as a 
compromise between democratic nationalist groups and the ruling post-Communist elites.25 
Still, this Europeanization can also be called ‘declarative’.26 Nothing has really challenged this 
account until recently; the Yanukovych government’s fatal November decision became the 
major turning point of this declarative Europeanization. The events that took place before, 
during and after the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013 confirmed 
this observation once again, yet also revealed a major discrepancy between conventional 
policymaking in Ukraine and civil society’s aspirations.
Dariya Orlova has produced arguably one of the most interesting pieces of research on 
the representation of Europe in Ukrainian public discourses. This work can also be applied 
to other Eastern and at times even Central European contexts.27 She focused mainly on the 
EU as a normative model in the most popular Ukrainian live political talk shows (2006–
2010). According to Orlova, in the mediatized political discourse,
‘Europe’ is largely referred to as embodiment of normality and development, advanced 
social and political practices. However, this reference frequently constitutes part of the 
discursive strategies employed by actors of discourse to legitimise or delegitimise certain 
practices and decisions within the Ukrainian context. […] Therefore, ‘Europe’ is mostly 
referred to as a reference point, which evidences that symbolic aspect of references 
dominates over institutional.28
Thus, Europe could in the Ukrainian discourse be constructed twofold: as a final destination 
and a separate geopolitical entity.
07510_Ch04_p093-132.indd   102 4/4/17   5:59 PM
Narratives at War
103
‘Europe Is Over’ and ‘Familial Europe’: More Adventures in Russia and Poland
When it comes to the narrative of Europe, Russia shares the Soviet experience with Ukraine. 
However, earlier experiences were rather different. Zenkovskiy gave an adequate, if 
emotionally partial, account of how eighteenth-century Russian elites started developing 
their own idea of Europe, when, after a few decades of respectful interest that followed the 
top-down Petrine reforms (1696–1725), the Russian intellectual community split into two 
warring camps: the militant anti-European nativists or Slavophiles and the more moderate 
Westernists.29 The discourse on Europe focused on the idea of the West’s decline and decay. 
Few were as radical as Petr Chaadayev (1794–1856), who in his legendary Philosophical 
Letters lambasted Russia for lagging behind and praised Catholicism as a ‘political religion’; 
his works were banned and he was later certified insane. Even such staunch Westernists as 
Aleksandr Herzen (1812–1870) could write: ‘the role of today’s Europe is entirely over: since 
1826, its decay has grown with every step’.30 The perceived terminal crisis of the West 
(nativists formulated it on much harsher terms) forced many authors to adopt the 
messianistic idea that Russia was supposed to save the West from its moral corruption and 
lack of spirituality. This anti-European mood deepened especially after the 1853–1856 
Crimean War, when European countries were accused of ‘hatred’ towards Russia and the 
Slavonic populations of the Ottoman Empire. The early twentieth century, however, 
witnessed a trend towards reconciliation and some kind of middle way between nativists 
and Westernists; this evolution was cut short by the 1917 revolution, which rejuvenated the 
old critique of Europe and fused it with new communist elements. The émigré philosopher 
Nikolay Berdyayev (1874–1948) continued this line of development in France. In his The 
Russian Idea, he is critical of both camps but also has some praise for them and clearly sees 
the difference between Europe and Russia (a question he addresses specifically in this 
book).31 ‘But the type of Russian thinking and Russian culture was always very distinct from 
that of Western Europe’, he wrote; ‘Russian thinking was much more totalitarian [totalitarno] 
and integral [tselostno] than the thinking of the West, which is more differentiated and 
divided into categories’; and in another place: ‘There is enshrined deep down in the Russian 
people [naroda] greater freedom of spirit than there is among the more free and enlightened 
peoples of the West’.32 While Soviet Russia was typecast by its leaders and docile intellectuals 
as the Communist enemy of the capitalist West, Berdyayev’s views enjoyed a resurgence in 
post-Soviet Russia and still defined the perspective of some Russian intellectuals.
From a postcolonial perspective, the relationship with the West created in Russia what 
some call an ‘inferiority complex’.33 According to David C. Moore, ‘Whereas the British 
mimicked no one but themselves, the Russians were mimicking the French and British, 
to whom, again, they had long felt culturally inferior’.34 This complicated dynamic of 
representation never seriously changed, neither in 1917 nor in 1991, as the same logic 
stubbornly reproduced itself in Russia’s self-positioning in relation to Europe. Even the 
perestroika and glasnost periods were short-lived and then labelled a ‘failed excursion 
from “the West” to “Europe”’.35 Since at least Putin’s first presidency period of 1999–2008, 
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the West in general, and, to a slightly lesser degree, the EU, is again perceived as a rival, 
as an adversary – and this is the image the Russian media were projecting too.36 This is 
much facilitated by the country’s media model, which Yelena Vartanova described as statist 
commercialized,37 i.e. combining the decisive role of the state and the effects of a market-
driven economy, where the ‘integrated state-business elite has supported the use of political 
media in new circumstances as traditional instruments of political elite management’.38
‘The spread of fear of alleged Western subversion carried out by opponents of the Kremlin 
has’, Ilya Yablokov notes, ‘served as the main tool of social cohesion’ during Putin’s third 
term (starting 2012).39 The Russian political scientist Dmitriy Trenin recognized already ten 
years ago that ‘Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started 
creating their own Moscow-centered system. […] In the past year, Russia has begun acting 
like the great power it was in tsarist times’.40 Meanwhile, the internal situation in Russia 
qualifies the country for what in political science is called a ‘hybrid regime’, combining 
elements of authoritarian rule and a democratic facade with ineffective political opposition 
and low political participation.41 Sparks and Reading (1998) emphasized that, despite many 
transitional processes, the changes in Eastern Europe were in many cases less significant 
than the continuities, and perhaps in Russia this is most clearly the case.42
Poland’s encounter with Europe has been more intimate but no less complicated. Early 
Polish narratives of Europe (summarized, among others, separately by Andrzej Walicki and 
Andrzej Wierzbicki) focused on the country’s own role as a natural barrier and a defender 
of the continent from the Asian threat.43 As Andrzej Walicki noted, early modern Poland 
was actually suspicious of the absolutist monarchies seen as ‘autocratic’ and took much 
pride in its concept of Sarmatism, an embodiment of liberty and Poland’s ‘special way’. 44 
The crisis of the state based upon this idea led to the first, barely successful, attempts at the 
Westernization of Poland in the second half of the eighteenth century.45 At the same time, a 
loss of independence and the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century stimulated 
Polish thought towards fashionable pan-Slavism (shared with both Ukraine and Russia) and 
the idea of a European confederation, which, however, never resulted in any detailed project 
proposal. For a long time, anti-Western Slavophilism was as widespread among the Polish 
thinkers as it was in the Russian lands; this changed only with the rise of economic and social 
modernization agenda that could base itself only on the Westernist premises.46 The Polish 
narrative appeared considerably more project-oriented and practical than those of its eastern 
neighbours: pan-Europeanism and regional or subregional projects of European cooperation 
became popular towards the early twentieth century.47 The time was also characterized by 
the spread of geopolitics and the Jagiełło and Piast models of relations with neighbours, 
epitomized by the more accommodating patriotic socialism of Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–
1911) and Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) versus the more intolerant integral nationalism of 
Roman Dmowski (1864–1939).48 In post-war Communist Poland, the context for the West 
and Europe was strictly negative, albeit freer than in the rest of the Eastern bloc.49 The Paris-
based journal Kultura, published by Jerzy Giedroyc (1906–2000), developed a perspective 
on Poland as both reconciled with its Eastern neighbours and an integral part of the West.
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Poland’s protest movement in the 1980s was in many ways different from Euromaidan, 
but interestingly the idea of Europe, and of Poland’s return to it, figured prominently in the 
protest against the Jaruzelski regime, both during and after martial law (1981–1983). Just 
as in other Central European countries, this helped Poland to take a lead in the ‘democratic 
transition’ in the post-Communist camp.50 But the contemporary perception of Europe 
and of Poland’s place in it could be most immediately linked to the changes in symbolic 
geography ever since the Solidarność movement and the famous visits of Pope John Paul II, 
which offered the Poles a view of ‘their country as an outpost of Western Europe. They were 
no longer an extension of the Soviet Union, but the somehow decentred heart of Catholic 
Europe’.51 It has since become commonplace that Poland’s view on Europe is determined by 
identity politics52; Poles often controversially feel both Europe’s ‘unwanted child’ and the 
‘creators and defenders of the European values’.53 Poles perceive Europe as part of their own 
lived familial experience: the history of Poland was marked by a feeling of being a severed 
part of Europe that strove to be reunited with the ‘rest of the West’ while viewing it critically 
and acting pragmatically.54 The emotional link, however, is perhaps best represented in 
Czesław Miłosz’s 1959 book, Rodzinna Europa (Native Realm in the published English 
edition, but meaning literally The Familial Europe). Rather unsurprisingly, the Polish media 
system became one of the most commercialized of all the former Eastern bloc countries 
while moving closer towards the Italian or Mediterranean model of relatively strong 
political parallelism and polarization.55 Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska only partly agrees 
with that, emphasizing the last decade’s influence of the liberal model, the post-Communist 
legacy and the democratic corporatist model elements.56 As in many European countries, 
interpretation, commentary and the ‘advocacy’ type of journalism dominate the coverage.57
Dysfunctional Families: Semantic Mapping of the Ukrainian and Russian Press
The Ukrainian, Polish and Russian press analysed here share a few key features in their 
coverage of Europe. In the examined articles, there is certainly an ambiguity in what ‘Europe’ 
means, even in the narrower and most immediate sense (see Figure 4.1). First of all, Europe 
is a geographical entity; a continent with indefinite, yet somehow negotiated, limits that 
define whether or not any particular country is European according to a tacit agreement 
between journalists and audiences. Such is the context in Dzerkalo Tyzhnya: ‘We are second 
in Europe […] in terms of HIV prevalence’.58 This fundamental idea then may go through 
several rounds of clarification that narrow it further, as a rule, on the basis of institutional 
criteria. The wider institutional meaning is associated with the Council of Europe (CoE) 
(this is what is meant in the Kommersant article ‘Russia responds to Europe’, dated 1 October 
2013, or when, in the same newspaper on 11 February 2013, the cancellation of a death 
penalty moratorium is called ‘a provocation against Europe’, i.e. the CoE).59 One more step 
closer towards a narrower Europe is of course the EU, and it can be concluded that this is 
what is meant by Europe in most articles. In Kommersant, ‘Europe’ occasionally comes to 
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mean the European market, which is probably also thought to be equated with the EU. And 
then there is an even narrower definition that is typical of Polish newspapers, which 
meticulously define the eurozone as some special kind of Europe: the European hard core. 
This distinction is, however, largely irrelevant to the Ukrainian and Russian newspapers.
Some categories are found in all newspapers.60 One such theme is what could be referred 
to as ‘Europe in distress’ and includes a depiction of economic and social troubles in the EU. 
Another fundamental narrative of Europe present in every newspaper is Europe as unity 
or, perhaps, a subject. While this might just mention Europe as a location of the events (the 
continent), most typically it is constructed as a political subject in phrases such as ‘Europe is 
seriously concerned’, or, in the context of external policy, as a consolidated geopolitical actor 
pursuing ends of its own: ‘Europe begins to understand that its Ukraine policy, inflexible 
and declarative, proved ineffective’.61
These are virtually all the similarities between the newspapers, and the significant 
differences begin here, which is already evident in how the newspapers report the crisis. 
This category arguably takes up different amounts of space in these newspapers, as seen in 
the diversity of subcategories. While the Ukrainian media only report on some aspects of the 
financial crisis and the internal EU disagreements, the Russian newspapers paint a full-scale 
apocalyptic picture for their readers. For instance, a Spanish court, under pressure from the 
European Court of Human Rights, grants an early release and financial compensation to 
54 dangerous terrorists: ‘In Spain, terrorists and rapists walk free [vypuskayut iz turem]’62; 
the use of cocaine is spreading in Europe thanks to the crisis; a Roma girl on a school trip 
gets deported after she was captured by the French police; member states perceive the 
authority of Brussels as illegitimate.63 Izvestiya is especially notorious for its overwhelmingly 
negative and sensationalist coverage of Europe, but although Kommersant’s reporting is far 
more balanced, its focus on the EU’s migration problems, crisis of leadership and gloomy 
economic figures is more sombre than in any other sampled newspaper. And in a telling 
Figure 4.1. Europe: Gradations of meaning.
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sentence, one could read: ‘28 member states comprise the EU, but in none of them are the 
citizens content and happy’.64
The crisis of Europe has many dimensions, ranging from economic to social to political, 
but the alleged moral crisis is a significant part of this ‘Europe-in-distress’ discourse. 
‘Contemporary Europe has unlearnt to choose. In any case, it has unlearnt to choose 
the right thing’, the journalist Mikhail Shakhnazarov wrote in Izvestiya on 11 May 2014 
following Conchita Wurst’s Eurovision triumph. ‘“The old woman” [Europe] is increasingly 
reminiscent of a sexless creature who at the end of its days has decided to offer its withered 
body for acts of abomination by sodomites’.65
It is worth noting that the discourses in the Russian newspapers tend to avoid identifying 
Russia with Europe or as part of Europe. It can often be hidden in a complex wording that 
initially admits Russia’s ‘Europeanness’. In an interview with Russian Minister of Culture 
Figure 4.2. Semantic map of the Russian media, February 2013–September 2014.
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Vladimir Medinskiy published in Kommersant,66 the interviewee responds to the journalist’s 
question, ‘If Russia is not Europe, what is it?’ in the following way: ‘Russia is not just not 
Europe. Russia is actually half of Europe. But it is way broader than just Europe. […] Rather, 
when it comes to values, the West is turning into its opposite, and Russia has to protect itself 
from this “anti-Europe” in order to protect at least for itself Shakespeare without paedophilia 
and “The Little Prince” without homosexual body language [plastika]’.67
In a strong and striking difference from the journalists from the other two countries, 
Russian newsmen often choose to portray Europe as an adversarial agent, as a threat. 
Brussels and Strasbourg act as authoritarian centres that command and exploit member 
states; the EU ‘feels it is an empire’.68 It is no coincidence the same newspaper interviewed 
the French far-right populist leader Marine Le Pen during her visit to Moscow.69 ‘European 
bureaucrats are obsessed with a messianic idea of a common home, erased borders between 
nations, genders, etc. These people perceive themselves and their task very pathetically, so 
they most likely will sulk over the renegade Ukraine for a long time’.70 When Yanukovych 
rejected the association with the EU, ‘Europe’s political elite lost their face. A bacchanalia 
broke out. Yanukovych was openly teased, humiliated, and literally threatened [derzili, 
khamili, bukvalno ugrozhali]’.71 Brussels ‘corners the Eastern Partnership countries’ to force 
them into choosing between Russia and the EU.72
Closely related to this ‘aggressive Europe’ category is the narrative that depicts the EU as 
being in a conflict with Russia. It occupies a prominent position in Kommersant: the EU has 
‘an objective to outplay [pereigrat] Russia’ in Ukraine.73 The CoE, Izvestiya claims, seeks to 
humiliate Russian pride with its demands, and if the Vilnius summit fails, ‘we will celebrate 
another diplomatic victory’.74 Europe, depicted as a weakling in most Russian newspapers, 
seems nearly doomed to fail everywhere: over Ukraine, the US spying affair, Syria, the South 
Stream project or just anything else. In the end, ‘the most admired European’, according to 
Izvestiya, is Vladimir Putin himself.75
It is especially worth noting that when speaking about the EU the Russian newspapers 
are keen on using emotionalized language that constructs Europe as unsure of itself and 
almost hysterical: ‘the experience of Uruguay scares Europeans’; ‘Europe is afraid of Russia’; 
‘shock and anxiety [trepet], disappointment and irritation in European capitals’; Europe 
‘sulks’; ‘the whole of Europe embittered against the US’; and ‘Europe doesn’t want to serve in 
Afghanistan’.76
The oppositional Novaya Gazeta, also thought to be more ‘highbrow’, is a notable 
exception on a number of positions. While it assumes too that Europe is a sort of geopolitical 
actor and dedicates some space to covering its frail economy and political weakness and 
‘the conflicting thinking [raznomysliye] in [Europe’s] capitals’,77 it nevertheless chooses to 
portray the conflict between Russia and Europe as more peaceful and gentler. Instead of 
the discourse on the European threats, what I call a ‘phantom-menace’ discourse is found 
here: Europe as a fictional threat, a paper tiger of sorts. Although the threats are listed once 
again, they are much more critically assessed and in many cases dumped. The symbolic 
approach to Europe is also to be seen, although it seems to appear episodically within 
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largely Ukrainian contexts (or those of specifically Euromaidan); the writers are aware of 
the symbolic task Europe poses to the Ukrainians. Yet they seem unwilling or unable to 
accept this task for themselves (or at least to speak about it, whether openly or ‘between the 
lines’). Novaya suggests another discourse instead of concentrating on differences between 
Europe and Russia. In many of its articles, the journalists spend dozens of lines comparing 
the levels of corruption and the treatment of opposition in Russia and Europe/the West. 
This comparison is also left hanging in the air as a statement on the order of things rather 
than a direct or indirect call for action to change backward practices. Europe appears from 
this comparison as Russia’s sheer Other, a completely different system of rules and norms – 
sometimes but not necessarily better than the Russian model. In this normalization and 
almost justification of difference, ‘progressive’ Russian journalists strongly differ from their 
Ukrainian counterparts, as I intend to demonstrate now.
Figure 4.3. Semantic map of the Ukrainian media, February 2013–September 2014.
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To some extent, the conflict narrative is also present in the Ukrainian media, at least 
in Korrespondent, which portrays external reactions to the Ukrainian situation as a clash 
between Brussels and Moscow, as well as in the Russian-language tabloid Segodnya, which 
saw the situation before Euromaidan in terms of a conflict and would strike a somewhat 
Eurosceptic tone every now and then. While acknowledging the EU as a goal, albeit an equal 
one to the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), the newspaper chooses to compare 
potential gains and losses of European integration. Even in this way, the tabloid eventually 
saw more benefits than losses, although the ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy receives its share 
of praise. However, suspicion of and disappointment at the EU reveal themselves in the 
negation forms typical of the headlines and highly unusual in other analysed media: ‘EU 
requirements not realistic’, ‘Europe won’t go to war over Ukraine’, ‘EU won’t grant Ukraine 
a visa regime’, ‘Barroso: EU not ready to accept Ukraine’.78 This type of framing and choice 
of phrases connote an idea of an unsympathetic and unwelcoming Europe, something in 
demand for the Eurosceptic section of the Ukrainian audience seeking confirmation of the 
idea that ‘no one awaits us in Europe’.
But what really defines the dominant Ukrainian view of Europe are the categories of 
a successful and advanced society, a symbolic Europe of values that imposes ‘attaining 
Europe’ as both a task and a path to modernization. The Ukrainian coverage of Europe 
is as positive as the Russian is negative. Europe is a vessel of ‘the European standards’ 
and an investment ‘resource’.79 One Korrespondent columnist, a chief executive of a news 
agency, compared on 31 May 2013 the EU to a bourgeois family that had ‘renovated 
its apartment in a European way, with comfortable furniture and good house appliances, 
and lives peacefully and safely’, unlike Ukraine and Russia, which resemble down-and-
out, dysfunctional families living in filthy holes. However, Europe can be idealized 
and criticized at the same time.80 ‘When we say “European choice”, we mean political 
orientation and material abundance’, the prominent Soviet dissident Yevhen Sverstyuk 
wrote in Dzerkalo Tyzhnya on 11 October 2013. ‘In fact, this implies the choice of the most 
vital values: freedom, human rights, rule of law. The Western world is far from ideal. It is 
diverse. Its freedom often borders on lewdness. Its democracy is sometimes a caricature. 
Its liberalism often means lack of principles’.81
The EU’s inability to act decisively against Russia in the Ukrainian crisis further embittered 
many of its critics who remain sympathetic to the Europe of values while targeting political, 
commercial and bureaucratic elites who ‘either do not grasp what Russia and its energy 
policy are or have a very flexible consciousness’.82 In the words of another journalist, ‘no 
matter how Europe threatens [Russia over Ukraine], no matter its formidable pose, it is all 
but clear that it is scared and backs off ’.83
However, against the background of a Europe of values, Ukraine is perceived as deficiently 
European and its condition as lacking Europeanness:
Europeans and people from the Pechersk hills (Ukraine’s ruling elite) speak different 
languages. They are not from different worlds, they are from different planets. ‘We’re absolutely 
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incompatible!’ one European diplomat admitted in despair. Of course you are! Some (the 
Europeans) speak of principles and values and are used to trusting each other’s word. Especially 
the one given at the presidential level. The others (the Ukrainian elite) only believe in and act 
according to the laws of the criminal world.84
These values constitute the symbolic Europe and thus empower those who can associate 
with them to speak from a position of authority. By ‘right of birth’, these are Western 
European countries, and the EU is their alliance and fulfilment of those same values. Europe 
is also the gaze that controls and monitors the actions of Ukraine’s elite; it is in the eyes of 
the EU that Putin wants to discredit Ukraine.85 Europe is also empowered to decide on how 
well Ukraine completes its self-assigned task of becoming part of Europe, which is, in some 
cases, also the centre where the most interesting and topical trends are to be found.
 ‘Return the European Spirit to Europeans’: Semantic Mapping of Europe in  
the Polish Press
For the Polish newspapers, Europe appears in its symbolic dress in articles on EU enlargement 
and suggested solutions to the perceived crisis of Europe.
The Polish newspapers do not shy away from what they portray as the crisis of Europe, 
viewed not only as an economic or social one but also as a deeper crisis of trust, ethics, 
values and even narrative. On 31 August 2014, Jacek Żakowski wrote in Polityka an open 
letter to the EU president-elect, former Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk, criticizing 
Europe’s ‘excess of bureaucratic pragmatism and deficit of meaning’:
You can do a lot to return the European spirit to the Europeans, [the spirit] that has been 
disappearing for years, replaced by the spirit of various egotisms. To accomplish that, you 
would first of all have to offer a new European narrative. Such [narrative] that would be an 
equivalent, at least during the first half of the twenty-first century, to the narrative created in 
the second half of the twentieth century by Robert Schuman, which lasted until the end of the 
1900s but has now exhausted itself.86
This echoed the words of Tusk himself in an interview with Polityka a few months earlier, on 
19 April 2014. Analysing the decision-making-process implications for Poland from an 
institutional perspective, the politician admitted the graveness of the crisis the EU was 
facing and acknowledged that ‘Europe ceased to be the source of hope […] If you are asking 
me about my Europe, I will answer very briefly: political liberty and rule of law, 
constitutionalism and the idea of human dignity. Europe is [its] citizens’.87 These two 
passages reflect to what extent the Ukrainian and the Polish perceptions of Europe as a 
symbolic, political and citizen-oriented value complex have moved towards each other in 
recent years.
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The symbolic Europe also helps Poland distinguish itself from Russia: ‘That state 
[Russia] did not have the Middle Ages, gothic architecture, nor took part in the conflict 
of the faculties. It developed neither the respectable bourgeoisie nor the nobility. The tsar 
looked on everything from above, besides God, keeping his people in fear and obedience’.88 
Europe’s relations with Russia, however, are seldom portrayed as conflictual; more often, 
the newspapers refer to the Russian influence without the framework of open conflict, for 
example: ‘By overturning the table on which the Association Agreement must have been 
signed, Ukraine’s government confirmed the opinion of those European politicians who 
believed Yanukovych led Europe a merry dance in order to bargain as much as possible 
from Russia’.89
What the Polish newspapers bring is some, albeit limited, attention to history and culture, 
mainly in the form of entertaining life stories (e.g. the one on Europe’s most famous cemeteries; 
in this case, a death rather than life story). More significant is another Poland-specific category: 
the European institutions feature peripherally in some Ukrainian articles and items from 
Novaya Gazeta; but in the Polish newspapers, it is much broader and enriched with an internal 
EU perspective. Michał Krzyżanowski noted the importance of the institutional framework 
in the construction of European identity, particularly in Poland, where the journalists indeed 
report on Europe in much greater detail and with attention to many more subtleties than their 
Figure 4.4. Semantic map of the Polish media, February 2013–September 2014.
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Eastern colleagues do.90 They not only mention internal EU divisions and disagreements but 
also explain at great length where common interest lies, where particularism is stronger and 
what the most likely final outcome is. In Rzeczpospolita, Europe fortunately receives a rather 
optimistic reportage of the early signs of recovery from the crisis, the EU’s great potential 
(mostly seen as unrealized) and its successes, such as the new space mission.91
While Russia isolates itself from Europe, and Ukraine accepts it as a task, Poland often 
reports on EU events with a sense of shared responsibility, yet, in many cases, also chooses 
to oppose Europe. One such article is ‘Europe opens, Poland closes’, which concerns the 
different retail opening hours of various countries, and another is ‘Poland is one of the few 
countries that do not sell passports’.92
On an Exercise Machine to Paris: A Digression on the War of Visuals
While portraying Europe as a self-assigned task seems endemic to both the Ukrainian 
mainstream and popular media, Russian discourses on Europe reveal themselves to have 
much more in common with the anti-EU sentiment that is marginal in the Ukrainian 
context. It is not unlikely that the consumption of – or, rather, trust in – either the 
Ukrainian or the Russian media is related to the creation of such different images of 
Europe as in Figures 4.1–4.6. In the analysed Russian newspapers, only two cases activated 
such discourse, as was also the case in the Ukrainian context (a telling detail!), stating 
that ‘many Ukrainians wish to integrate into Europe with its greater stability, better-
developed institutions, welfare and security’,93 and mentioning Europe as the final 
destination for Ukraine.94
This perspective on Europe has spread well beyond the influential and/or popular printed 
media sampled here. Ukraine’s civil society is largely coordinated by the informal elites 
often bound to state institutions through a network of personal ties, but they can also very 
much function as an oppositional force. Their thinking in the weeks before Euromaidan 
is pretty much summarized in a blog by Alyona Hetmanchuk, director of a Kyiv-based 
advocacy centre called the Institute of World Policy (IWP). In the months leading up to 
the Maidan events, the non-governmental organization team toured central and eastern 
Ukraine putting on a series of street events to promote European integration; the influential 
blogger and activist noted the level of resistance to their action from the local authorities 
controlled by the then declaratively pro-European Party of Regions. According to her, these 
street debates highlighted the locals’ pragmatic attitude towards the EU, and they answered 
the most frequently heard question ‘What will Europe give us?’ with ‘our children at least 
will have a better life’. Sceptics, interestingly, produced examples of Belarus as a perfect 
haven of clean streets and an effective state – a fact worth closer consideration as possibly 
highlighting the existence of at least two different kinds of ideal political imaginary among 
prospectively oriented pro-Western (pro-Ukrainian) and retrospectively oriented pro-
Soviet (pro-Russian) Ukrainians.
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Hetmanchuk summarized her impressions thus:
This is the case where we – experts, journalists, diplomats – have to be clear and understandable 
rather than smart and good-looking. Clarity is needed to explain the upsides of European 
integration without both manipulation and frightening potential supporters. For example, one 
does not need to be pathetic and claim there is no corruption in the EU. Rather, it is better to 
explain that corruption is a matter of choice in Europe, while it is unavoidable in our country. 
Or just to produce a fact: the EU member states are ranked highest in the corruption indices, 
while Ukraine is ranked joint 144th with Syria, Cameroon and [Democratic] Republic of 
Congo. We have to be understandable because many Ukrainians in the regions are impressed 
not so much by a certain statement by some EU member state ambassador but by the fact 
that he speaks Ukrainian (this was particularly discussed by a crowd of locals after the speech 
by the EU ambassador Jan Tombiński in Mykolaiv). Or the fact that he just went to talk to 
the people out in the street on the main square of a regional capital rather than going to a 
state-owned venue [aktova zala] with forced attendance before another election and with 
another set of propagandist slogans: without any bodyguards. Yes, it is very important when 
the officials talk about European values and behaviour models. Even more important is not to 
debase these values by going out, with a small army of bodyguards, to talk to the people and 
shaking their hands just as much as needed for two photographs. In such cases, European talk 
is too dissonant for a post-Soviet visual.95
The IWP also commissioned a number of political cartoons; one of them drawn by a well-
known professional cartoonist from Kyiv called Ihor Lukyanchenko epitomizes the view of 
Europe typically found in the news media (see Figure 4.5). A traditionally clad Ukrainian 
Cossack seems to be cycling towards Europe, which he sees in front of him, yet the image is 
merely a framed picture, and he is sitting on an exercise bike. Or has he put the poster on the 
wall to motivate himself to become fitter? In any case, the core Ukrainian ideas associated 
with Europe are here: movement forward and progress, improvement and the idyllic picture 
of successful urban modernity. All of them symbolize the longings of a once-peasant nation, 
in the past nearly destroyed and forced backward. The image, no matter how ironic, still 
connotes Europe to the values of progress and the Enlightenment.
This picture, originally part of an entire exhibition, was not the only such cartoon. After 
the Vilnius summit, another set of pictures was commissioned from multiple cartoonists 
to help improve the EU’s image among Ukrainians (as if much improvement was needed). 
Limited in reach and embodied in far from the most powerful form of propaganda, it hardly 
had any role in fostering pro-European sentiment, although it does indicate the dominance 
of a simplistic sender–receiver communication and influence model in the post-Soviet 
perception of the media. But this set of pictures also gives an intimate, albeit ironic, insight 
into the Ukrainian perception of Europe on the eve of Euromaidan (see Figures 4.5–4.9).
The cartoons focus on the most explicit comparison of a number of everyday situations 
that allow us a glimpse into the daily lives of Ukrainians and Europeans: police practices, the 
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Figure 4.5. Ukraine getting fit for Europe (courtesy of Ihor Lukyanchenko/
the Institute of World Policy; http://youpicture.org/?v=2014-09-16_no3azejl-
p4h03qpc5e87t8b8p.jpg#.VgTiJsuvHIU).
Figure 4.6. ‘Police with the People’ (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/
prev/31.jpg).
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living standards of the elderly, corruption and care for the environment. In these and other 
cartoons (they number around twenty in total), the grim Ukrainian reality is contrasted 
with the image of a better way strongly bound to the European location (note the use of 
iconic landmarks from European capitals). Europe again is seen in an idealized way as the 
haven of righteousness and where things are done properly; to a West European eye, such 
a portrayal, as if what already exists cannot be ‘bettered’, may seem annoyingly uncritical; 
yet it should be remembered that the comparison with their own more difficult situation is 
what matters most for East Europeans. One can criticize what one already has, and for these 
cartoonists, Europe becomes not just an object of sentimental, almost nostalgic, longing 
for another place where everything seems better but also an objective, an explicitly stated 
current, and not necessarily ultimate, goal of progress in their part of the world. 
There were also other takes on this. In the autumn of 2013, the Communist Party of 
Ukraine (an heir to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, arguing for its restoration 
and simultaneously supporting the then ruling Party of Regions as part of the parliament’s 
oligarchic lobby) launched a costly TV advertising campaign under the slogan ‘We speak 
one language’. In a number of adverts, people posing in front of the same recognizable 
European landmarks addressed the audience in English, German and French (without 
any translation or subtitles), narrating terrible stories of the economic and social misery 
engulfing the EU, where starving Asians are not welcomed. Interestingly, the advertisement 
meshed this fairly widespread EU criticism with an identity turn when it ended with a 
Russian jingle, ‘You didn’t understand a word? The Customs Union – we speak one language!’ 
This implied of course that the EU is a foreign, alien and perhaps hostile entity, while the 
Russia-dominated ECU is where one would feel at home. The campaign apparently did not 
Figure 4.7. ‘Affluent Old Age’ (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/prev/15.jpg). 
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seek to convert any pro-Europe supporters but rather to mobilize the Soviet-nostalgic and 
pro-Russian population.
The campaign nonetheless angered pro-EU activists and they responded to it in September 
2013 with an amateur video that was viewed 86,000 times as of March 2015. The video 
consists of a number of clips from earlier user uploads filmed at different times and locations 
showing people saying ‘fuck you’ [poshёl na khuy] in Russian, ending with the same jingle, 
‘We speak one language!’ Thus, the EU supporters returned the identity reading suggested 
by the anti-EU campaign back to where it started, inscribing backwardness and brutality 
into the Russian identity, just as failure and indifference were etched into the European 
identity by the original campaign: a narrative harbinger of the more physical clash to come.
The basic ideological disposition before, during and after Euromaidan, from 2014–2015 
to the time of writing, the Donbas war, is extremely clear in a comparison of the IWP 
commissions and a user-generated cartoon (Figure 4.10), likely by an amateur cartoonist 
from Donetsk called Ruslan Smak. Here, once again, we see a Cossack figure symbolizing 
Ukraine; yet again, there is a comparison of two pictures. However, this time, everything is 
reversed: the dimly lit European side curiously presents Hitler, gay men kissing, drugs, the 
LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) and EU flags and the devil himself. Opposing 
him is an angel in a Russian folk costume defending bright traditional values, including 
the large nuclear family, religion, reverence for the history and worship of the victory in 
Figure 4.8. ‘Which Treatment is Better?’ (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/
prev/20.jpg).
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Figure 4.9. ‘Clear Water!’ (courtesy of the Institute of World Policy; http://iwp.org.ua/img/caricatures/prev/23.jpg).
Figure 4.10. Ukraine facing choice between decadent West and traditional Russia, a.k.a. ‘I 
Choose Freedom’ (courtesy of Ruslan Smak; http://i.imgur.com/LDDGQeK.jpg).
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World War II (symbolized by the period tank mounted on a pedestal), space exploration 
and military power. 
This cartoon could be accompanied by a later post-Maidan wallpaper picture (dated 12 
April 2014) by a so far unidentified author whose barely legible signature can be seen on 
the second-to-right shield (Figure 4.11). The visual literally puts the infamously brutal and 
subsequently disbanded Berkut riot police in the same row as Kyivan Rus princes framed 
as guardians of history, tradition and possibly native soil, almost in the Blut und Boden 
tradition. The striking difference between pro-European and pro-Russian Internet imagery 
provides an explanation for the later armed rebellion in Donbas as a war between not so 
much two different identity allegiances as two incompatible ideological positions and 
perspectives on the world as embodied in the Maidan and anti-Maidan communities (as 
East Ukrainian rebels like calling themselves), hence also the imminence of the clash and 
the ensuing war, as evident in the recent violent experience (bloodshed in Maidan) and the 
active Russian support for one of the sides. Europe is at the core of this clash as a geopolitical 
actor, a symbol of stakes and choices as well as an empty signifier into which each side reads 
its own agenda, values and objectives.
Figure 4.11. ‘Berkut’ wallpapers (courtesy of Rammist/Look.com.ua; www.look.com.ua/98958-berkut-geroi-shhity-
bogatyri.html).
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Online Discussions: ‘Brothel Europe’? 
The study of networked online discourses confirms the findings of the press and both 
mainstream and folkloric visuals. During the autumn and winter of 2013–2014, the blog 
section of Ukrayinska Pravda became a hub of discussion on the association with the EU. 
This is a site where many public figures (politicians, analysts, writers, artists, lawyers, activists 
and journalists) keep their diaries and which, to some extent, sets an agenda for the political 
and cultural debate. Here Europe is used as a ‘reference point’, in the words of Orlova.96 In 
his blog entries, Vadym Kolesnichenko, one of the most resented pro-Russian MPs and a 
staunch Yanukovych supporter, demanded, based on European Parliament resolutions, that 
Ukraine’s rightists who celebrated the birthday of Stepan Bandera, a historical figure 
associated with their movement, should be punished.97 Kolesnichenko had also published a 
much earlier entry called ‘The future belongs to the united Europe’.98 The pro-opposition 
journalist Serhiy Andrushko explained ‘Why our politicians do not want to integrate into 
the EU’: ‘Being in the EU means transparent tender procedures. […] Buying raspberries for 
70 euros [per kilo] or a metro station bench for the price of an inexpensive car will be 
impossible. […] Look at how MEPs declare the gifts they receive’.99 One of the protest leaders, 
Yuriy Lutsenko, summarized this more succinctly: ‘Europe is a system of relations where a 
man [lyudyna – literally “a man”, “a human being”] is the centre of power. Everything works 
towards the man [lyudyna]’100 (NB the parallel with Tusk’s ‘Europe is [its] citizens’).
The trend is, however, unfortunate for Europe. As the protest went on without any tangible 
support from the EU, the discussions in January 2014 became more sober if not sombre. 
‘Europe is responsible for violence in Kyiv because of its inaction and silent observation’, 
one activist and journalist argued. ‘Neither government nor Europe hear us; people are 
forced to resort to an uprising as the last option. So we urge Europe to intervene and impose 
sanctions. If Europe just stands by watching, we can repeat Munich 1938’.101 In a final chord, 
the frontman of one of Ukraine’s leading rock bands exclaimed: ‘Stop referring to the protest 
as “pro-European”. Europe doesn’t give a shit about us. And it’s not about it anyway’.102
Bloggers on the important Russian blog platform Snob.ru reiterated the same apocalyptic 
and agonistic discourses as their country’s mainstream media. Anecdotic evidence suggests 
that Russian webspace is already awash with half-invented stories about the West’s moral 
decay, juvenile justice, gay prides for kids and other symptoms of the Untergang of 
Geyropa (‘Gayrope’, an ironic reference by the Russian ultraconservatives to the European 
understanding of human rights). On Snob.ru, one could recently read entries on the idea 
of Europe being destroyed by the US and Russia,103 an open question on whether Jews are 
really fleeing Norway because of the xenophobic migrants,104 reflections on the geopolitical 
epic battle for Ukraine between the EU and Russia,105 and French neocolonialism in 
Africa.106 Eduard Limonov, the leader of Russia’s National Bolsheviks and an almost classic 
modern writer, suggested: ‘In fact, it would be good for us if Europe collapsed. It is in our 
interests, in the interests of Russia to support the migrants in Europe against the European 
indigenous populations to weaken Europe’.107 At the same time, unlike the printed media, 
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on the Internet one can also find examples108 of the symbolic use of Europe as the source of 
values and righteous practices. One blogger dwelled on how the idea of Europe coincides 
with that of political modernization. Importantly, the website launched a series of articles 
entitled ‘Why Russia lags behind Europe’.
Poland may lack a prestigious blog platform that takes part in agenda setting and framing 
the most important issues. Most blogs on the news outlets’ websites belong to the journalists 
who work for them. A more popular blog platform Natemat.pl suggests strong identification 
with Europe among its authors. In many cases, whenever Europe is mentioned, Poland is 
also included in the pan-European or pan-Western ‘we’. This, however, does not make the 
stance less critical. The journalists and bloggers attack Europe (and very often Poland itself as 
a part of it) whenever possible, from underreaction to overreaction to the events in Ukraine. 
Ukrainians themselves feature notably in the blogs: the lawyer and politician Bartłomiej 
Ciążyński, while criticizing the EU’s lack of unity, quoted from a Ukrainian activist’s address 
to Europe: ‘You are too old, blind to what is happening; you are deaf and can’t hear screams. 
[…] Above all, you don’t want to help anybody until it brings you profit’.109 Similarly, one 
blogger, the self-styled ‘conservative punk’ Maciej Borowicz, supported the important writer 
Andrzej Stasiuk in his criticism of ‘Poland becoming part of the overly calculating West’ 
too quickly.110 The participants discuss the crises of Europe and question its adherence to 
its own values; sometimes the conservative discourse similarly occurs regarding how it is 
in Russia, for instance when the journalist Kamil Sikora cited a right-wing MP (albeit in an 
ironical context): ‘Europe is a brothel where everything is allowed, with a goat, a horse, an 
ape, another woman, a child, with anybody’.111
Words to Play With: The Rhetorical Uses of Europe
The observation of Polish blogs and especially newspapers leads to an interesting conclusion. 
One practice extremely typical of both Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza is the 
generalization of Europe. The article often contains a story from just one or maybe two 
countries still generalized as representative of Europe and featuring in the headline and/or 
lead, for example the Gazeta articles ‘Europe Homo+’ on the legalization of gay marriage in 
France and ‘Europe protects its culture from the US’ on new French measures to close the 
markets to American cultural products.112 Although these stories may have some significance 
for other European countries, there is nothing in them for us to assume it is about more than 
merely national action. The ‘Europe’ of these articles is rather a figure of speech, in this case 
a synecdoche, which substitutes the whole with its part or vice versa. In a peculiar specificity, 
this approach is untypical of, and almost unknown in, both the Ukrainian and the Russian 
sources analysed here.
Europe in general is made sense of through a set of metaphors and related rhetorical 
devices. Metaphor could be defined as ‘seeing, experiencing or talking about something in 
terms of something else’.113 Lakoff and Johnson posit the defining role of this form of speech 
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for human activity in general: ‘metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language 
but in thought and action’.114
There is a certain lack of clarity and consensus as to the relationship between synecdoche, 
metonymy and metaphor (itself abundant with subspecies). Different authors consider them 
separate figures, forms of each other or parts of a greater umbrella concept. This disagreement 
is of minor importance to my analysis as long as a categorical distinction is made between 
them, and they represent different ways of perceiving certain phenomena.115 I largely agree 
with Lakoff and Johnson when they say that ‘the essence of metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’, while metonymy is defined by ‘using 
one entity to refer to another that is related to it’.116
Metaphor and metonymy are different kinds of processes. Metaphor is principally a way 
of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding. 
Metonymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to 
use one entity to stand for another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device. It also 
serves the function of providing understanding. For example, in the case of the metonymy 
THE PART FOR THE WHOLE there are many parts that can stand for the whole. Which 
part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on.117
One of the primary differences between the three countries’ narratives of Europe lies in how 
they use Europe as a linguistic device. Overloaded with different meanings, the word 
‘Europe’ functions as a semantically empty trope: Europe is not ‘what’; it is ‘how’. Broadly 
speaking, it is most likely a metonymy; something called by the name of something else 
closely associated with it, instead of being called by its own name.
 1. Ukrainian texts tend to prefer ordinary metonymy, employing Europe as shorthand for 
the values and practices seen as important, useful and vital to Ukraine’s own survival, 
just because the values originated in Europe and are associated with it. When a blogger 
writes ‘Ukraine has to become a European country’, they do not mean it should be 
recognized as a geographical part of the continent – this has already happened a long 
time ago. Rather, they establish a category of advanced, affluent, developed, democratic 
societies to which Europe belongs or even gave birth to, thus using a metonymic device 
to refer to the political goal in a more concise spatial rather than ideological context. 
 2. For Poland, an EU member, any part thereof can more easily substitute the whole in a 
synecdoche (which is indeed often seen as a form of metonymy. Again, the question 
of classificatory hierarchy is really secondary for this analysis as long as we agree to 
distinguish between the concepts in principle). In a typical use of ‘Europe allows same-
sex marriages’ in an article on France, the Polish journalist reveals the perception of 
Europe as a whole (which invalidates the question of the exaggeration in the article – if 
it is a whole, it does not really matter which part of it does something), whether this 
perception reflects an actual or a desired reality. 
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 3. Russian sources often push the limits of metonymy further to almost extreme forms of 
metaphor where anything at all can substitute for anything else, such as in a catachresis – 
literally ‘an abuse’ of a word used arbitrarily without any connection to its semantic 
context; therefore facilitating the construction of the metaphoric, if not hyperbolic, 
stories of decline and fall or epic battle. Many authors (including Jacques Derrida) discuss 
catachresis as a violent form of metaphor that takes the concept out of its common-use 
context to denote a concept for which no word exists. This also hints at the arbitrariness 
with which Europe has been taken out of its context to function as a geopolitical enemy 
and a symbol of the ‘decadence of progress’. The cartoon lumping together LGBT flags 
and Hitler to signify ‘the European choice’ defines Europe by arbitrarily associating with 
mutually contradictory phenomena the Russian conservative ideology sees as wrong and 
adversarial, thus committing conceptual violence, which is at the heart of catachresis. The 
article that claims terrorists walk free from European prisons, based on a particular case 
of an amnesty in Spain, does pretty much the same thing. Both cases also demonstrate 
the use of synecdoche and hyperbola, but they function in this specifically catachrestic 
way, which is very foreign to, say, Polish discourse. At the same time, the Russian case 
also allows for more variation compared to the two others. And the aforementioned 
historical examples indicate that the catachrestic use of Europe has for a long time been 
endemic to Russian discourses and extremely unusual in Poland or Ukraine.
There is of course a more down-to-earth explanation for this. Polish newspapers see Europe 
from within and have a more precise idea about it; this is perhaps one of the reasons for the 
presence of institutional and market aspects as they entail a more accurate definition of 
Europe. What Europe is, is clearly defined and demarcated (see Figure 4.4). In Russia and 
Ukraine, these criteria are more blurred and therefore more metonymic and even 
catachrestic. If the aspect of values and authority dominates in Ukraine, Russia sees Europe 
from the perspective of a conflict and a geopolitical game where Europe is destined to be the 
losing side.
Conclusion: Europe as an Empty and Floating Signifier
The political meaning of this situation of conceptual emptiness is that Europe has become 
the main driver of East European domestic politics and the signifier that mediates internal 
political struggle. It is tempting more specifically to invoke the concept of empty signifier, 
which Ernesto Laclau theorized as ‘a signifier without signified’.118 An empty signifier is 
different from a floating signifier, which can be attached to different signifiers. Unlike 
floating signifiers, an empty signifier refers to something that does not exist but politically is 
perceived as a lack: ‘The emptying of a particular signifier of its particular, differential 
signified is […] what makes possible the emergence of “empty” signifiers as the signifiers of 
lack, of an absent totality’.119 For example, in the Hobbesian condition of the natural state, 
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‘“order” as such has no content because it only exists in the various forms in which it is 
actually realized. However, in a situation of radical disorder “order” is present as that which 
is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence’.120 ‘Order’ is one 
example, but other empty signifiers could include liberation, revolution, progress and 
change.
The political nature is exactly what makes it different from a case of complex polysemy 
or plurality of interpretations. It is precisely when such a polysemic concept is politicized as 
necessary and lacking that it becomes an empty signifier; empty because it can be filled by a 
set of goals that a certain political actor claims are identical to the assumed positive content 
to which the empty signifier refers. For instance, to achieve ‘progress’, a classical example of 
an empty signifier, one group can insist more economic growth is needed, while another can 
call for exactly the opposite, degrowth and deindustrialization. 
Juxtaposed with the situation presented in this chapter, this line of thinking would suggest 
that while ‘European standards’ exist in their actual – nation-specific – forms, the perceived 
lack of modernity and of ‘Europe’ urges the participants of the political struggle in Ukraine 
to bring about ‘Europe’. Whatever group succeeds in persuading others that its goals are 
the most compatible with that task is the one which fills that lack and wins the political 
struggle.121 The critical perspective would then imply not so much criticizing the perception 
of the lack of Europe associated with modernity and progress but rather attacking group-
specific claims of the ability to overcome it, which lay the foundation for the hegemony of 
those groups. Instead of targeting Ukrainians’ aspirations of becoming part of Europe, an 
adequate critique would have to attack the claims to bring these aspirations about made by 
various groups within the Ukrainian political class.
In Russia, Evropa/Geyropa can, on the contrary, be seen as a floating rather than an empty 
signifier. The former can be deliberately attached to whatever is perceived as a negative value 
(including also vastly different concepts such as LGBT rights and Pax Americana), while 
the true Russian empty signifier, the great lacking good, is the restorative, nostalgia-driven 
sense of an unfair lack of greatness, superpower status and respect. In Poland, the process 
of filling Europe – once an empty signifier very similar to the one we can see in Ukraine 
today – with more specific content is under way right now. However, the completion of such 
a project is sheer utopia. As long as Europe remains polysemic and political, it will produce 
empty signifiers at this intersection. This is at least the case if such a perspective is adopted, 
which I am proposing here as a final theoretical hypothesis rather than a definite empirical 
finding and as a suggestion for a more detailed enquiry.
Three main concluding points can be suggested: 
 1. Discourses in all three countries agree that Europe primarily has geographical and 
institutional dimensions. Journalists tend to see it most typically as a locational frame of 
reference or associate it with the EU (even the qualitative analysis gives the impression 
that this understanding is dominant) while at times also identifying Europe with the 
larger CoE or just the smaller eurozone.
07510_Ch04_p093-132.indd   124 4/4/17   5:59 PM
Narratives at War
125
 2. Although all seem to agree more or less that Europe acts as a political subject and hardly 
faces its best times, there are vast differences in how Europe is identified. Russians focus 
on the EU’s dramatic internal crisis, along with the perceived otherness and often 
aggressiveness of Brussels. In contrast, Ukrainians prefer a symbolic understanding 
of the Europe of values or Europeanness as a self-assigned task, and Poles are unique 
in their self-identification with Europe and their attention to the EU’s institutional 
framework. 
 3. These dissimilarities coincide with each country’s political status in Europe and their 
different vocabulary on Europe, with different semantic and rhetorical form, thus 
suggesting a dominance of synecdoche in Poland, metonymy in Ukraine and catachresis 
in Russia. For all three, Europe is a different figure of speech as much as a different 
meaning.
Looking at this summary in the project’s wider context, I believe that one of the striking 
conclusions is the continuity of the official Soviet/mainstream Russian anti-European 
narrative, as is evident from Stefan Jonsson’s contribution in this volume. The Polish case 
reminds of the relatively optimistic perspective of the Latvian press on Europe in the wake 
of the 2008 crisis and the Occupy movement (cf. Anne Kaun’s findings). In a more general 
sense, these public discourses may be lacking the near-identical versions of the narratives of 
the kind that Johan Fornäs found in the ESC entries although the generality and level of 
abstraction of some perspectives on Europe as either declining or resurging, an arch-enemy 
or an epitome of progress and modernity, sometimes make news media seem to be plucking 
the same strings as pop music does. But eventually, both pro- and anti-European narratives 
are very far from what Jan Patočka, according to Carl Cederberg, understood as ‘care for the 
soul’ in an alternative conceptualization of Europe. Regardless of their claims, these 
contemporary Ukrainian, Russian and Polish narratives of Europe remain within the 
Hegelian paradigm of thinking Europe as spirit, which monopolizes progress and modernity 
or, in an incarnation of its ugly twin, desires to banish this spirit in the hopeless melancholic 
longing to restore tradition and turn the tide of history. In this sense, a centuries old spectre 
is indeed still haunting Europe: the spectre of Europe itself.
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 3 Andruchowytsch (2014, quoted from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2014). I refer to the 
German transliteration of the name as given in the article.
 4 While the semantic complications and contradictions of the notion of Europe will be given 
due consideration here, during the actual research a more ‘ad hoc’ understanding was 
adopted: what the analysed texts and statements imply by ‘Europe’?
 5 Jensen (2002: 247).
 6 I decided to sample the items published between February 2013, a date that roughly 
marked the beginning of a more intensive rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU, 
and September 2014, the first Minsk agreements, which represented the end of the earliest 
stage of the war in Donbas. However, no strict sampling procedure was performed, given 
the qualitative character of the methodology applied here. All in all, about 200 articles from 
nine newspapers were analysed, plus 17 blog entries from three blog platforms. I tried to 
avoid any preconceptions and develop categories directly from the material. While reading 
the articles closely, I marked the themes and frames that construct Europe as reported, and 
the repeating themes were then put into categories. If new semantic constructions appeared 
later on, they established a fresh category. The articles were read and analysed until no new 
categories appeared, and the results demonstrated the expected saturation. The analysis was 
qualitative, not quantitative, and does not represent any statistical data.
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‘Our time to act has come!’
Blockupy Frankfurt’s call to protest
With ‘Our time to act has come’ Blockupy, a European protest network that is an offshoot of the Occupy movement, started the call to block the opening ceremony of the new headquarters of the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt am Main 
on 18 March 2015. Particularly targeting the ECB – one of the troika besides the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC) – Blockupy opposes austerity 
measures imposed by the troika to tackle the eurozone financial crisis. Clearly reframing the 
initial Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, on which Blockupy draws symbolically, the 
activist network articulates a European perspective on the flaws of global capitalism. This 
chapter deals with European forerunners to the Blockupy call for action. It considers local 
versions of OWS and analyzes the European recontextualization of activist narratives as well 
as narratives constructed by the mainstream news media.
On 17 September 2011, activists gathered in Manhattan to start what has come to be 
known as the OWS movement, whose idea and practices quickly disseminated globally, and 
encampments emerged in numerous cities worldwide. As a reaction to the financial crisis 
in 2007–2008, Occupy grew as a protest movement, spreading hope for sustainable and 
democratic change.2 Questioning the sensible, namely what is visible and audible in society,3 
the movement had a broad agenda and was explicitly multi-voiced. However, the movement 
was most prolific in its critique of the financial markets and of the increasing inequality in 
the US. The movement has of course changed over time, but it has also remoulded itself by 
moving to different national, regional and local contexts. 
While the OWS movement was identified with criticism of the US American economic 
and political system, the focus of which changed for its sister movements in Europe. 
Although Swedish and Latvian Occupy activists clearly rooted their activism in the 
regional and national context, in both cases European narratives are absent throughout 
the mainstream news media’s reporting. This is somewhat surprising, since predecessors of 
the Occupy movement such as the Indignados in Spain and the Indignant Citizens 
Movement in Greece as well as the European versions of OWS palpably expressed European 
perspectives by addressing institutions of the European Union (EU) as being responsible for 
the crisis and the consequences of strict austerity policies.4
This chapter addresses particularly the lack of a European perspective in mainstream 
news narratives generated in the context of Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia – both 
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geographically and politically – and in conclusion suggests reasons for the disconnection 
between activist and news narratives. The aim here is to identify major narrative strategies 
employed by the mainstream newspapers in their reporting on the movement in Sweden 
and Latvia. Looking at Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia, I move from the central 
arenas of global capitalism to its periphery, which is no less affected by the contradictions of 
accelerated capitalism, which OWS addressed in its criticisms. Consequently, I examine how 
the Swedish and Latvian mainstream news media recontextualize the Occupy movement 
according to their specific contexts while I also consider activists’ narratives gathered 
through in-depth interviews and the monitoring of social media, particularly Facebook 
groups set up by activists. Furthermore, the chapter aims to contribute a new perspective 
on the analysis of the global Occupy movement, moving away from the network metaphor 
proposed by, for example, Castells and a focus on central nodes.5 Instead, I argue that rather 
than being one strongly interlinked network based on communication infrastructures, the 
global Occupy movement is a travelling narrative characterized by very specific reshapings 
and reinterpretations in different localities.6 
The Mediation of Occupy Wall Street
The narrative of OWS predominantly starts with a call by AdBusters, a Canada-based, not-
for-profit, anti-consumerist magazine, to occupy Wall Street by introducing the hashtag 
#occupywallstreet on Twitter. After the attempt to take Wall Street, a camp was set up in 
Zuccotti Park – a privately owned space. The protest camp remained in place until the first 
eviction in November 2011. Although the mainstream media only barely reported on the 
movement during the opening days of the occupation, word of OWS spread around the 
world, not just to the main European capitals. This led to further adaptations of similar 
tactics and different versions of OWS on a global scale. In the financial centres of Europe, 
such as London and Frankfurt, the protesters began to occupy public spaces, promoting the 
slogan ‘We are the 99%’, but also in cities and areas often perceived as peripheral to global 
capitalism, the ideas and ideals of Occupy were spread and appropriated to the specific 
context. 
In the American context, commentators on OWS often highlight the mainstream media’s 
complete news blackout during the first eight days of the occupation.7As a consequence, 
various digital media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, have been essential 
in spreading images of, and information about, the movement all over the world. With 
the help of self-produced media,8 the occupiers in New York City disseminated tactics 
and strategies that other encampments picked up and modified. At the same time, these 
platforms have been subsequently highlighted by commentators and the mainstream news, 
steering the focus away from the movement’s political practices as such.9 Later on, granting 
the movement some attention and in some cases even sympathy, as Todd Gitlin notes,10 the 
mainstream media’s reporting largely downplayed the importance of Occupy as a global 
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movement for social change. Navigating within the realm of the post-political condition, 
the mainstream news media focused on individual activists and highlighted the spectacle 
character of OWS and its global spread.11
In research focusing on Occupy and the media, Twitter, Facebook and blogs are 
highlighted as the main communication and organizational platforms.12 Castells, for 
example, characterizes the movement as a networked movement navigating the space 
of flows.13 Bennett and Segerberg develop the notion of connective instead of collective 
action, using Occupy as an example.14 Gerbaudo provides a critical view on the role of social 
media for the Occupy movement,15 arguing that the emergence of Occupy as a networked 
movement was mainly a myth produced by the mainstream media: 
[T]he emergence of Occupy Wall Street was characterised by a tortuous development 
in which social media were only partly used as a means for a choreography of assembly, 
setting the scene for public protest, and often became more a kind of channel for the 
reverberation of events taking place on the ground.16 
Unlike these previous works, this study shifts the focus towards the representation of 
Occupy in the peripheries of global capitalism, in countries and cities that are, however, 
similarly strongly affected by the outgrowth of the global economic system. Representations 
of Occupy as a global movement aiming for an alternative political, social and economic 
organization help develop an understanding of how shared values are negotiated in 
contemporary societies. Mainstream media representations not only serve as a source of 
arguments on which politicians, the cultural elite as well as citizens draw to form their own 
meanings and opinions; however, they are also sites of a struggle about dominant views on 
political and cultural norms. Symbolically, they are sites of the expression, enactment and 
legitimation of norms and values.17
The Economic Crisis and Occupy in the European Periphery
Although the Swedish and Latvian encampments and the mobilizations around the 
Occupy movement were not nearly as big as in the US, they represent an interesting point 
in the case of transnational activism, which forms a global movement, but which is very 
much rooted in local causes and previous activism. As Michael Gould-Wartofsky shows 
in his careful narration of OWS, the New York mobilization has a long history of local 
and international activism.18 Similarly, the activists in Sweden and Latvia have personal 
and collective histories of political activism. At the same time, Occupy Stockholm and 
Occupy Latvia, although small and sometimes including only a handful of activists, 
represent one of the clearest European responses to the economic crisis, addressing 
European institutions and hence serving as an entry point to looking at European 
narratives generated by and around protest movements. 




According to the IMF, the Baltic countries have suffered considerably from the financial 
crisis that peaked in 2008.19 With the gross domestic product shrinking by 14.2 per cent in 
2009, compared to the previous year, and an unemployment rate as high as 19.5 per cent 
in 2010, Latvia was, after a period of rapid growth, faced with an extreme economic 
situation.20 As in other EU member states, the crisis was tackled with a strategy of ‘internal 
devaluation’, including extensive cuts in wages and public spending.21 Despite these strong 
austerity measures, Anders Åslund22 and Valdis Dombrovskis, the former prime minister 
of Latvia, argue in a 2011 book that the democratic institutions worked well. Therefore, 
they propose, there were only few protests and very little public criticism. The celebration 
of political institutions silences, however, accounts of social unrest that appeared. Latvia 
had seen crisis-related protest mobilizations already in 2008–2009 predating the global 
Occupy movement, but employing similar protest tactics. On 13 January 2009, for example, 
a protest against the government’s and Europe’s handling of the crisis was met with strong 
police action. Protesters, mainly students and youths, were calling for the resignation of the 
government. During the mobilization, a number of protesters tried to hinder MPs from 
entering the parliament by camping in front of the main parliament building. After the 
resignation of the government, the protest quickly faded, as the activists seemed to have 
reached their goals. Additionally, in the autumn of 2009, a group of approximately 20 
activists camped in front of the Cabinet of Ministers, the main Latvian government building. 
The encampment remained until the summer of 2010. The camp’s activists put forward a 
broad range of demands directed at the Latvian government. Some of the main issues were 
unemployment and austerity measures. Despite these early occupations of different public 
spaces, Latvia has never seen an occupation connected to the global Occupy movement. 
However, with the global spread of Occupy, loose online networks linked to the movement 
appeared discussing economic greed and politics in Latvia. These online groups were linking 
themselves symbolically to the global movement with the help of social media platforms. 
The analysis considers the online engagements linked to the Occupy movement, particularly 
activities of the Occupy Latvia Facebook group. As reason why no Occupy encampment 
emerged in Latvia after 2011, two of my informants suggested that the name Occupy did 
not appeal to citizens and potential activists, given Latvia’s occupation by Germany and 
the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century. In that sense, one of the Occupy 
movement’s main aims, namely to overturn and reclaim the notion of occupation, failed in 
the Latvian context.23 
Occupy Stockholm
Compared to other European countries, Sweden has often been described as having coped 
relatively well with the effects of the financial crisis. However, in Sweden, the economic stress 
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indices reflected growing tensions in the markets in 2009,24 and the youth unemployment 
rate, compared to the average rate of unemployment, was actually the highest among OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries.25 
A local branch of the Occupy movement emerged in Stockholm in October 2011 and – 
with changing locations in the city centre and suburbs – kept an encampment until July 
2012. Like other camps, Occupy Stockholm quickly diversified into several groups and 
committees working on specific issues; one of the largest was the media group, including 
a number of subdivisions working on its home page, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, printed 
outlets and posters as well as graphics. Other divisions were dedicated to demonstrations 
and to a study group that met weekly between January and May 2012. As two informants 
involved with Occupy Stockholm have suggested, many first-time activists joined the group 
in the beginning. During the late summer of 2012, however, more and more members 
vanished, and with that, the actual occupation ended. A core group of five people remained 
and held regular general assemblies until October 2012, when they decided to dissolve 
Occupy Stockholm until the decision is taken to revive it. 
The topics around which particular mobilizations evolved were broad and included 
homelessness, support for the demand to restrict the size of international banks, general 
Europe-wide protests against public debt and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), World Environment Day, demonstrations against US war policies, support for 
the protest against European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds, demonstrations against 
privatization and the financial system, Occupy May 1st and protests against weapon exports 
and the Data Retention Directive. Although Occupy Stockholm mobilized around specific 
European causes, this was not reflected in the reporting on the movement. 
Swedish and Latvian Occupy Narratives
In choosing Swedish and Latvian recontextualizations of the Occupy movement, 
the analysis builds on two heterogonous samples: Sweden, which actually had several 
Occupy encampments, and Latvia, which although it never saw an Occupy camp, the 
idea of Occupy resonated with alternative political voices and was invoked in different 
digital initiatives and offline mobilizations. Latvia and Sweden also represent historically 
different political activism contexts. As Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg argue, 
post-Communist countries such as Latvia have often been considered as having weak civil 
societies, which is linked to their political history of state authoritarianism.26 However, the 
authors demonstrate that a broad variety of political activism exists in the post-Communist 
context, which, perforce, has not taken the same paths as in the West. Although I am 
not necessarily interested in reinforcing an East–West divide, the question of different 
historical contexts adds complexity to the analysis of protest movement narrations. 
At the same time, Latvia and Sweden share specific historical experiences such as the 
economic crisis – though to different degrees – which justifies a comparative perspective. 
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The economic ties become particularly evident when looking at the three main banks in 
Latvia, which are all Swedish. Furthermore, Swedish media conglomerates such as Bonnier 
had been active in Latvia, which makes a comparison of mainstream media narratives 
especially interesting.27 
Besides the comparative aspect, the material gathered for the analysis here emerged in 
different institutional settings. The chapter combines mainstream news with narratives 
developed and spread by activists, expressed in both texts circulating in social media and 
in-depth interviews I conducted with the activists. In that sense, the analysis moves between 
different sites and perspectives and could be considered a multi-sited narrative approach.28 
The sample of the mainstream news media consists of major Swedish and Latvian dailies 
reporting on Occupy. The choice of newspapers includes a broad spectrum of political 
positions (from liberal to conservative) as well as quality and tabloid. For the Latvian case, 
the sample includes the most important Latvian and Russian-language daily newspapers, 
which are mainly read by the strong Russian-speaking minority (approximately 27 per cent 
of the Latvian population).
All articles featured in the Swedish newspapers Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet, 
Aftonbladet and Expressen, the Latvian newspapers Diena, Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, Latvijas 
Avīze and the Russian-language newspapers Chas and Vesti that referenced the Occupy 
movement from September to November 2011 were included in the material. The period 
was chosen based on the main OWS activities. The Swedish sample consists of 63 articles 
in total, whereas during the same period, the Latvian newspapers published only 17 articles 
mentioning the Occupy movement. The first report in Sweden appeared on 29 September 
2011 in Svenska Dagbladet; it was a fairly long article in the finance section. In Latvia, the 
earliest article on the Occupy movement was published on 3 October 2011. Additionally, 
I aimed to capture Occupy narratives from the activists’ perspective. Hence, I monitored 
the main social media sites: the Facebook groups Occupy Latvia and Occupy Stockholm. 
Furthermore, I conducted in-depth interviews with activists involved in either of these 
movements.
Analytically, I suggest considering Occupy in terms of the reshapings of a metanarrative in 
different contexts, instead of focusing on central nodes of a global protest network. Narrative 
analysis, rooted in literature, history, anthropology, sociology and linguistics, encompasses 
a variety of research practices and analytical strategies.29 In general, the notion of narrative 
may refer to an actual text or a more abstract discourse. Narrative analysis enables, therefore, 
the inclusion of individual voices and more abstract discourse. The inclusion of individual 
voices is of particular importance in the context of the Occupy movement, which was, and 
is, characterized by a broad diversity of political views and actors. Stories and narratives 
are here considered expressions of emplotment, which refers to the ordering function of 
narratives for all kinds of experiences in different contexts. The narrative establishes an 
order for all experiential elements in a contiguous plot. By way of ordering, the situational 
elements are given meaning; in this way, a specific role in the plot and a temporal structure 
are established. At the micro level of stories, as well as at the more abstract discursive level, 
07510_Ch05_p133-152.indd   140 4/4/17   6:05 PM
Narrating Protest
141
narratives establish some kind of coherence in a world of disorder.30 Focusing on narratives 
allows me to follow the emplotment of individual and collective experiences, here in the 
sense of recontextualization.31 In line with van Leeuwen’s framework, recontextualization 
considers all social practice as reformulated in talk and texts. Through discursive articulation, 
practices become meaningful from a specific point of view grounded in material, socio-
economic contexts. Van Leeuwen constructs a chain of recontextualization, moving from 
social to discursive signifying practices to discourse. Reisigl and Wodak suggest a number 
of narrative strategies often employed in recontextualizing social practices.32 Based on the 
analysis of the material gathered for this project, I have identified the four major strategies: 
nomination, predication, perspectivation and mitigation.33 Nomination refers to the 
discursive construction of social actors, objects, events and actions. Predication, in contrast, 
pertains to the evaluation of the events, focusing on the discursive qualification of actors, 
objects, events and actions. Perspectivation takes the writer’s or speaker’s point of view into 
consideration and encompasses the involvement of specific actors within the narrative. 
Mitigation refers to the modification of ‘the illocutionary force and the epistemic or deontic 
status of utterances’.34 
Lack of a European Perspective
In the following, I will take a closer look at the question of specific European narratives 
constructed by the mainstream newspapers and the activists themselves. A European 
perspective can in that context be understood in diverse ways. Moreover, it makes a 
necessary distinction between the EU as an organizational, ideological entity and Europe 
as a geographical region that might be linked discursively to shared history, cultural 
expressions and values.35 In the context of Occupy, references to Europe potentially 
include questions about the transnational European solidarity of the movement and 
established contacts and mutual support between activists in different European cities. 
The EU is often seen as an organizational and political entity representing neo-liberal 
values and austerity measures dictated by core countries, such as Germany and France, 
to countries experiencing the harsher consequences of the financial crisis, such as 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. I, therefore, expected such themes to be at the heart of the 
criticism expressed by Occupy, which would also be reflected in the reporting on the 
movement. Monitoring the social media activities of Occupy Stockholm and Occupy 
Latvia confirmed this expectation. In the case of Stockholm, several anti-EU protests 
were organized, which attracted numerous supporters. For example, Occupy Stockholm, 
two of whose core demands were national and European financial reform, protested 
against the ESM. 
However, conducting a simple word search of the articles of the mainstream news media 
considered here using the terms Europe, European, the European Union or the EU reveals 
the lack of a European perspective (if defined as referring to the geographical region or 
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political institutions) in conjunction with the discussion of Occupy Stockholm or Occupy 
Latvia. Only 7 out of 85 articles mention the EU or Europe when discussing the Occupy 
movement. European institutions such as the ECB are foregrounded in articles that focus on 
the status quo of the eurozone financial crisis and mention the Occupy movement. In these 
articles, however, the Occupy movement remains a sidekick, as the following short quote 
from Dagens Nyheter illustrates:
The EU countries and the US have done their best not to compromise on the idea of 
progress for the sake of progress and on the indispensability of capitalism. […]
The march went over to the European Central Bank’s skyscraper, where approximately 
5000 had joined in. There were different events in around 50 German cities. 
(DN, 20 October 2011)36 
In general, Europe is referred to as a geographical region to which the American 
movement has spread. No further connections are constructed beyond this merely place-
based signification. In the Latvian context, the disconnection of the Occupy movement 
from its European context is also expressed in the fact that most of the articles are 
published in the foreign news section. In contrast, the Swedish newspapers published 
most articles in the economics or financial section, thus indicating quite different 
approaches. 
None of the articles analysed here highlights important differences between OWS as 
an American movement and Occupy Stockholm or Occupy Latvia as European versions 
of the movement. The only comparison provided recontextualizes Occupy Stockholm as 
being mainly amateurish without being rooted in a serious cause. Most of the articles 
include cynical observations both on OWS and Occupy Stockholm. One article in Dagens 
Nyheter, for example, comments on the comparatively small size of the movement, 
arguing that the number of protesters in New York City was rather small compared to 
the size of the city: ‘Nor are there that many of them. A few thousand protesters in a 
city of 8.5 million inhabitants is not impressive for a movement whose slogan is We are 
the 99 per cent’.37 The article goes on to suggest that the movement is ill-suited to the 
Swedish context, which never really experienced the crisis. Unemployment and poverty 
are not as high, and Swedish society is less polarized. Furthermore, salaries have increased 
considerably in the last 20 years. As a consequence, the reasons for the local occupations 
throughout Sweden, and especially in Stockholm, are questioned, and the significance 
is mitigated:
It simply is not true. Ninety-nine per cent of Swedes do not at all have to choose 
between paying for food or rent. Of course, the inequalities have increased the 
last couple of years, but the majority of the Swedish population is doing quite well 
financially.
(Expressen, 22 October 2011)38
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Sweden is different. The average income increase since the end of the 1970s is around 100 
per cent, and even considering absolute wages, a Swedish worker has almost 30 per cent 
more income today than 20 years ago. 
For a leftie, this difference should of course be stressed. That it is better here for the 
majority is not a coincidence, but, on the contrary, a result of more than one hundred 
years of political and trade union work.  
(Expressen, 22 October 2011)39
Although comparing the divergent contexts of the Swedish and American movement, there 
is no reference to the role of EU institutions. This is despite the activists considering the very 
same European institutions strongly involved in causing, and later trying to profit from, the 
financial crisis. Counter to the arguments presented in the article quoted above, Sweden has 
experienced heightened economic stress levels, and inequality has significantly increased. 
The article fails to acknowledge the activists’ specific reason for mobilizing in Sweden. It 
is particularly the achievements of past political campaigns, especially those by trade 
unions, that Swedish activists aimed to preserve in an increasingly neo-liberal environment 
characterized by new public management, privatization, profit-making welfare institutions 
and increased bureaucratization. This lack of a specific European perspective could be related 
to the general discursive practice of mitigation of the movement in both Latvia and Sweden.
In the Latvian articles, mitigation was mainly constructed by firstly ignoring the event – 
only 17 articles were published on the topic – and secondly by denying any relevance to the 
Latvian context not considering how activists and non-activists experienced and discussed 
the crisis. None of the articles in the Latvian newspapers related the Occupy events to 
current political and economic developments in the country. Two articles suggested that 
there might be protests in Stockholm, and two others included information that, according 
to the interactive map on 15october.net, protests on 15 October might also take place in 
Riga. This is the closest the articles came to connecting the Occupy movement with the 
Latvian context. The journalists did not reach out to organizers of the protest events held 
in Riga, which were based on the language and aesthetics of OWS. Furthermore, they 
failed to discuss why the Latvian protests did not become bigger, although there had been 
predecessors and the general public had strongly felt the consequences of the crisis. The 
articles also relied almost exclusively on press releases from international press agencies 
and quoted international news outlets. The Occupy movement remained largely a matter 
of foreign affairs and was looked upon from a distance as not having any relevance to the 
Latvian experience. Even editorial pieces, despite informing the public of the possible 
protests in Riga and expressing a positive attitude towards the international protests, did 
not discuss the local or European context.
Besides, in the context of the lack of a European perspective, mitigation as a discursive 
strategy is especially palpable regarding the discussion of the movement’s tactics, practices 
and symbols. Both the Latvian and Swedish articles often include descriptions of it as 
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a leaderless movement, involving Guy Fawkes masks as well as the slogan ‘We are the 
99%’. However, the articles include relatively little or no discussion of how the camps 
were actually organized. In particular, the main decision-making forum in the General 
Assembly as well as communicative strategies such as the hand-sign system and the 
people’s microphone are absent in the reports, although they became emblematic of the 
movement:40
Initiators of it [OWS] were inspired by the example of the Arab revolution. The protesters 
do not have a united leadership; for communicating with each other, they use social 
networks (mainly Twitter). They are united by common slogans. 
(Chas, 3 October 2011)41
Why Is Europe Not There?
In countries forced to introduce severe austerity measures, like Spain and Greece, the 
mainstream press drew a clear link between protests and EU institutions.42 However, 
that was not the case in the Swedish and Latvian mainstream narratives. In Latvia, strict 
austerity policies were not questioned, and journalists rather focused on the hope for 
better times. In Sweden, the euro crisis was presented as less urgent and with less severe 
implications for Swedish society at large. Hence, protests against, for instance, Eurobonds 
were considered slightly exaggerated. Although recontextualized forms of the Occupy 
movement in Stockholm and partly also in Latvia addressed the role of EU institutions 
as the root causes of the financial crisis and as drivers of a neo-liberalization of European 
societies, this was not reflected in the narratives constructed by the mainstream 
newspapers. 
This finding could be considered in the light of previous research focusing on the 
EU and its institutions that has outlined three deficits: a democratic, a public-sphere 
and an identification. The democratic deficit is often referred to in terms of questions of 
representation, especially a lack of direct influence by European citizens. The European 
Parliament, the only directly elected EU body, had for a long time been bereft of the 
necessary authority in the legal process. Connected to the democratic deficit, research has 
identified a lack of a shared European public sphere. If there were one, it might have positive 
consequences for EU citizens’ identification with the Union. Although current analyses have 
documented a strengthening of a European public sphere, EU citizens’ identification with 
the EU is still mainly pragmatic and not in a sense of an imagined community.43 Especially 
with the financial crisis, the urgency to overcome the deficits in democratic participation, 
identification and the public sphere has been addressed and voiced through public protest, 
such as the Spanish Indignados and the Indignant Citizens Movement in Greece, calling for 
real and direct democracy.
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Structurally, the European Parliament has been identified as key to solving the democratic 
deficit, and especially after all member states ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which 
saw the parliament gain more legislative power. Now the European Parliament appoints 
the President of the Commission, and its co-decision powers have been extended to new 
areas, including the budget, agriculture policy, justice and home affairs.44 This changed role 
became especially apparent during the ACTA negotiations in 2012, which the European 
Union and 22 member states signed. After massive mobilization, starting in Poland, the 
European Parliament, however, declined its support. The protests mobilizing against ACTA 
capitalized on the emerging opportunity structure, placing the European Parliament more 
prominently in the European decision-making process. The massive protests addressing the 
European Parliament and its members directly forced the elected representatives to act.
This was not the case for the Occupy movement, which was not as clearly linked to 
EU institutions by the traditional news media, although activists issued several demands 
relating to EU institutions. As indicated earlier, the articles analysed here mitigate the role 
of the movement in both Latvia and Sweden, albeit in distinct ways. The lack of a European 
perspective is part of and reinforces the general downplaying of the movement’s relevance. 
While in Latvia the movement came under the foreign news section from the beginning, it 
was framed in Sweden as having no real foundations. In Latvia, the framing of the Occupy 
movement was hence in line with how early protests have been reported, namely as something 
foreign that was not part of the Latvian political landscape.45 In the Swedish context, the 
focus was on the event character of the early encampment and of specific mobilizations; 
the interest quickly faded without confrontations and conflicts between the activists and 
the police. Thus, the lack of a European perspective in the discourse constructed by the 
mainstream news media prevented the movement from putting serious pressure on the 
European institutions that played a major role in how the economic crisis developed. At 
the same time, the Occupy movement did not address one specific political issue such as 
a trade agreement but advocated a broader, long-term social change by linking different 
smaller initiatives discursively. In the context, the downplaying of the movement is connected 
with the continued European crisis of democratic representation – the democratic deficit.
Conclusion
While Blockupy is one example of the European-wide mobilization against austerity policies 
and the EU’s neo-liberal foundations, the chapter has shown that the Swedish and Latvian 
mainstream news media had no European contextualization of OWS. The lack of linking 
and explaining the specific European context for the mobilization of Occupy Stockholm 
and Occupy Latvia is an indicator of the general mitigation or downplaying of the Occupy 
movement in Europe. Although activists drew clear links to the European economic crisis by 
identifying concrete policies and austerity measures as the root causes of growing inequality, 
the mainstream media did not recontextualize the movement in the same way. Rather 
07510_Ch05_p133-152.indd   145 4/4/17   6:05 PM
Europe Faces Europe
146
than considering their reasons for occupying spaces in Stockholm and for holding online 
discussions and street protests in Latvia that were largely about Europe, the mainstream 
media discourse emphasized the US American origin of the movement and its unsuitability 
for the European context. 
In terms of the narrative mode, the mainstream media narratives about Occupy 
Stockholm and Occupy Latvia hence represent typical examples of the protest paradigm, 
which captures the mainstream news media’s tendency to focus on spectacles and violence 
in the context of protests. At the same time, the mainstream media have a propensity to 
marginalize or mitigate protest movements such as Occupy by focusing on other concerns 
than the ones addressed by the activists.46 For Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia, this 
was clearly the case, given that there was, as implied by the activists, no discussion of the 
European perspective. Furthermore, the relevance of Occupy Stockholm and Occupy Latvia 
was downplayed by focusing on short-term media tactics such as social media practices 
rather than on long-term political decision-making and the set-up of the encampment.
Comparatively, there are, however, clear differences in the discursive practices of the 
recontextualization of the movement in Sweden and Latvia. In the Swedish context, the 
discourse manifests the underlying idea that the situation is fundamentally different from the 
American experience. The dominant narratives are as follows: Compared to the structural 
inequality and the magnitude of the crisis in the US, Sweden is much better off. As a 
consequence, the protests and occupations are treated patronizingly: they are amateurish and 
lack serious concerns. In the case of Latvia, the underlying argument refers to the recurring 
hardship that Latvian society had suffered historically while always hoping for a better future. 
Latvia has in that context been presented as a success story of how severe austerity measures 
have enabled it to end the crisis.47 This perspective is shared by the Latvian and Russian 
newspapers despite their otherwise very profound differences in reporting. 
The findings show that tracing European narratives in the Swedish and Latvian Occupy 
discourse entails certain difficulties. Similarly, Johan Fornäs has pointed out in his chapter 
that it is hard to pinpoint one European narrative from the eastern periphery in the context 
of the Eurovision Song Contest. The differences between Sweden and Latvia in the European 
narratives are here not necessarily based on an East–West divide, but they definitely have 
historical roots. The governments and citizenry of both countries responded differently to 
the crisis. The analysis has also reinforced that narratives are never stable but always in 
the making based on the specific context within which they are constructed. In the case of 
protest, they, however, show particular patterns when constructed by the mainstream news 
media, e.g. the protest paradigm.
The different views on and approaches to Europe narrated by the Occupy activists and 
the mainstream news media emphasize that narratives are always also sites of struggles over 
the authority over meaning production, which Katarina MacLeod’s chapter on narrative 
resilience in the periphery addresses. In that sense, the approach to combine activist 
narratives with narratives constructed by the mainstream news media is a fruitful way to 
capture this ongoing struggle over the authority over European narratives.
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Introduction
‘It is very important to develop a regional exchange of ideas’, says Łukasz Gorczyca, the 
co-founder of Raster Gallery. ‘We understand each other well because of the black hole of 
communism that we all went through’.1
The story of Eastern Europe has taken shape in the visual arts with few parallels. The curator 
and art historian Andrzej Szczerski points out that art played a crucial role in renegotiating 
the history and construction of Europe after 1989.2 When art from Eastern Europe became 
more accessible and known, a new story had to be renegotiated between a perceived centre 
and periphery. New inclusions had to be made in art history, a discipline that traditionally 
adheres to a modernist master narrative of inclusions and exclusions, underpinned by a 
notion of newness: new art, new materials and new tendencies. Some 25 years after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, there are still tensions in art history and curatorial discourses regarding the 
dichotomy between centre and periphery. The concern of this chapter is how art exhibitions 
have narrated this tension between 2009 and 2011 at major art institutions in the West, and 
how it entertains a bifurcated Europe. The focus is on four examples that address Eastern 
Europe. In each, there is a pronounced need to define this vast geographical and cultural 
area but equally a reluctance to do that. Art from Eastern Europe deserves to be exhibited, 
marketed and researched, but what does Eastern Europe mean and where to draw the line, 
and from whose experience?
The aforementioned quote from the co-founder of Warsaw’s Raster Gallery reflects the 
influx of so-called Eastern European art into the art fair in Basel, one of the great hubs for the 
international commercial art market. The journalist writing the article expresses an interest 
in, if not surprise at, the growing number of galleries from Eastern Europe exhibiting at the 
art fair. Artists from Eastern Europe have long been showcased on the international scene, 
but the increasing number of galleries representing ‘their’ artists was in 2010 perceived as 
a rather new event. This increase is matched by a rise in private funding.3 Perhaps it is 
surprising that the art market has taken so long to welcome and profit from art in this 
region. Yet as the art gallery owner Gorczyca points out, the ‘black hole of communism’ 
continues to perpetuate the perception of art from Eastern Europe as a regional matter.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, there have been a 
number of exhibitions mapping the newfound terrain of Eastern Europe. It can be described 
07510_Ch06_p153-178.indd   155 4/4/17   6:08 PM
Europe Faces Europe
156
as a gold mine for (Western) art history and curators to (re)discover art last seen long ago but 
also, more importantly, essential to the construction of identity from an Eastern European 
perspective.4 There have been numerous exhibitions and research projects mapping this 
‘new’ terrain – writing and rewriting history – through which art from Eastern Europe has 
been returned and reinstated into a general, or rather Western, narrative. This tradition has 
been established by, for example, epic exhibitions, such as ‘Europa Europa’ in Bonn in 1994 
and ‘After the Wall’ in Stockholm in 1999. Since then there has been a trickle of exhibitions 
addressing the relationship between art from Eastern Europe and its reception particularly 
in Western Europe and North America, with a sudden resurge between 2009 and 2011.
The four case studies are taken from this short and recent period in time and are listed in 
the order in which they appear in this chapter:
Example 1:  Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe, editor Nikos Kotsopoulos, published 
by Black Dog Publishing in London, 2010.
Example 2:  ‘Ostalgia’, at the New Museum, New York, 2011, curated by Massimiliano 
Gioni.
Example 3:  ‘Promises of the Past: A Discontinuous History of Art in Former Eastern 
Europe’, Paris, 2009, curated by Joanna Mytkowska and Christine Macel.
Example 4:  ‘Gender Check: Femininity and Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe’, at 
mumok (Museum Moderner Kunst Stiftung Ludwig Wien), 2009, curated by 
Bojana Pejić.
Example 1, Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe, stands out in format. Unlike the other 
cases, which are exhibitions with catalogues, it is a book whose hard covers and glossy 
pages make it very suitable as a ‘coffee-table book’, popularizing rather than academically 
analysing its theme. Yet the edited selection corresponds largely to that of the exhibitions 
in the other case studies. Several artists are well known to an international art scene; others 
have re-emerged since the fall of the Berlin Wall; others yet are of a younger generation 
and also well established outside of their native countries. Example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, and 
example 3, ‘Promises of the Past: A Discontinuous History of Art in Former Eastern 
Europe’, are both based on discussions about the geoculturally specific experience of 
having lived life behind the Iron Curtain and a sense of memory of and nostalgia for the 
former Eastern Europe. The exhibition with the most diverse set of artists is example 4, 
‘Gender Check: Femininity and Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe’, where the 
starting point was to show the ‘other’ of the ‘other’. Interesting to note is that in all 
catalogues a range of critics and writers contribute with a contextual framework. Several 
artists and writers reappear in the exhibitions and catalogues and are people who have 
shaped the understanding of art from Eastern Europe in a number of books, exhibitions 
and research projects, as, for example, the writers and curators Bojana Pejić and Joanna 
Mytkowska, and the art historians and critics Piotr Piotrowski and Boris Groys. Artists 
who appear in at least three of the cases studied are, for instance, Boris Mikhailov 
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(b. 1938), Marina Abramović (b. 1946), Jiří Kovanda (b. 1953), Roman Ondák (b. 1966) 
and Anri Sala (b. 1974).
The relationship between an individual piece of art and a narrative framework is complex – 
wherein lies the narrative? Any piece of art harbours its own narrative, however abstract or 
conceptual. When set in a larger curatorial context, it also goes beyond its own narrative and 
becomes part of another story. The historian Hayden White points out that historical events 
can be told through narrative accounts, but they do not have to be. There are other ways to 
communicate information without embedding it in a narrative form. He makes an important 
distinction between the historian who retells the events, that in a way is always to narrate, 
and the person who narrativizes these events.5 In other words, there is an implied difference 
between accounting for facts and telling a story. The curatorial tradition is deeply embedded 
in this tension between accounting for facts and telling stories. Facts about artists and 
artworks are at times embedded in a narrative designed to tell new stories or cast fresh light 
on known artworks; to rediscover new artworks or redraw the historical map.6 Some would 
have curating to be the new art history. The art historian Charlotte Klonk points out that if 
museums in the past represented applied art history like a ‘textbook in space’, i.e. recounting 
‘facts’, there has been a turn since the 1960s for exhibitions to produce knowledge, i.e. to 
narrate and further a change in attitudes.7 For art from Eastern Europe, past and present, the 
exhibition format has been crucial to both understanding cultural aspects of the area and to 
bridging gaps. An artist’s origin may be of relatively little consequence to the contemporary 
art scene. Hans Belting expertly shows how much has happened in an ever-globalized art 
scene where the trajectory of art history and its concepts of art, origin and art productions 
are increasingly outmoded.8 Yet in the examples studied in this chapter, the idea of origin in 
terms of geographical belonging is paramount for the constructed narratives.
Klonk makes a convincing argument for curating taking on the task of art history in 
telling new narratives: filling in missing gaps, changing our understanding and creating 
new knowledge. But the exhibitions and projects discussed here are not only representing 
art – art represents more than itself. As Szczerski writes, when Europe is being rewritten, it 
is in no small part done so in the language of visual art.9 In the examples explored in this 
chapter, there is a shared ambition to reshuffle centre and periphery and to emphasize the 
cultural, social and geographical impetus from Eastern Europe. Yet all these projects took 
place in the West, or had Western publishing houses, and what this text looks at is how an 
East–West dichotomy is both disputed and perpetuated. The periphery, it seems, is resilient 
when art from Eastern Europe is thematized.
The primary empirical material for this study consists of exhibition catalogues and 
accompanying books such as The Gender Check Reader. These constitute the material 
remnants, situated in a public archive of knowledge once the short-lived exhibitions are 
dismounted. Whilst it is the artworks and how the curator has put them together that make 
an impact, it is the catalogues that produce knowledge of history. Catalogues, reproductions 
and reviews add to the larger narrative of a particular theme, regardless of the quality of 
an exhibition. Therefore, this text gives special attention to the overall portrayal of Europe 
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through the chosen examples rather than critically focusing on the artistic achievements of 
the different exhibitions, catalogues and books.
In the introduction to this book, four dimensions or key features are described as a 
guide to interpreting narrative structures: (1) the structure of the narrative, according to 
the model, is rather straightforward: leading museums and institutions that put on major 
curated exhibitions, and as in example 1, a popularized edited book. The narrators are, from 
this perspective, curators and editors rather than individual artists or artworks. The longer 
answer is, as we will see, a more intricate web of mechanisms that has to do with funding, 
canon formation in the sense of which artists and what kind of art is seen as relevant. A longer 
answer needs to take into account the conflicting views of what it means to represent art 
from a given geographical area. Furthermore, who defines what or who is Eastern Europe?; 
(2) the temporal perspective is also rather straightforward. The four examples, which are only 
a selection of exhibitions and books covering the field of interest of art from Eastern Europe, 
are framed through current interest; however, they have a particular focus on art from the 
1960s to the present; (3) the genre is curating rather than art, as it is the curatorial strategies 
and their reception that are the focus of the analysis; (4) the final point is the meaning of the 
narratives. This chapter is to be understood within its context, of understanding narratives 
of Europe, and has two main concerns. Firstly, to uncover the narratives underpinning the 
recent return to exhibitions portraying art from Eastern Europe. Secondly, to discuss what 
these narratives tell about the portrayal of Europe.
Mapping Europe
The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that 
precedes the territory. 
(Jean Baudrillard)10
A map, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, is in its most traditional understanding 
a ‘graphic representation, drawn to scale and usually on a flat surface, of features – for 
example, geographical, geological, or geopolitical – of an area of the Earth or of any other 
celestial body. Globes are maps represented on the surface of a sphere. Cartography is the 
art and science of making maps and charts’. Rather than conveying truths, each map can be 
read narratively as visual images telling stories of specific geographical areas. Furthermore, 
one can instantly recognize the political narrative implied in any map defining nation-state 
borders, which are always man-made. Maps are also documents, and even narratives, of time 
and place. An out-of-date map can be interpreted as a historical document of colonization, 
repression and certainly of political change.
For the philosopher Jean Baudrillard, the construction of a map precedes actual nation-
state territory. We can understand this as the map dictating reality, and the way it is drawn 
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and a nation’s border penned in has an impact on the lived world. A map, therefore, is 
in Baudrillard’s terms never mere representation because that implies a relationship where 
‘the sign and the real are equivalent’.11 An image can transgress between different stages 
of relations to the real: from mimicking reality to masking it – where the last stage is pure 
simulation. The map is for Baudrillard an example where the reality of a territory has 
imploded. Rather than drawing lines around a geographical area, the simulacrum of a map 
imposes itself on lived reality. Baudrillard dresses in words the tense relationship between 
nation borders, politics and lived experience. This is a core question in all the curatorial 
examples studied here, as a geographical area, defined by how lines are drawn on maps, 
precedes how the art is exhibited and narrated. In a European context, the most striking 
case is how lines were redrawn with dramatic consequences after World War II. In an art 
context, a line drawn on a map and imported to real life makes art from East Berlin and art 
from West Berlin belong to different art histories.
There are two major strands of thought regarding geography and art production in the 
four examples on which this chapter focuses. The first could be described as ‘birthplace’: the 
geographical area where an artist is born defines his or her inclusion in an exhibition. In 
example 1, Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on ‘in’, birthplace is the 
logic for selection. So too for the academically framed and critically researched exhibition 
in example 4, ‘Gender Check’, where the focus is both on showcasing women artists and 
highlighting different political frameworks for feminism and representations of gender in 
Eastern Europe. The second strand is by association or out of interest such as in example 3, 
the exhibition ‘Ostalgia’.
The geopolitical narrative of origin and belonging has a long track record. The first wave 
of major post-1989 exhibitions explicitly aimed to make visible what was hidden from 
the West, with a focus on art that went under the radar of oppressive regimes. The aim of 
After the Wall (1999) at Moderna Museet in Stockholm was to scrutinize the contemporary 
art scene ten years after the fall of Communism. The then director David Elliot wrote: ‘In 
the majority (but not all) of the twenty countries we have visited, Communism (Marxist-
Leninism) is an ideology which has been firmly consigned to the past and is now regarded 
as an irrelevance, if not an embarrassment’.12 The political experience was highlighted in the 
catalogue texts and through several of the artworks, but the predominant focus for selection 
was on artists from the geographical area.
Example 2, ‘Ostalgia’ and example 3, ‘Promises of the Past’, have a less directly geopolitical 
selection, and focus more on social and psychological experiences from the ‘Communist’ 
period. The focal point of both is the area of Eastern Europe but with inclusions of artists 
who work with relevant themes out of interest, not necessarily through birthright. Thus, in 
examples 1 and 4, the experience of Eastern Europe is predefined, albeit in example 4 with 
lengthy discussions as to what that experience may entail. The other two examples, 2 and 3, 
investigate the psychological realities of this notion.
The trajectory of unveiling and mapping which art has come from where, and highlighting 
a plethora of artists missing from a Western story of art, was the focus of the Slovenian 
07510_Ch06_p153-178.indd   159 4/4/17   6:08 PM
Europe Faces Europe
160
artist group IRWIN’s ‘East Art Map’ – a large-scale project that also took as its starting 
point geographical origin, although many of the artists live and work in Western Europe 
and North America. A group of artists and curators staged art from Eastern Europe by 
evoking the metaphor of the map, both as a curatorial strategy and as illustration. It is 
an evocative picture that sets the scene in the printed book version East Art Map.13 On a 
white page, a section of the world map is presented, from the Americas across to Europe. 
Up until the eastern edge of Western Europe, the map is as we know it, delineated with 
borders, country names, the pink of mountain chains marked out from the otherwise green 
landmass, encircled by the blue seas. To the right, the landmass of the former East is black. 
All differences such as nation borders, names and geographical undulations are blotted out. 
This map sets the tone from the start of the book: here it seems to say, is that you have no 
idea about, of what you think is Eastern Europe, closed off until the Iron Curtain was pulled 
up. The project East Art Map opens up this field of knowledge by inviting curators, scholars 
and artists from each country in the region to name a set number of people to be included. 
The project becomes an infinite and always-unfinished project, at least as it is portrayed in 
the book and on the website. It is a symbolic geography based on the realization that, as such, 
it is always in contrast to lived experience. Nationality as origin is the context of art history 
and in some sense as uncertain as aesthetic judgement. The necessarily subjective choice 
of any selection of art is therefore emphasized, regardless of how neutral the parameters 
are argued to be. However, this project was also among the range of exhibitions during the 
1990s and 2000s that created a bipolarity of West and East, and as the art historian Louisa 
Avgita writes: ‘the logic that sustains the essentialisation of these concepts’.14
In example 1, Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe, the visual idea of East Art Map is 
inherited but reversed: Western Europe is in a dull grey, whereas Eastern Europe is still 
painted black but with country names clearly marked. Added to this, there is a timeline 
with crucial events setting the frame. The timeline begins with art historical events and 
the first is the death of the Russian artist Kazimir Malevich (b. 1878) in 1935, ‘the pioneer 
of the Avant-Garde Suprematist movement’. The timeline ends in April 2010 with the 
opening of the Regina Gallery in London, specializing in Russian art. Between these two 
reference points, isolated art events are pointed out, such as the Marina Abramović show 
at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York in 2010, as well as political events 
of major historical significance, such as Warsaw Pact troops invading Czechoslovakia in 
1968 and Albania and Croatia joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2009. 
Example 4, ‘Gender Check’, is structured by a more complex understanding of time, 
politics, experience and representation but largely follows a similar logic in which all the 
artists included have a physical connection to the geopolitical area of Eastern Europe. The 
relationship between geography and art is complex. What was previously a harsh critique 
of any mega-narrative on Eastern Europe is now a common understanding, namely that 
the ‘Communist experience’ is not one; they are many and varied. Furthermore, artists 
from Eastern Europe cannot be easily lumped together. Yet the geographical distinction 
with its cultural specificity of having been behind the Iron Curtain is what defines 
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the selection. Perhaps one could claim that an artist like Christo (b. 1935 as Khristo 
Vladimirov Yavashev), who moved to Paris in 1958 at the age of 23 and met his artistic 
partner and wife, Jeanne-Claude (1935–2009, Jeanne-Claude Denat de Guillebon), born 
in Morocco, is more closely related to the Western European art scene, where he has had 
a stellar career for half a decade. He was born in Bulgaria, perhaps forever marked by the 
experience, but what makes him, or anyone, an Eastern European artist? Is it the nation 
state of your first passport, your lived experience or the context in which you as an artist 
developed? At any rate, the title of the book Contemporary Art in Eastern Europe is in this 
case misleading.
The map is a complex affair, both as a guide to the real world and a metaphor for charting 
art. Critical cartography points to how political and ideological aspects are always embedded 
in maps – three-dimensional geographical areas are difficult, impossible even, to represent 
in a two-dimensional space. Even when represented as a globe, certain choices have to be 
made – the world translates itself with difficulty to another scale.15 Regardless of what a map 
depicts, it is a narrative image that tells a story not only about what it claims to represent 
but also how it is represented. In other words, the narrative levels can be read not only in 
the cartographer’s choice of perspective and placing of land and countries but also in the 
choice of colours, how the map is framed and onto what paper it is printed. The use of maps 
in cartography, artworks and curating is based on a collective understanding of something 
shared.
Dimitrije Bašičević, aka Mangelos (1921–1987), made manifestos painted onto ready-
made globes and they are included in example 3, ‘Promises of the Past’ (and in the East Art 
Map catalogue). The manifestos of art, made between 1971 and 1977, are named manifests of 
‘relationships’, ‘death’ and ‘energy’.16 These globes are transformed with paint in variations of 
black, white, red and gold, onto which there is neatly joined-up writing between two drawn 
lines. The aesthetic effect is schoolbook like. The artist, theorist and art historian Mangelos’s 
work is also a textbook example of conceptual art as it developed during the 1960s and 
1970s. In short, Mangelos transformed found objects by imprinting words and theoretically 
grounded propositions. In one version, a globe purchased by MOMA in 2005, the title 
reads ‘Manifest de la Relation’. Painted monochrome, the globe erases all geographical 
relationships. Any preconceived notion of a map or globe is challenged by the white surface. 
Or it is made blank to start again. Sinziana Ravini writes how the association of school 
implies learning. But in his art, Mangelos unlearns: his art ‘demonstrates the importance of 
starting afresh after having wiped out the traces of past histories’.17
Mangelos’s work portrays the enigma of the periphery, a peep hole into the art scene that 
in its aesthetics and intellectual endeavours was part of the conceptual art that developed 
in the 1960s across Europe and North America. Yet the peripheral positioning keeps being 
entertained each time groups of artists are framed through an Eastern European headline. 
Mangelos’s work would only ever be an enigma of the other, marked by its geographical 
origin and at the fringe of the conceptual scene when presented as an add-on to the Western 
canon of conceptual art.18 Restaging Mangelos’s work in big exhibition projects as part of the 
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Eastern European narrative certainly helps spread knowledge about his work, yet it seems 
that art history’s margins take a long time to shift. In his globe manifestos, Mangelos is 
predominantly interested in the conceptual art discourse of questioning the meaning and 
value of the art object. On the MOMA globe, purchased the same year as the gallery Peter 
Freeman, Inc., hosted an exhibition of the late artist’s work, the words play with the notion 
of ‘thinking functionally’. For Mangelos, this contrasts with intuitive thinking or intuitive 
art (like abstract expressionist art).19 This line of enquiry is a shared concern of several 
artists of his generation, across the art world, and not least in New York and Paris. Suffice 
to say that Mangelos’s work adheres to multiple mega-narratives in art history. The turns 
of exposure, transaction and incorporation into one of the most prestigious collections in 
the world also support what Boris Groys observed: the power of art is intricately related to 
being exhibited, and that, in turn, is fundamentally dependent on external financing.20 The 
making and showing of art are reliant on financing, and it is when money starts to roll in 
that the influx of art from Eastern Europe becomes mainstream. In turn, when something 
exists in the mainstream, it belongs to a central narrative of art. Mangelos’s globes capture in 
a sense the whole problem of art from Eastern Europe pinned on a narrative of periphery. To 
escape the margins, you cannot erase knowledge by painting the globe white, but you also 
cannot just add on knowledge, risking creating a genre of art from the periphery.
The idea of centre and periphery seems integral to a narrative of Europe, as discussed 
in several of the chapters in this book. Europe as organized around a relationship between 
centre and periphery, within its continent and certainly beyond, is also a historical narrative 
that seems innately dependent on maps. The media scholar William Uricchio asks his 
readers to imagine Europe and concludes that any picture of the continent (whether or 
not it is as the mythological figure Europa or as a map) is defined by its cultural, historical 
and political history and any present. The whole, he says, must be defined in relation to its 
parts. When looking at Europe through different mappings of populations and geography, 
the necessity arises of also questioning what narrative is told. Uricchio seems to say: what 
does a map really tell?21 Moreover, the historian Michael Wintle points out in The Image of 
Europe that a map of a region from a given point in time is a way to understand the mindset 
of a people and their relation to the rest of the world. It can also either alter or amplify a 
self-understanding of people in a region as to their political and cultural standing.22 Wintle 
points to a number of critical cartographic works highlighting the intrinsic political, social 
(and aesthetic) effects of maps throughout the centuries. In the first chapter, where Wintle 
explores ‘A Changing Concept of Europe’, he keeps returning to the lack of knowledge of 
the geography of Eastern Europe in historical maps produced in the West. There was a lack 
of production of maps from the eastern part and also a somewhat hazy understanding of 
actual borders with other continents.23 Larry Wolff suggests that the eighteenth-century 
mapping of Eastern Europe was in fact far from accurate compared to standards at the time. 
He even pins the failure of the Swedish king Charles XII on a cartographic mistake where 
the map and the reality were not aligned: ‘His failure to conquer Russia, like his original 
intention, was thus partly a matter of mapping’.24
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Mapping Europe’s art scene is a complex task linked to a historical perception of what 
the map contains. The many exhibitions showing art in relation to the geographical area of 
Eastern Europe paint several pictures. They portray a common story of the contemporary 
art world searching for the latest, of art historians wanting to find new empirical data to 
process and lay bare hidden treasures. More importantly, the exhibition as a collective 
effort answers to a need for representation, a need to mend a broken Europe. Yet despite all 
good intentions, the divide is sustained not just in history but also in the present. Mapping 
art from Eastern Europe is an achievement; more art is made visible to more people, and 
knowledge expands and shifts. Nevertheless, each time this narrative, ‘Art from Eastern 
Europe’, is perpetuated without fundamental institutional changes to, for example, Europe’s 
museums of modern and contemporary art, it is also partly a failure.
N/ostalgia
Narrative, the philosopher Paul Ricoeur has shown, is necessarily related to time. A literary 
or fictional narrative takes time and is placed in time. Time is a central concept of all the cases 
studied in this chapter, as the past is remembered and processed. What is remembered is 
art from a historical and political period, largely from the 1960s to today. What is processed 
through curatorial concepts and sometimes in individual artworks is the experience of this 
specific political climate and its impact in present times. Curatorial efforts fast become 
history and are set in a specific time and place, but the artworks are always encountered in 
the present. Time is narrated through these curatorial concepts as well as through individual 
pieces and is a necessarily fluent concept.
Time is also very specific. The narratives of all four examples are orientated towards the 
1989 events when the world changed. The torn-down walls, real and political, allowed art to 
flood across between East and West. Art in Europe took a new turn. It is a real point in time; 
real bricks and mortar were demolished, but it is also a fictionalized time. Cultural critics 
have pointed out that this date has a political resonance as a focus for narrating history but 
is also blatantly Eurocentric, putting other cultural and language areas on the periphery. 
Eastern Europe was through Soviet domination deeply embedded in a global system, and 
other historical milestones are therefore, for instance, the start of Gorbachev’s perestroika 
in 1985, Chernobyl in 1986, or in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of 
the newly independent states.25 However, none of these are as visually striking as the tearing 
down of a wall and the uniting of a people, nor as frequent in visual representations. The 
year 1989 marks a shift in understanding European art through the changes in Europe. But 
the story of Europe did not stop at its national borders, as Piotr Piotrowski points out. The 
narrative of European and Western art was transformed when the world changed in 1989, 
including, for instance, the massacre in Tiananmen Square and the start of the abolishment 
of South African apartheid. The post-Communist condition affected, and continues to 
affect, the world.26 And the surrounding world also affects Europe.
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In all four examples, the year 1989 and its before and after are paired with a more diffuse 
experience or nostalgic longing. The title of example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, means what it says: it plays 
with the German concept Ostalgie, employed in 1990s Berlin, where a certain nostalgic 
feel for the former East started, expressed through films like Good Bye, Lenin! (2003). In 
the 1990s, Ossi parties, Ostivals and Ostprodukte went from being devalued as useless, an 
embarrassment from a defunct system, to symbols of nostalgia in a liberal, market-driven 
society. It also turned into an income opportunity when the ‘Made in GDR’ stamp became a 
selling point.27 Already the titles of example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, and example 3, ‘Promises of the Past: 
A Discontinuous History of Art in Former Eastern Europe’, declare the act of remembering 
a central concept for understanding the effect of time in Europe. The title of the Paris 
exhibition (example 3) played with the idea of what the past holds for the future. Nostalgia 
is central to narratives of Eastern Europe. This nostalgia, according to the anthropologist 
Dominic Boyer, is not necessarily about longing for a specific social or cultural set-up or 
for a home in a place, but rather a ‘sociotemporal yearning for a different stage or quality of 
life’.28 Nostalgia, one could say, is to long for something that can never come back. It is firmly 
set in the past. Svetlana Boym describes modern nostalgia (different from the eighteenth-
century illness) as ‘a mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an 
“enchanted world” with clear borders and values’. She also differentiates between two types 
of nostalgia. Restorative nostalgia, typically featured in nationalism sees truth in tradition. 
Reflective nostalgia, typically about cultural memory, inhabits an ambivalence as to what is 
longed for and the feeling of longing or loss.29
In example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, the Berlin art scene is at the heart of the exhibition. In the much-
acclaimed film ‘Marxism Today’ by the British artist Phil Collins (b. 1971), the artist engages 
with the past educational model of the German Democratic Republic, portraying teachers 
of Communism 20 years after their professions had become obsolete. They tell their stories, 
and the film shows what has happened to all those people whose knowledge lost its meaning. 
The film can be described as nostalgic in the sense of looking back at a time and life that 
cannot return. But it is also set in the present, reflecting on what has happened to these 
people and what they have done with their lives. The overall curatorial ambition of example 
3 is to look at contemporary artists and other artists who address issues of the East–West 
divide relevant in present society, and more precisely Berlin.
In Collins’s work, there is a desire to unpack what has happened in the present to the 
teachers of Marxism, then linchpins of a society that no longer exists. In ‘The Praise of 
Laziness’ (1998), a piece by Mladen Stilinović (b. 1947) that is also included in the Ostalgia 
exhibition, the artist declares how art can no longer exist in the West: its systems have 
invalidated the meaning of art. Art, he says, could only exist under the auspices of totalitarian 
regimes. In Eastern Europe, he writes, art was made impossible, but it is precisely why it 
could exist. ‘Artists in the West are not lazy and therefore not artists but rather producers of 
something’. They are preoccupied by things without importance: ‘production, promotion, 
gallery system, museum system, competition system (who is first), their preoccupation with 
objects’.30 Both artists grasp the impact of Eastern Europe and its past socialist structures 
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on the present. Stilinović also expresses a particular view and experience of artists working 
behind the Iron Curtain. The exhibition ‘Gender Check’ shows very clearly how divergent 
the art scene was; some worked both as official artists and under the official radar with less 
acceptable forms of art. Or indeed, art produced within the field of vision may also have 
importance today.
It is in the arts, some would argue, that private memories and individual points of view 
can be represented. ‘Whereas the collective memory of Communism is described and 
analyzed in political, historical, and sociological studies, private memories of the previous 
system are portrayed predominantly in belle lettres, film, and theatre’.31 And in visual art. 
When grouped into a curatorial narrative, these individual representations become part of a 
collective story. However multifaceted, this larger narrative hinges on political and historical 
frameworks, and there is a tension between each piece and the larger curatorial concept it is 
subjected to. Sometimes an artwork is enlarged by it, sometimes reduced by it. Some of the 
artists included in example 2, Ostalgia, were just becoming established on the international 
art scene, such as Berlin-based Petrit Halilaj, born in Kosovo in 1986. It also included several 
artists who grew up in Western Europe and have dealt with the culture of Eastern Europe, 
like Phil Collins or Tacita Dean (b. 1965). Simon Starling (b. 1967) is yet another Western 
European artist who has explored an interest in Eastern European culture and an East–West 
divide through his piece ‘Flaga’, which questions the economic and symbolic relationships 
between East and West. Starling’s ‘flag’ was made up of a Fiat car, purchased in Turin and 
driven back to Poland, where it was made, and altered, then returned to Turin and mounted 
on a wall. Hung on the side like a painting, the Fiat car featured the colours and patterns of 
the Polish flag, with a red body, white front doors and a white bonnet.
From these few examples, it is clear that several artworks in example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, dealt 
with how Eastern and Western Europe relate to each other: economically, politically or 
ideologically. The New York Times critic Holland Cotter claimed it to be ‘an exhibition that 
finally portrays something new with a political twist, that goes under the surface of what it 
meant to live under communism, making any singular view of art and culture during Soviet 
times obsolete’.32 However, the choice of artists prompts a number of questions regarding, 
for example, to what extent the artists’ birthplaces became synonymous with the subject 
matter of life in Eastern Europe. The artist André Cadere, for instance, was born in Poland 
in 1934, grew up in Romania, emigrated to Paris in 1968, where he died ten years later. 
Cadere intricately dealt with conflating painting and object, as well as critiquing the system 
of marketing artworks.33 Perhaps his critique was intrinsically dependent on his birthplace, 
but it is likely it can equally well be positioned in the context of the left circles in which he 
lived and worked in Paris.
The curator for example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, Massimiliano Gioni explains that what he had 
in mind with this exhibition was how a number of artists related to Eastern Europe. Not 
all critics were equally taken by the Ostalgia premise of making a psychological portrait 
through artworks from 20 countries across different generations based on a contemporary 
fascination with Ossieness. Whose nostalgia, or Ostalgia, is at stake, asked the art historian 
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Corina Apostol. ‘What I want to get at is that Ostalgia can also be interpreted as a symptom 
of the West’s longing for the cultures of the East – which still holds a powerful sway over its 
imagination’.34 The article ends by mocking the curator yet puts it succinctly: the Western 
healing curator will help identify both problems and solutions. The result of which is that 
the West through these narratives assumes the task of healing Europe by reconstructing its 
narrative, but always from a perceived cultural centre, a given core.35 In an analysis of the 
underlying paradigm – to show the world, or the West, art from Eastern Europe – the art 
historian Edit András identifies projects such as example 1, the book Contemporary Art in 
Eastern Europe, as an outright backlash. The book, she argues, cements a simplified history 
based on a one-eyed view of art as having ever been on the outside, taking for granted 
a centre and a periphery. Her comments pinpoint the whole problem of understanding 
art: how can art ever be outside of anything when it is first and foremost itself? Moreover, 
she sees example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, as a colonization of experience hijacked by scholars, artists, 
curators working from ‘within’. Nostalgia, András argues, is a term that cannot be employed 
without implicit connotations of power struggles where the East is necessarily suppressed. 
When she asked in her article ‘Whose Nostalgia’, she concluded: ‘The vision, mediated by 
Ostalgia, surely does not match with the landscape seen by those about whom it purports 
to represent, and it is not about the East either, but rather about the desire and fantasies 
seemingly still existing in the West’.36 The New York critic’s relief at seeing something new 
on his art scene may be as valid a point of view as András’ scholarly take and critique. The 
critic and the scholar may also focus differently on what is at stake in this exhibition. Yet 
András argues how there is an inherent power relationship between East and West even in 
the mere concept ‘nostalgia’, even more so in ‘Ostalgia’, to which the curator and later the 
critics seem to be oblivious.
The works taken from example 3, ‘Ostalgia’  in this passage all deal with matters important 
in contemporary art, such as political systems and a capitalist art market, or simply the 
conditions of life and death. The framing of the exhibition could in theory have been from a 
different angle, but it is not the aim of this chapter to suggest a better curatorial take. What 
is important to identify is that as soon as there is a distinction of experience and/or origin 
through a bipolar understanding of history, it is a matter of who is addressing what on behalf 
of whom.
The title of the exhibition in example 3, ‘Promises of the Past: A Discontinuous History 
of Art in Former Eastern Europe’, announces that it is representing a patchy, ‘discontinuous’ 
history of art in former Eastern Europe. In the introductory text, the curators declare from 
the outset that this area does not exist. Perhaps it never existed beyond a paper construction 
when Europe was split between East and West after the Second World War. They also 
highlight how Eastern Europe, with all its artistic output, has been squeezed out of a canonical 
Western centre. They maintain it is now time to move on from the stage of rediscovering 
that ‘there has been art made beyond Western Europe and North America’, and they go on 
to say that ‘attempts to reformulate the narrative, such as the artistic and editorial project 
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‘East Art Map’ by the group IRWIN, have achieved their purpose’.37 The curators took their 
cue from an article by the cultural critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin, entitled ‘On the 
Concept of History’, written after the signing of the Soviet–German pact in 1939. What the 
curators took from Benjamin’s ideas was to create a history that goes against the grain, i.e. a 
nonlinear history always full of ruptures, ‘arabesques and imbrications’.38
Example 2, the ‘Ostalgia’ exhibition, received a mixed reception: praised by New York 
critics for showing the local scene something new, yet heavily critiqued by people whose 
stories it told. The Paris exhibition (example 3), in turn, created a complex platform, 
adhering to a tradition of understanding memory as never complete but always a patchwork 
of differences. Critics and academics have praised the effort and it stands out as well 
researched in every single detail, from the Benjaminian concept to the exhibition design – 
staged as an analogy of several parallel narratives. With the help of ‘nooks and crannies’, 
different routes and stories were orchestrated. It was impossible to walk a linear narrative, 
but one had no choice but to keep running into impasses and dead-ends. Having to retrace 
your steps, to go back and form new impressions of what you have already passed, seems an 
unusual strategy for exhibition designs, often set out to lead their visitors forwards, not back 
and forth or in and out.
Another imperative of this exhibition was as an art historical self-reflection of what it 
meant to define art as Eastern European ‘today’, i.e. Paris 2010. It was also an exhibition 
in close collaboration with academic work on renegotiating art history. Piotr Piotrowski 
has emphasized the need for parallel histories where art from Eastern Europe is concerned, 
because what may look the same such as conceptual art might respond to profoundly different 
circumstances.39 The curators also refer to Slavic and comparative literature scholar Svetlana 
Boym’s idea of ‘off-modern’, which allows for a variety of modernisms, sometimes at odds 
with each other. ‘Can we really assume that Pompidou is representing common history? Isn’t 
it rather a particular history that speaks with an accent, just as I speak with an accent when 
I talk about history? I am curious to know what that accent is’.40 Hence, the starting point, 
Paris 2010, provided an opportunity to analyse ‘specific positions, the political conditions 
that have provoked them, intercultural influences and intergenerational connections, 
without reducing them to illustrations of the East-West opposition’.41 The artists included 
in the exhibition reflected current interests in art. It also moved slightly beyond the East–
West divide of Europe, including a couple of artists from the Middle East, Asia and the US 
in an acknowledgement of how Europe affects the world and vice versa. New names in the 
narrative of art from Eastern Europe were added, and others resurfaced: Marina Abramović, 
the Gorgona group with Mangelos, or Tacita Dean.42
The narrated stories of Europe in examples 2 and 3 revolve around the concept of 
nostalgia, whether this should be understood as blatant or nuanced. In a Benjaminian 
reading, there is no reason for nostalgia to be futile; rather, the empowerment from nostalgia 
comes out of ‘active remembrance as a ritual summoning and invocation of the traditions 
of the oppressed in violent constellation with the political present’.43 In example 2, ‘Ostalgia’, 
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nostalgia is the linchpin onto which curatorial framing and artworks are pinned. In example 
3, ‘Promise of the Past’, remembering is the theoretical starting point. In both cases, the 
effect of narrating art from Eastern Europe, and Eastern European influences, in terms of 
dialogues and correspondences, is discussed. It is not naïve or unknowing. Yet it is within 
a tradition of understanding Europe as a bifurcated continent. It is a divide with a long 
history, as Larry Wolff showed in 1994. When coining the term ‘the invention of Eastern 
Europe’ as a Western construction, he showed how the East–West divide went beyond the 
cold war. It stems from long before the construction of modern society. Other writers bring 
the discussion back to precisely the cold war divide, because it is only when this history 
is fading away from a black-and-white history that any alternatives can come forth. The 
historian and philosopher Maria Todorova contends that the coming to terms with the 
trauma of Communism, which stretched over a long period of time and vast geographical 
areas, is not only traumatic. Remembering socialist times is also to remember what many 
people perceived to be a truly modern project. Thus, a key question for Todorova is to be 
precise in ‘who is speaking or performing nostalgia’ when bringing together the term within 
the geographical, social, cultural and heterogenous area of Eastern Europe. In other words, 
from what position is the speaker speaking or curator curating, and on whose behalf? And 
from what generation? Those who have lived their experiences or younger generations with 
a fresh interest in their cultural or personal past? Secondly, ‘What does nostalgia express?’ 
The post-Communist nostalgia is multivalent, both in content and in relation to geocultural 
specificity. And last, ‘What are the spheres of life and particular genres in which nostalgia 
is expressed?’44
However, simply engaging with the idea of nostalgia at all is contested in the context 
of studying Eastern Europe. Edit András argues that the turn to nostalgia by curators and 
academics (such as Todorova) is a practice firmly situated in a Western scholarly or artistic 
context, regardless of the writer’s or curator’s relation to Eastern Europe. It reflects a need for 
‘stuffing the region back into the old straitjacket’.45 It is a colonial and derogatory project of a 
need in the West to keep the myth about the Eastern Europe masked as light entertainment. 
However many strands of differences the curatorial framings reiterate, how many calls for 
the need to reconstruct an art historical narrative, the genre itself seems to confirm Wolff ’s 
description: Eastern Europe is a Western construction. Dominic Boyer spells it out: the urge 
for returning to nostalgia has to do with colonialism. Nostalgia narratives are about ideology: 
‘an ideological necessity of post-imperial Western Europe, a suppressed recognition of a 
constitutive practice of domination upon which the imagination of Western European (and 
also more generally Western) freedom, autonomy and futurity is contingent’.46 The effects 
of the division of Europe have had a far-reaching impact on European art history. It is no 
coincidence that the Irwin Group illustrates its project East Art Map with a black map. 
Art history books are devoid of knowledge of art from Eastern Europe, partly because of a 
real lack of a cold war exchange of art and artists, although nowhere near to the extent as 
has commonly been described, but also because of the nature of art history as a discipline, 
structured by a narrow selection of which examples can be highlighted. Museums have 
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limited floor space, art history courses limited time frames and collectors tend towards what 
is already known. These four examples help remedy and patch up these stories. But these 
cases begin to paint another picture, one that has to do with art history and curators’ need 
for labelling. This desire to comprehend through labelling a collective goes hand in hand 
with a narrative of a divided Europe.
The Periphery
In the introduction to Primary Documents: A Sourcebook for Eastern and Central European 
Art since the 1950s, Laura Hoptman and Tomáš Pospiszyl pinpoint the problem of the 
pervasive label ‘Eastern Europe’. It is a concept that is ‘neither geographic nor social; it is 
economic and political’; it is constructed and not given. When the concept is repeated in 
the various curatorial projects discussed here, its political connotations dominate the art 
under its umbrella. Engaging with the idea of Eastern Europe implies, according to some, 
an engagement with the peripheral.
Between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the growth in the 2010s of commercial galleries 
specializing in art from Eastern Europe, there have been a number of exhibitions on 
reconsidering, recognizing and re-establishing art from Eastern Europe, both in the 
West and in the former East, in which East/Eastern is paramount to the narratives told. 
Alternative notions have emerged as a response, such as the ambitious project of conferences, 
exhibitions and research under the umbrella ‘The Former West’ (2008–2014), led by the 
curator Maria Hlavajova. It addresses the fact that ‘the other’ is never alone, and rather 
than focusing on how art and culture from outside the West is also important, a Western 
centre for understanding art and culture is negotiated. Knowledge of the West must be 
restructured, because art from Eastern Europe changes the whole scene, not just its ‘own’ 
regional discourse.47 Narratives of art and Europe must fundamentally change according to 
this line of thought: the centre and periphery that come with the East–West divide in art 
history must be challenged.
Many curators, artists, critics and art historians would strongly oppose a singular story 
and a simplified canon formation of modern masters. Diversified storytelling may be a 
widespread ambition; yet as has been discussed above, artists from Eastern Europe who 
were not established in the West during Soviet Communism are marginally represented at 
museums and art institutions in Europe and North America. Art from Eastern Europe keeps 
resurfacing in different narrative frameworks with references to geographical regions and 
cultural experiences, where a dichotomy between inside and outside seems firmly resilient. 
The impact of projects such as The Former West is too soon to assess. The terminologies in 
the different curatorial and theoretical texts that frame each exhibition discuss how to talk 
about the area of Eastern Europe, where there is a shift in nuance between a spatial concept 
and a temporal definition of politics and culture. In some exhibitions, the prefix Eastern is 
carefully avoided; in some, overtly stated; in all of them, implied.
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The political scientist and anthropologist Iver B. Neumann stated in 1999:
The use of ‘the East’ as the other is a general practice in European identity formation. ‘The 
East’ is indeed Europe’s other, and it is continuously being recycled in order to represent 
European identities. Since the ‘Eastern absence’ is a defining trait of ‘European’ identities, 
there is no use talking about the end of an East/West divide in European history after the 
end of the Cold War. The question is not whether the East will be used in the forging of 
new European identities but how this is being done.48
Neumann underlines the inherent understanding of the link between the East and the ‘Other’ 
in European identity formation. Piotrowski has pointed out: ‘Of course, it is impossible to 
deny that East-Central Europe has functioned as a type of a periphery for Western Europe. 
One must, however, transform such position into an analytic advantage, a tool that will allow 
us to reveal the meaning and the dynamic of the place in its entire, complex identity’.49 In the 
arts, numerous exhibitions have tried an inclusive strategy without naming their inclusions, 
just as it is normal to expect women artists in contemporary curating without pointing it 
out. One such example is ‘Manifesta 2’ in Luxembourg in 1998, curated by Robert Fleck, 
Maria Lind and Barbara Vanderlinden, which included a range of artists from all across 
Europe without pointing out their geocultural belonging. At the subsequent ‘Manifesta 3’ 
in Ljubljana in 2000, curated by Francesco Bonami, Ole Bouman, Maria Hlavajova and 
Kathrin Rhomberg, the previous curators’ standpoint of silent inclusion was debated. The 
team of curators maintained that removing identity undermined those who had a specific 
Eastern European experience. In examples 2 and 3, Europe and Eastern Europe are also a 
psychological affair.
According to Bojana Pejić, the curator of example 4, ‘Gender Check: Femininity and 
Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe’, to be an Eastern European artist was also to be 
a male artist. Through the extensive exhibition and the accompanying The Gender Check 
Reader, Pejić created a platform for understanding gender politics and difference in the 
countries from former Eastern Europe, as a comment to what art had been exhibited in 
previous projects. Of the four case studies, the exhibition ‘Gender Check’ stands out as 
the most different because it not only included such a large number of women artists 
(but also male artists) but also challenged the Other of the Eastern European otherness. 
It questioned too the canonizing effects of Western feminism and its colonizing 
understanding of gender politics in representation. Perhaps its most notable difference 
was its refusal to adhere to a Western canon of what was regarded as important art, 
largely art with a conceptual base, which went under the radar of totalitarian regimes. To 
understand gender politics, and the lack thereof in many instances, in Eastern European 
countries, example 4, ‘Gender Check’, exhibited material ranging from socialist realism 
posters to art produced in the official Soviet art system to subversive accounts of sexual 
politics in present times.
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‘Gender Check’ has been praised as a landmark exhibition, creating a platform for self-
defining how ‘we’ are spoken for in the exhibition.50 The art historian Martina Pachmanová 
writes that the reason why Eastern European artists, and women in particular, have been 
consistently excluded is not just the West’s fault, rather the lack of a self-created platform 
from which to speak.51 It was also criticized for precisely not speaking of a broad enough ‘we’. 
One of the exhibition’s participants, Marina Gržinić, artist and theorist, presents a vehement 
critique. Not only does she portray the curatorial strategies leading up to the opening as 
unethical – the names of the Eastern European artists were not even on view until the last 
minute, unlike the invitees based in the West. But the whole idea of categorizing East and 
West after the Berlin Wall was seen as redundant.52 This exhibition adhered to two strands 
of curatorial narratives. Whilst it denied a one-sided understanding of Eastern European art 
through a Western paradigm that conceptual art is good art, it still clearly and knowingly 
performed Eastern Europe in a Western art institution. It also adhered to a need for creating 
a platform for women artists and questions of representation of gender, a strategy with roots 
in nineteenth-century European culture.
As shown here, the notion of Eastern Europe as a way to organize art keeps being 
reiterated 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is natural to compare with how the 
‘woman artist’ is a concept that refutes any categorization despite women artists keep being 
packaged collectively. The art world these exhibitions are within, to a certain extent and 
with many local exceptions, may have moved beyond the need to identify art by way of the 
artist’s gender.53 Yet the category of ‘the woman artist’ has become a narrative concept of 
its own,54 detached from historical and present-day practice but keeps finding validation, 
for better or worse. The history of curating ‘the woman artist’ started with exhibition 
projects such as the ‘Union of Women Painters and Sculptures’, founded in Paris in 1881, 
which helped exhibit women artists’ work.55 Throughout the twentieth century, numerous 
exhibitions have manifested the institutional neglect of women artists. In the last decade, 
exhibitions such as ‘Wack! Art and the Feminist Revolution’ and ‘Global Feminisms’ (both 
2007), ‘Elles@Pompidou’ (2009) and ‘Royalists to Romantics: Women Artists from the 
Louvre, Versailles, and Other French National Collections’ (2012) continue an established 
trajectory, of which the exhibition ‘Gender Check’ is a part.56 Focusing on the category of 
the woman has historically been a necessity for women artists to be recognized at all in art 
history.57 Yet it has also become its own narrative category that can be seen to perpetuate its 
marginalization.
Being labelled a ‘woman artist’ can indeed be a double-edged sword. It is also a 
narrative genre in curatorial work that mirrors the attempt to group artists from Eastern 
Europe across similar differences, although here culture, geography or political systems 
are the defining factors. Citing example 4, ‘Gender Check’, the art historian Katja Kobolt 
counterposes arguments for and against changing the canon. The exhibition was, in 
her view, a productive expansion: ‘The exhibition worked critically and creatively with 
different historical and contemporary canons, including the canons of socialist imagery, 
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nonconformist avant-garde and critical contemporary art, all of which tended to be male-
dominated in most of the Eastern European cultures represented in the show’.58 The critique 
of the master narrative of the woman as other, or the Eastern European other, concerned 
their essentializing effects: binding what someone produces in terms of identity, body or 
nationality is demeaning. The counterargument goes that a ‘woman-only’ policy may be 
necessary as a kind of strategic essentialism as long as the institutional structure dictates 
an ‘othering’.59
In some ways, all the exhibitions analysed here can be seen as failures since in each case the 
peripheral notions are perpetuated and repeated, despite wordy introductions promising 
the opposite. On the other hand, all the exhibition curators argue how they have turned 
the notion of periphery into an analytical argument and possibly also an advantage. For 
a centre to exist, a periphery is necessary. The literary scholar Yuriy Lotman has shown 
that the margins may not be a bad place to be, but are instead where new intersections can 
take place, where new knowledge may form.60 Each time the periphery is named in the 
exhibitions, the art from this ‘periphery’ is made visible – but also kept in the margins. Many 
thinkers have claimed the importance of naming as the basis of exclusion or subordination. 
One example is Frantz Fanon, one of the founders of postcolonial theory, who refused to 
stop identifying his skin colour – which is what made his identity. The curators of Manifesta 
3 insisted on the importance of acknowledging and naming the identity that an Eastern 
European experience dictates. It remains unresolved whether the naming of identity – 
related to gender, nationality or geography – is constructive for change or, on the contrary, 
cements traditions.
However, this study is not concerned with finding an art historical solution, or even 
pointing at an impasse in the curatorial discourse. Its ambition is to see what happens with 
the idea of Europe when narrated through art. As for exhibitions and mediatized images 
of art from Europe between 2009 and 2011, what is most striking is the return to the old 
impetus of representing, showing and making known the periphery. The dichotomy between 
centre and periphery is a narrative that underpins each example.
Every time art has been exhibited and marketed under the cultural umbrella of Eastern 
Europe, more artists are added to a greater bank of knowledge, and the image of Europe 
is expanded. Simultaneously, the same umbrella cements Eastern Europe beyond a 
geographical area and reinforces its cultural otherness. In his book In the Shadow of Yalta: 
Art and the Avant-garde in Eastern Europe, 1945–1989, Piotr Piotrowski paints the picture 
of a homogenized view of Western canonical standard and East European art as an exotic 
other. Although interesting, not least as a new commercial opportunity, art and narratives 
from the former East, Eastern or central Europe have been synonymous with being ‘not-
as-good-as’ the West.61 In a later book, Piotrowski further discusses how art history has 
continuously had a hard time shifting its geographical focus and is more or less consciously 
led by the idea of a Western European sense of universalism.62 The examples explored in this 
chapter show the difficulty art institutions have in progressing from the idea of Europe as 
divided in two. If art, as Andrzej Szczerski claimed, was important for portraying the new 
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Europe, it has struggled to paint a sufficiently diversified picture.63 Not through individual 
artworks but through the curatorial projects, creating art history for the future is to come. 
Despite good intentions, the image of Europe pictured in these case studies is divided rather 
than ‘united in diversity’ according to the EU motto.
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There are several good reasons why the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) is a particularly suitable place to search for East European narratives of Europe. Other genres and kinds of music could also be relevant, in art music as well as in popular music.1 
However, the ESC is a unique annual event of particular significance for the European 
unification process, offering a limited set of songs in a yearly televised event that has a very 
broad audience all over Europe. The event is a unified official ritual organized by the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) and at the same time stages a number of individual songs selected 
by national audiences and therefore representing a range of different stylistic and regional 
approaches. It is significant that an EBU spokesman has described the ESC as a rare example 
of ‘an entertainment programme with a message’, which makes it particularly interesting to 
interpret.2 The ESC is a big annual television event constructed for manifesting Europe in 
music; it is hence reasonable to expect that it will be a rich source of narratives of Europe.
Besides the defining institutional context of the event, the ESC has three general traits of 
significance here: it is based on music, on popular music and on televised popular music. (1) It 
combines sounds with lyrics, commentary, visual performance and graphic representations, 
music is a symbolic mode with a strong emotive impact, used for intensifying rituals of 
community and collective identifications, combining emotive appeal with social interaction 
in ways that offer rich resources for identifying practices.3 (2) The focus on a popular genre 
supplements studies of literature and visual arts. The ESC has an enormous transnational 
attraction, reaching out to roughly 125 million TV viewers each year watching some 40 
competing national acts, in stark contrast to cultural genres and fields in the high arts. (3) 
The emphasis on how the ESC is televised – rather than experienced live by local audiences – 
adds an element of mediation that involves an inter- or transmedial combination of two 
distinct cultural industries: music and television. 
The ESC deserves to be taken seriously because it is to a certain extent a forum for dealing 
with current issues of European integration. In fact, it is surprisingly reminiscent of the 
‘agonistic’ model of political democracy advocated by Chantal Mouffe:
Contrary to the antagonistic friend/enemy relation in which there is no shared symbolic 
terrain and in which the different sides aim at eliminating their opponent, in an agonistic 
relation the adversaries share a common symbolic space and they recognize, at least to some 
degree, the legitimacy of the claims of their opponents. A sort of ‘conflictual consensus’ 
exists between the various groups. They agree about the ethical principles which should 
inform their political association, but they disagree about their interpretation.4
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Artists and nations in the ESC likewise form an agonistic arena, sharing ‘a common symbolic 
space’ and recognizing each other’s legitimate right to participate and voice their claims in a 
‘conflictual consensus’ typical for such contests – and partly similar to sports events such as 
the European Champions League. The ESC rules are determined ‘from above’ by the EBU, 
but history shows that they can be renegotiated on the initiative of participant countries, and 
therefore are the result of international agreements. The ESC does not result in a consensus 
where everyone agrees that the best tune won; still, all participants accept the rules, and if 
they have objections, they voice them in next year’s competing songs, instead of coming to 
blows and tearing the arena apart.
Mouffe herself would probably strongly hesitate to include the ESC in her agonistic model 
of politics. One might, for example, object that televised entertainment and pop concerts do 
not constitute any form of political association. The ESC is in a sense not quite ‘for real’: it is 
a symbolic event – a fun game that no one is prepared to die for. But this just makes it even 
more important as a model and an arena for exploring how other formations of Europeanness 
might be developed elsewhere. It is actually a relatively successful experimental effort at 
‘keeping antagonism at bay by establishing institutions allowing conflict to take an agonistic 
form’.5 Also, the impact of such aesthetic and affective communities should in general not be 
underestimated. The ESC might be widely ridiculed, but such emotively constituted communal 
experiences of transnational relations should still be taken seriously. Ridicule is itself actually 
also a form of self-distancing reflexivity that can be found in various kinds of European texts, 
and that may strengthen rather than weaken the efficiency of this agonistic arena.
Here one may again refer to Mouffe’s acknowledgement of ‘the crucial role played by 
affects and passions in politics’.6 ‘In the current stage of post-Fordist capitalism, the cultural 
terrain occupies a strategic position because the production of affects plays an increasingly 
important role’, Mouffe further argues.7 The ESC may not be the most vital among ‘agonistic 
public spaces where counter-hegemonic struggles could be launched’.8 Rather than forming 
an autonomous counter-hegemonic public space, it functions as a media space allowing 
different national voices to suggest competing versions of what may count as a hegemonic 
European identification. In this way, the ESC constitutes a terrain ‘where the construction of 
political subjectivity takes place’.9 Indeed, Philip V. Bohlman argues that the ESC illustrates 
how ‘New Europeanness enters the public spheres’. While it ‘furthers a type of European 
unity’, it has also ‘provided a public space for the emergence of alternative voices and politics’.10
The purpose of the ESC events is to annually decide the best newly composed European 
song in this specific format. Participants agree that each entry is to be listened to carefully 
and that there should be a voting process with equal rights for the competing countries. 
A good ESC winner supposedly expresses some relevant and cherished aspects of what 
Europeans desire and feel at that moment. Different countries and individual voters may 
interpret this differently: some looking for sheer entertainment and uplifting tunes, others 
for serious messages linked to shared values or sounds with a strong emotional impact, 
etc. But they do agree on taking part in the institution of this competition itself, as a way 
to produce some kind of affective communication across the continent, sharing at least 
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a brief moment of excitement and joy  – and for some, disappointment and a desire to 
improve next year.
When discussing European symbols or media, the ESC is repeatedly cited as the most 
publicly successful example, comparable to the official symbols and forums established by 
the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU), including the European flag, 
anthem, and motto and Europe Day as well as the euro currency. The ESC finals and song 
entries constitute a broad, popular format that negotiates between central institutions and 
dispersed audiences. The whole event is highly centralized and regulated by the EBU in a 
way that leaves limited space for diverging voices. The EBU is not involved in the preceding 
national selections, only requiring them to be ‘fair and transparent’, hence leaving room for 
different solutions depending on the local status of the competition and the habits and norms 
of each nation’s political and cultural public spheres: some organize public voting, while others 
let specialists select the competing entries. On all levels, there is a balance between particular 
(national) and general (European) values. The ESC’s status as an institutionalized pop music 
extravaganza certainly delimits the range of statements it can allow, but this does not prevent 
it from offering keys to unlock hegemonic discourses in this widely popular context. 
Here follows first a presentation of the ESC finals, beginning with a general introduction 
to this media format and its eastward shift, followed by a condensed survey of the post-
1989 finals, and concluding with a thematic summary of their main narrative strategies. The 
second half of the chapter investigates the individual songs. After a general introduction and 
some illustrative examples follows a structured summary of the main narrative dimensions 
found in these songs. The final section then begins with a comparative and contextualizing 
commentary and ends with some concluding words.
Figure 7.1. ESC logos from the 1950s and the 1990s (logos.wikia.com/wiki/File:Eurovision_montage.jpg).




As they are broadcast on television, all finals have a similar narrative structure, with a fixed 
beginning (opening sequence and welcoming presentation) and ending (vote counting, 
celebrating the winner and ending credits) surrounding a standard set of intermediate 
stations (song performances, host dialogues and entertaining interludes). Individual songs 
too tend to form narratives, with the lyrical and musical development from intro to verses 
and choruses to the customary rise in key and the final coda. Music is a symbolic mode 
based on temporal development and with signifying capacities that make it highly capable 
of narrations. Music also represents a virtual sequence of events in an audial mode that 
builds more on emotive-sensual levels of development than on cognition and rational 
argumentation.11 Single sounds, words or images such as flags or maps may not always 
obviously be narrative, but their sequential combinations tend to be interpreted narratively, 
and when explicitly referring to European topics, they are relevant here. In this study, the 
intramusical narratives serve to qualify and fill in the thematic content of the song lyrics 
and the visual performance. Certain elements of sound texture and musical form structure 
will be taken into account here, but the most obvious narratives of Europe are verbally 
expressed. Televised images, words and musical sounds thus combine in forming narrative 
structures at several levels. 
To some extent, all ESC songs take part in constructing a super-narrative of Europe just 
by being performed in this context. As soon as a singer constructs a ‘we’ together with the 
audience, Europe may in some way be implied. Specific sounds, lyric themes and visual 
expressions can often be linked to European issues, and the ESC context makes such 
interpretations more plausible than for songs performed elsewhere. Ivan Raykoff has argued 
that ‘countless popular songs describe love and desire, or breakup and heartache, but the 
Eurovision context can lend a political connotation to familiar amorous sentiments’, and 
that ‘more specifically, some Eurovision songs present an analogy between romantic union 
and European Union’.12 His examples include the UK’s ‘I Belong’ (1965) and ‘Power to All 
Our Friends’ (1973) as well as the Swedish group ABBA’s victorious ‘Waterloo’ (1974), which 
can be heard celebrating integration with lines such as ‘Promise to love you for ever more, 
couldn’t escape if I wanted to, knowing my fate is to be with you!’ 
However, some particular songs more explicitly focus on Europe, for instance when lyrics 
or even song titles clearly talk about ‘Europe’, thematize European identity or tell stories 
about its history and future. Surrounding texts and commentaries may also interpret songs 
in terms of Europeanness. Visual elements of artist performance or its framing through 
stage setting, videos or CD covers may further assist in inserting a song in a narrative about 
the fate of Europe. Finally, the musical sounds themselves may have a temporal structure 
that implies an intended reading of them as forming a narrative of Europe. 
The ESC events and songs are of course never only about Europe. They always also 
thematize and signify other topics, such as love and grief, competition and cooperation, 
the power of song and music, or the role of television and other modes of mediated 
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communication. Much previous research in this field has focused on such other themes, not 
least the way that nation branding is played out in these events. 
Here the focus is on stories about Europe found either in the framing events of those ESC 
finals that since 1989 have been staged in East European countries or in East European ESC 
entries. The interpretation of these events and songs will be contextualized in relation to 
(1) the documented intentions of their producers (politicians, broadcast authorities, artists, 
writers and composers); and (2) the reception history through which music listeners and 
media users interpret this music and use it to construct their own narratives of Europe. 
In both cases, this analysis can only hint at some selected aspects that might be relevant 
based on Internet sources such as ESC websites, YouTube clips, fan sites and blogs. Further, 
horizontal comparisons have then selectively been made with (a) West European ESC finals 
and songs from the same period, in particular since 2000; (b) some East European music 
from other genres; (c) official European anthems; (d) songs and music from other European 
peripheries and from Central and Western Europe, including independent or alternative 
songs with divergent views on Europe; and (e) a few examples of music linked to other 
continents or big countries. Most existing ESC research has studied the ESC as a total event, 
the nation-branding strategies activated by the competing entries and the identity themes of 
ethnicity, gender and sexuality.13 Here the focus is rather on how Europe itself is in the ESC 
context narrated from its eastern periphery.14
Turning Eastward
Yugoslavia, non-aligned since 1948, was between 1961 and the post-1989 events the ESC’s 
only Communist East European participant. The ESC started as a West European project; 
however, since 1965 it was also broadcast in Eastern Europe by Eurovision’s counterpart: 
Intervision, organized by the Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision 
(OIRT). The OIRT was the East European equivalent to the EBU, and it included too Finland’s 
YLE (but not Yugoslavia’s JRT!) among its members. Mari Pajala has analysed the complex 
relations between the two, emphasizing elements of cooperation across cold war divides.15 
Especially in the late 1960s, the hosting presenters often referred to this wider audience 
and sometimes also addressed viewers in Russian as well as in English and French, creating 
an imaginary sense of communion across the Iron Curtain. But besides Yugoslavia, the 
competing countries were all from the non-Communist side of that division. From 1977 to 
1980, the OIRT also held in Poland the Intervision Song Contest, as an alternative to the ESC.
Yugoslavia won in May 1989 – coinciding with the fall of the Berlin Wall – and therefore 
staged the 1990 final, shortly before the country violently disintegrated. Until Estonia won 
in 2001, all other finals took place in Western Europe (or outside Europe, with Israel in 1979 
and 1999). The geopolitical balance started changing drastically after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, and in particular after the millennium turn. In 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Slovenia participated for the first time, followed by Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
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Poland, Romania, Russia and Slovakia in 1994 and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia in 1998. Latvia followed in 2000, Ukraine in 2003, Albania, Belarus and Serbia 
and Montenegro in 2004, Bulgaria and Moldova in 2005, Armenia in 2006, the Czech 
Republic, Georgia, Montenegro and Serbia in 2007 and finally Azerbaijan in 2008. These 
new participants were welcome since they added something fresh to the show, probably 
invested much in the events and also multiplied the number of voters and brought in East 
European viewers/listeners with different tastes. These combined factors eventually turned 
out to make them victorious. The 2000s have therefore seen almost half of the ESC finals 
held in East European countries: Estonia, 2002; Latvia, 2003; Ukraine, 2005; Serbia, 2008; 
Russia, 2009; and Azerbaijan, 2012. There has thus been a striking post-1989 eastern turn in 
the history of the ESC, particularly emphasized in the new millennium.16 
On each such occasion, surrounding presentations on television and on the ESC website 
constructed a mix of strategically designed narratives of Europe’s past and future, where 
the host nation located itself in relation to Europe as an evolving totality. The national 
competition format itself frames all the narrations it contains. Competition is always 
double-edged: on the one hand, it implies some kind of animosity, of dividing up and taking 
sides for one’s friends (presumably the team of one’s own country) against one’s enemies 
(other countries’ songs), and on the other hand, competition also presupposes a shared 
understanding that the rules of competition are acceptable, and that victory is worth 
fighting for. This might be linked to Mouffe’s aforementioned ‘agonistic politics’ but also 
to how Pierre Bourdieu’s cultural sociology implicitly assumes that polarized social fields 
are based on a shared understanding that some key values and positions are worth fighting 
for. On such a basis, national teams and viewers – even when taking an ironic position – 
tacitly share a belief in Eurovision as a public space for constructing competing affective 
identifications since they invest in a narrative of European nations uniting around a common 
good, sharing an enjoyment in each other’s voices: symbolically ‘united in diversity’, as the 
European motto goes. Even without any symbolic underpinning in the actual televised 
performance, the structural phenomenon of the ESC as such therefore acknowledges 
competitive collaboration between nations under a pan-European label. Pajala has found 
five rather permanent characteristics of European music broadcasts: a sense of liveness 
in the co-presence of a dispersed international audience; a rotating organization between 
participating countries; an emphasis on national characteristics; symbolic references to 
Europe at large; and an element of competition.17 All this was, and remains, central to the 
ESC, which explains its continued success.
Initially, winners were selected by national juries, but elements of televoting have been 
added since 1997, and from 2009 a 50/50 system has been followed, in which half of the votes 
are awarded by a national jury and half by viewer televoting in that country. As more and 
more countries participated, and it was impossible to manage much more than two dozen 
entries in one programme, various forms of qualifying rounds were introduced from 1993, 
with the break-up of Yugoslavia into several countries, until a semi-final was introduced 
from 2004, and two semi-finals from 2008. As an extra bonus, having two semi-finals also 
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made it possible to group competitors in order to reduce the impact of neighbour voting, for 
instance by dividing the Nordic countries between the two semi-finals or keeping Cyprus 
and Greece apart. This may be regarded as yet another way to strengthen the common goal 
against mutual fighting, in a similar manner as through the fundamental rule that national 
audiences are not allowed to vote for their own entries. Still, the finals are full of mutual 
competition between nations (states, countries) and implicitly also between larger regions 
(religions, cultures, historical trajectories).18 
The ESC thus offers a complex set of overlapping virtual maps of Europe. It is first framed 
by how transnational institutions such as the CoE, EU and the eurozone construct Europe. 
All EBU members form another map, as does each year’s competitors and voting countries, 
flanked by other countries where the show can be seen. In a further step, the actual voting 
behaviour of viewers tends to inhabit these maps by constructing lines of sympathy. In a 
statistical study, Marta Blangiardo and Gianluca Baio have scrutinized the 1998–2012 
televoting and found no negative bias, indicating that there are no persistent animosities 
between particular countries.19 However, they found slight positive biases that indicate 
cultural affinity patterns constituting four main regions: South and Central Europe, the 
Balkan region, the former Soviet bloc and the Nordic region, to which also the UK and 
Ireland tend to belong. Such friendly neighbour voting reconstructs Europe as composed of 
distinct cultural taste regions. They are not invisible but tend to be acknowledged by many, 
including the EBU, which tries to counteract such effects. It does so by way of carefully 
designed voting rules and the semi-final allocation draw, which ensures that not too many 
countries from each of these regions compete in the same semi-final and hence can vote 
for each other. This counter-strategy subverts as well as confirms this spontaneous viewer 
activity, trying to counteract any tendencies for Europe to fragment into an inter-regional 
battlefield. In this way, the resulting total image of Europe is a contested compromise between 
different superimposed and mutually interacting or sometimes conflicting mappings, 
whether institutionalized or merely imagined. This complex negotiation process explains 
the tenacity in how such maps evolve, as many actors tend to stick to older conceptions 
where Europe still had its centre on the French–German border.
Eurovision songs that deal with European issues tend to become political, forming a 
precarious dividing line for the event. According to the ESC rules, ‘political’ statements are 
forbidden: 
The lyrics and/or performance of the songs shall not bring the Shows, the ESC as such or 
the EBU into disrepute. No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar [sic!] nature 
shall be permitted during the ESC. No swearing or other unacceptable language shall be 
allowed in the lyrics or in the performances of the songs. No commercial messages of any 
kind shall be allowed.20
The Georgian entry ‘We Don’t Wanna Put In’ by Stephane & 3G fell foul of this rule and was 
duly banned in Moscow in 2009 since its title could be heard as anti-Putin, the then Russian 
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prime minister. On the other hand, the Ukrainian singer Verka Serduchka’s ‘Lasha Tumbai’, 
which many thought sounded like ‘Russia, goodbye’, was allowed in Helsinki in 2007. Several 
songs with a political edge have still not been hindered, for instance Anastasiya Vinnikova’s 
nationalistic ‘I Love Belarus’ in a 2011 Düsseldorf semi-final, Genealogy’s ‘Face the Shadow’ 
(#16 in Vienna, 2015), whose words ‘Face every shadow you denied’ and ‘Don’t deny’ may 
well refer to the Armenian genocide or the gay rights issues so prominent in the Malmö final 
in 2013. The 2014 Copenhagen final also had political repercussions as it coincided with the 
intensification of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. When one year later, in 2015, the 
local audience in Vienna repeatedly booed Russia, the EBU drowned out the noise by fake 
applause in a vain effort to depoliticize the soundtrack, and the local programme hosts felt 
obliged to exclaim: ‘Please remember that our motto is “building bridges”, and music should 
stand over politics tonight, and all our artists deserve equal treatment and respect, and it’s 
all for the music!’
ESC narratives often interact closely with political narratives in a narrower sense, but 
they can also in themselves be seen as political media events – or at least these two aspects 
are hard to distinguish. This has often become clear when politicians from EU candidate 
nations have drawn analogies between ESC activities and the larger political transformations, 
publicly interpreting their ESC success as signalling the future integration of their countries 
into the EU. 
On 18 May 2013, right before the Stockholm ESC final, Swedish TV programme ‘Studio 
Eurovision’ noted that the contest was ‘born as a peace project’: it had gone through the 
Balkan war, Franco’s Spain and the conflict in North Ireland, and had ‘influenced the whole 
development in Europe’; it became a cold war symbol for ‘pleasure, pop and freedom’, feared 
by Soviet authorities until Gorbachev lifted the Iron Curtain and ‘let Eurovision flow freely 
in the Soviet Union’; Serbian President Slobodan Milošević tried in vain to stop Bosnian 
artists from participating in 1993; the ESC has ‘taken a stand against a conservative Europe 
and embraced the gay movement’, with the transgender Dana International winning for 
Israel in 1998 and the lesbian Marija Šerifović for Serbia in 2007; there was police repression 
of gay activists while artists and audiences celebrated diversity inside the Moscow arena in 
2009. Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt was asked at the time why the ESC is 
so important, and he answered: ‘First, it is fun, which we must not forget – this is the key 
thing. But then – as this live transmission shows – it has an influence. It unites; it creates a 
feeling of community; it mitigates some antagonisms. It also gives nations that have been 
oppressed or had problems an opportunity to suddenly step forward on the stage, feel pride 
in themselves’.21 He was in Belgrade and in Latvia immediately after their respective victories, 
which they interpreted as important signs that ‘they are now a part of Europe’. Bildt claimed 
that in Kosovo someone even believed (‘and it can very well be the case’) that Kosovo ‘was 
more anxious to join the ESC than the UN’! He found it important that newly liberated 
countries could appear as independent and show themselves to the world: ‘Communities of 
people and cultures are not just politics. Government and politics may quarrel, there may 
be various kinds of problems, but this unites in a completely different way’. Bildt mentioned 
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how recently warring Balkan countries still vote for each other in the ESC, which shows that 
‘after the war, music could actually bring them together again, which I found great’. Asked 
how to deal with undemocratic states, Bildt stressed that it is not regimes that compete, but 
people: ‘We should try and unite people, and sooner or later the regimes will unite’. 
In fact, all popular culture is always in some way political in Mouffe’s sense of a ‘dimension 
of antagonism, which can take many forms and emerge out of diverse social relations, but 
which can never be eradicated’.22 The EBU’s rule to ban everything ‘of a political or similar 
nature’ from the ESC is thus untenable, which the word ‘similar’ already hints that the EBU 
is probably well aware of. Popular culture can never be reduced to ‘mere entertainment’, 
even though many wish to do so: fans want their desires to be left alone, while elitists deny 
that the popular has any relevant content. It is probably wise to stop open conflicts between 
nations from erupting, but there can never be any determinate border between the ESC 
and politics. It is all about situated negotiation. The very setting of the ESC is arguably 
political – channelling antagonistic voices to form a sense of togetherness among a set of 
countries. This is done by organizing an ‘ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions 
which seek to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in conditions 
which are always potentially conflictual’.23 The ESC and its songs express and comment on 
current issues that are partly political: war and peace, cooperation and competition, etc. It is 
therefore impossible to decide once and for all where the line is drawn between acceptable 
and non-acceptable political lyrics, speeches or gestures. 
Viewers are not the same as citizens; however, symbolically, the public voting system has 
sometimes been seen to signify democracy, while jury groups represent meritocracy. In this 
way, the competition format has political implications that may confirm official European 
values in contrast to totalitarian regimes. However, there are limits to this parallel. The ESC 
is in many ways just a mock simulation of democratic rule, as the ‘Big Five’ phenomenon 
shows. In 1996, Germany failed to qualify for the final. Under the threat that such big 
contributors to ESC funding could withdraw completely, it was decided as of 2000 to let the 
EBU’s largest funders always automatically qualify for the final. There were originally four 
such countries, but from 2011 Italy was also added, so the Big Four became the Big Five. The 
ESC rules of 2013 state that there shall be six guaranteed places, one for the host country 
and one each for France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the UK. This Big Five rule has a West 
European bias that compromises the event’s ‘democratic’ legitimacy, but its basis in hard 
economic realities has made it difficult to abolish. 
The contest between East and West is one of the most prominent polarities evident in the 
ESC and has been markedly present in recent years as a result of the post–cold war sentiments 
linked to the EU’s eastern expansion. Opening up Europe is a recurrent theme in these 
events, as are elements of mutual distrust between ‘old’ Western and ‘new’ Eastern Europe, 
when, for instance, senior ESC nations used to being awarded high points suddenly lose 
ground to juniors with different tastes. There is a temporal as well as a spatial aspect to this. 
The ESC by tradition has since 1956 taken place in May, the optimal spring month. This also 
happens to be the month when Europe Day is held, celebrating the Schuman Declaration of 
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9 May 1950, which proposed a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a means to 
put an end to inter-European wars. Spring may in many ways be seen as a European month, 
with the awakening after a frozen winter symbolizing a political resurrection after years of 
divisive wars. This seasonal metaphor was employed when the events in North Africa and 
the Middle East starting in early 2011 were nicknamed ‘the Arab Spring’. However, it can 
also be traced back to 1848, when a sudden wave of bourgeois revolutions, under the banner 
‘Spring of Nations’ or ‘Springtime of the Peoples’, and combining nationalist and democratic 
sentiments with class struggle, spread from France to much of Europe and Latin America. 
Celebrating European values in May, therefore, has a long history and makes sense as a way 
of underlining a desire, after long periods of deep darkness, to inaugurate a new flourishing 
era of peace and prosperity.
Symbolically, opening up has also geographically become a key motif for the EU. One 
example is the euro banknotes with their windows, doors and bridges, which are meant to signify 
the mutual openness and cooperation between Europe’s nations as well as communication 
with the surrounding world. Since World War II, this process has progressively expanded 
eastwards, with the ESC in the vanguard.
In the ESC finals, efforts are made to cross different spaces: the host city and its arena; 
visual representations of the host country; the participating nations, sometimes represented 
by crowds gathering to experience the event in other city squares; and the home environments 
where most viewers are.24 In this framework, Europe is represented through the competing 
singers and songs as well as through references to the dispersed transnational audience. 
Final Story: Opening Doors
Already before the expansion of the competition, the show was transmitted to parts of 
East Europe as well. Thus, in Lausanne 1989, the Swiss hosts emphasized that the big TV 
audience stretched ‘all the way to the Soviet Union’. Yugoslavia won for the first time, but this 
eastward shift was not specifically commented upon, and the song itself (Riva: ‘Rock Me’) 
made no explicit reference to the East–West dimension.
This changed abruptly in Zagreb 1990, when the European identity’s collapsing East–West 
divide was repeatedly alluded to. Being the first East European final host, Yugoslavia was still 
formally one single country; under President Josip Broz Tito, it had secured independence 
from the Soviet bloc and had a reputation for being relatively open and liberal. The Eurovision 
logo was travestied in a many-hued and childish pastel coloured version, with the letters 
looking like toy flowers, emphasizing playful diversity rather than serious homogeneity. The 
opening sequence featured an animated ‘Euro-Cat’ and various musicians playing classical 
or pop music, gradually switching to Marc-Antoine Charpentier’s ‘Te Deum’, composed in 
the late seventeenth century and has since 1954 been the Eurovision theme tune. 
Opening a visual interlude before presenting the votes, the middle-aged programme 
hosts made an analogy soon to be tragically contradicted by the host nation’s collapse: ‘We 
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think that Yugoslavia is very much like an orchestra […]. Just as in an orchestra, where 
the string section and the wind section, the keyboard players and the percussionists sit 
next to each other, so in Yugoslavia there are all different kinds of climates, cuisines and, of 
course, cultural influences altogether’. Just a few years before the explosive civil war started 
and dashed such idealism, Yugoslavia’s internal diversity was with this musical metaphor 
described as a model example of how the ESC promised to help uniting Europe in its 
diversity (agonistically, to use Mouffean language). Having depicted various tourist sites, 
the interlude then ended with a sunset over the Mediterranean, some dramatic church bells 
and after that an animated sequence with the European stars spiralling upwards into the sky 
together with a seagull.
This was the year that Toto Cotugno won for Italy with his ‘Insieme: 1992’, with its 
striking refrain ‘Unite, unite, Europe’. Moving stars were projected in the background to 
even further emphasize the political context. Cotugno thanked his Italian associates and 
then twice exclaimed, ‘Per un’Europa unita!’ (For a united Europe!), before repeating his 
winning tune, surrounded by audience members and lots of cameras. This song otherwise 
had much more substantial elements of a European narrative than the rest of the event.
In the following years, European unification continued to be on the agenda. In the 
Rome 1991 final in Italy, an introductory animation showed stars coloured as national flags 
transforming into the star circle of the European flag. In Malmö 1992, the competition 
coincided with Europe Day (9 May), which the Swedish hosts commented thus: ‘The map 
of Europe is rapidly changing. Old countries disappear, new ones are being formed. And 
when East is no longer East, and West is no longer West, Europe has become greater. This we 
celebrate today, the ninth of May, Europe Day’. Also, the EBU Executive Supervisor Frank 
Naef was asked about the future of the ESC, to which he answered that they had to ‘analyse 
a new formula for the newcomers from East and West Europe’. The following finals also 
continued to show various animation sequences that played with the European flag symbol, 
and the Irish hosts in Millstreet 1993 welcomed the new EU members:
Now the countries of Europe have forged close economic and cultural links through the 
EEC, particularly in this, the first year of the European single market – a market made up 
of over 350 million European citizens. We welcome them, and all the other millions of 
viewers from the rest of Europe and around the world. Yes, the Eurovision Song Contest 
is growing bigger, and this year we offer a special welcome to three new states: Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Again, in Dublin 1994, the ‘seven new states competing for the very first time in the Eurovision 
Song Contest’ were welcomed. The Norwegian hosts in Oslo 1996 likewise stressed Europe’s 
new unity: ‘This evening would like to unite Europe in music’. In Birmingham 1998, the host 
Terry Wogan’s jokes placed himself and Britain outside Europe by symbolically referring to 
a band ‘between here and Europe’, thus implying that Britain was not really part of Europe. 
The Swedish hosts in Stockholm 2000 excelled at speaking lots of languages to express the 
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transnational dialogue and polyglot diversity of the expanding continent, in a manner often 
repeated with slight variations in the following finals.
The first time the finals were staged in a former Soviet bloc country was in Tallinn 2002, 
after Estonia had won in Denmark the year before, and Prime Minister Mart Laar triumphed: 
‘We are no longer knocking at Europe’s door. We are walking through it singing’.25 This 
allusion to Estonia’s so-called ‘singing revolution’, however, turned out not to be the whole 
truth. Communal singing has a strong tradition in Estonia, with the annual Estonian 
Song Festival, held since 1869, becoming an important mobilizing tool in the struggle for 
independence from the Soviet Union. In 1988, more than 300,000 participants openly called 
for independence.26 Singing accompanied and fuelled a series of East European triumphs, 
but ‘new’ Europe’s efforts to claim the same identity rights as ‘old’ Europe continued to meet 
dogged resistance.
By celebrating this victorious integration in those terms, Laar simultaneously confirmed 
the existence of the door itself, and that Estonia and the other new members were in the 
past practically and/or symbolically outside Europe. The statement signified a passage 
from exclusion to inclusion, but also it affirmed the border itself and the transformation of 
parts of Eastern Europe from being outside or at least peripheral to becoming European. 
Similar demarcations continue to be made in subsequent finals. East European hosts tend 
to argue for their countries to be included by stressing their valuable difference from the 
West. In contrast, West European shows are inclined to reproduce the image of old Europe 
being just recently expanded by the addition of ‘new’ geopolitical units on its eastern 
frontier.
Staging the Tallinn final represented Estonia’s cultural and political geography as now 
at last again a part of Europe. The country was actively interacting with the rest of Europe 
and celebrating that its half-century of political, economic and social isolation behind the 
Iron Curtain had finally been broken.27 Images were shown of masses watching big screens 
on the streets of cities all over Europe, implying that the whole continent was now at last 
focusing on Estonia and letting it into their hearts.
Estonia introduced a specific slogan or motto for that year, which has since become 
an annual tradition. Estonian television chose ‘a modern fairy tale’, making it possible to 
stage the show around the topic of fairy tales, for instance in the ‘video postcards’ between 
tunes.28 The presenting duo’s introductory comments made the most out of it, using almost-
desperate rhetorical devices to fuse Estonia with Europe:
she: And Europe itself is the only continent that starts with E, because all the others 
start with A. 
he: And in Europe there are not many countries that start with E. Estonia is one of 
them!
she: So, this is the perfect place to hold the big E – the Eurovision Song Contest! […]
he: Estonian history is like a fairy tale too, with a happy ending.
she: Just like tonight’s show!
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Estonian history was thus likened to a fairy tale whose happy ending finally closed the door 
on decades of suffering. Similar associations are often made, striving to link the ESC event 
to abstract themes of love and community as well as to larger political issues of unification. 
However, the TV commentary of older ESC member states, such as the UK, Germany 
and Sweden, often tended by employing ironic distancing to reconstruct the same Estonia 
as some kind of Eastern Other, with Sweden safely positioned in Western Europe, but 
Estonia remaining outside, vainly trying to enter.29 In fact, the opening sequence and other 
elements of the hosting performance were ambivalent in this respect: it certainly strove to 
include Estonia within Europe, yet often stressed what is peculiar to this unique country, 
thus fuelling its own exclusion.30 A similar struggle between inclusion and exclusion can 
be traced through all ESC events, as such mechanisms are inherent in the competition 
format, which opens up Europe for each host and participating nation while offering them 
a chance to present their unique difference.31 However, it was given special intensity in the 
subsequent East European finals, where this European belonging could not be taken for 
granted in advance.
When Estonia and other Baltic and East European countries achieved independence 
and opted for a ‘return to Europe’, they did not erase the border between East and West. 
Instead, they moved it eastward by creating a new boundary between Europe and Russia 
as a new Eastern ‘other’.32 The whole emphasis of gaining independence implied an ‘enemy’ 
to be released from. Russia could not avoid playing that role due to not only its historical 
‘guilt’ of having been its neighbours’ oppressor but also its current dominance as the largest 
and strongest power in the region. The combination of these aspects makes it virtually 
impossible to even consider Russia ever becoming a full EU member, and Russia is thus 
doomed to remain an outsider in Europe. The 2002 Tallinn final discreetly contributed to 
such exclusion, for instance by showing right before the Russian entry a video postcard 
based on Alexander Pushkin’s fairy tale of a caught goldfish, with the slogan ‘Freedom’ then 
appearing immediately before the Russian flag.33 If the Baltic States had just escaped Russian 
influence to reunite with the rest of Europe, the topic of freedom from oppression had the 
side effect of raising a new curtain along Russia’s western borders.
The implicit exclusion of Russia also required suppressing the internal ethnic differences 
within Estonia, as Paul Jordan has pointed out.34 The video clips made no reference to 
multiculturalism and avoided any mention of the Russian-speaking minority, for instance 
by never referring to Estonia’s third-largest city, Narva, with its Russian-speaking majority. 
This year, the theme of diversity was thus sacrificed in favour of national unity against the 
Russian big brother. 
In 2002, Estonia’s neighbour Latvia won, and the Riga 2003 final chose the slogan ‘an 
enchanting rendezvous’.35 This year, the introduction to the event was a sequence depicting 
entering a galaxy of stars and then coming down to earth, where colourful flowers bloomed. 
An image of the Freedom Monument, an iconic site in downtown Riga concluded the video 
tour of the city, mixing new images with old photos. Live footage showed Russian cosmonauts 
sending real-time greetings from their international space station. Following an established 
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tradition, the visual star symbols were much used, deriving from the European flag’s perfect 
circle of twelve stars, which is also echoed in the EBU and ESC logos. Presentations often let 
the stars stand for individual nations, artists or citizens but also more generally for festive 
fireworks of light and energy. 
When Turkey hosted the final in Istanbul 2004, with the slogan ‘under the same sky’, 
the only clear European reference was to Istanbul as bridging two continents. The lack 
of other such explicit references to Europe is itself interesting to analyse but falls outside 
the scope of this study since Turkey is not a post-Communist state. In Kiev 2005, it was 
Ukraine’s turn to arrange the final, again making plenty of use of floating-star graphics. 
‘Awakening’ was a featured keyword in the aftermath of the ‘Orange Revolution’, which had 
revitalized democracy in Kyiv. At the official opening that year, Deputy Prime Minister 
Mykola Tomenko had emphasized the political importance of the event: ‘This contest is a 
serious step for Ukraine towards the EU’.36 When Greece won, President Viktor Yushchenko 
presented a special Ukrainian prize to the winners, using the word ‘Europe’ no less than 
five times: ‘Dear friends, dear Europe, good evening! I am congratulating all of you for this 
wonderful European night. The golden pectoral I am holding in my hand is a Ukrainian 
prize to the best European song, to the best European performer, for the united Europe. 
Congratulations on your victory!’
Neither Athens 2006 nor Helsinki 2007 made much out of the European theme, with 
their slogans ‘feel the rhythm’ and ‘true fantasy’. While Zagreb in 1990 had stressed the 
multicultural character of Yugoslavia, which soon became so disastrously compromised, 
Serbia 18 years later instead chose to stress its own firm unity. In Belgrade 2008, with 
the slogan ‘the confluence of sound’, the show started with a musical montage of a choir 
singing the Eurovision tune, followed by last year’s Serbian winner, after whom the 
two presenters had a brief dialogue, including an interesting turn of the post–cold war 
discourse: 
she: We have waited more than half a century for the Eurovision Song Contest to take 
place here on the banks of the Sava and Danube rivers.
he: Good evening, Europe, where have you been all this time?
Here the fifty years of isolation were reinterpreted in a more self-assured manner, questioning 
the West’s previous lack of attention rather than just celebrating vanishing boundaries. 
The challenging words ‘where have you been all this time’ not only seem to relate to the 
post–World War II period of isolation but also to the post-1989 period of negotiations 
for EU membership, during which there had been much hesitance to include Serbia after 
its Bosnian war. The sarcastic comment could resonate with how Serbs in large parts of 
(Western) Europe feel they have been abandoned and treated as evil pariahs in Western 
popular culture, making this ESC final craze appear as a sudden change of mood.
The sloganless Moscow 2009 had the Montréal-based Cirque du Soleil performing at 
the opening to celebrate Russia’s interest in circus arts. The presenting duo’s subsequent 
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introduction expressed not a small country asking to be allowed into the European 
community but a great and proud superpower being benevolent towards its neighbours 
and critical of how the rest of Europe looks upon it through US American lenses. ‘They say 
Russia is very cold, and it’s always snowing’, said one host, to which the other responded: 
‘And that is true… if you learned all you know about Russia from James Bond movies!’
The ESC was again envisaged as the shining galaxy that unites across borders, but the 
East–West balance was here different from when the Baltic States, escapees from the Eastern 
bloc, were hosting the event. Russia instead was depicted as a strong and self-sufficient other 
or neighbour, welcoming Europeans but not really striving to integrate with them, and 
certainly not as any returning family member (and even less so than, for instance, Turkey, 
which at least has a pending EU membership application). Russia thus placed itself in the 
same role as that in which it was positioned by those parts of East Europe integrating with 
the rest of Europe, for instance the 2002 Tallinn final tended to depict Russia as the new 
‘other’ of Europe. 
In Oslo 2010 and Düsseldorf 2011, the topics of European identity and unity were again 
relatively peripheral. Instead, the power of musical co-presence was the focus point, with 
slogans ‘share the moment’ and ‘feel your heart beat’. In Baku 2012, the situation was again 
slightly different, as the final took place in Azerbaijan, which is certainly far away from 
Central Europe both geographically and symbolically. It is instructive to study somewhat 
closer the dialectics with which this peripheral nation tried to link to Europe and at the 
same time had its peripheral status reconfirmed. ‘Light your fire’ was that year’s slogan, 
accompanied by a kind of yellow, orange and red fire flower. Whirling stars were again a 
prominent feature of the visual graphics. ‘Live from the easternmost part of Europe’ was an 
Figure 7.2. The logo and slogan of the ESC final in Baku 2012 (www.eurovision.tv/page/press/photo-downloads?gal=4
3373&type=Press).
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expression used to emphasize the peripheral boundary origin of the transmission. The video 
postcards between the tunes combined aestheticized images from the host country with 
phrases describing its culture and nature: ‘Azerbaijan – land of X’ or ‘Baku – X city’ (where 
X was, for instance, ‘mountains’ or ‘holy’). Sometimes these images and phrases seemed to 
correspond to the competing nation they introduced, for instance when mountains preceded 
Switzerland’s entry and ‘holy’ came before Israel’s. In this manner, a kind of homology was 
hinted at between the country and Europe as a whole, lending support to the claim that 
Azerbaijan might belong to Europe rather than Asia. In the second semi-final that year, an 
interlude potpourri of previous winning songs from Russia 2007, Serbia 2008, Norway 2009 
and Germany 2010 ended with ABBA’s ‘Waterloo’, ‘the greatest winning song of all time’. This 
was also an attempt to integrate the host country in the heritage line of the past events. In the 
final itself, the opening acts and interludes tended to emphasize the national folk idioms that 
would feel rather exotic to contemporary urban audiences in the rest of Europe.
In the aforementioned 2013 Swedish TV programme, Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl 
Bildt looked back at this final. He underlined the importance of the ESC to Azerbaijan in 
2012, ‘which is not evidently democratic, to put it mildly’: ‘There it meant very much since 
it is a Muslim country, [under] strong pressure from more fundamentalist forces, and here 
everybody performs, in all types of dress, with joy… and this means very much to reinforce 
this country’s deep-rooted secularism’. Similar to Estonia 2002, Azerbaijan tried to convince 
the world that it had knocked on Europe’s door and could now walk through it, singing. 
Again, the ironic, sceptical commentary found in some West European TV presentations 
reinterpreted this in characteristic ways. Whereas Azerbaijan wished to convince everyone 
that it had now entered Europe’s core and heart, what Western Europe often seemed to 
actually experience was rather a kind of brief tourist visit in an exotic foreign place. 
However, one important bridging element should be mentioned. Not only did artists 
from different corners of Europe meet and sing together on the ESC stage. It is also striking 
that for each year, more and more entries are the result of transnational cooperation. In 
2012, for instance, Swedish artists (singers, writers, composers and choreographers) were 
involved in at least ten nations’ songs (Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Malta, 
Norway, Spain and the UK, besides Sweden).
In Malmö 2013, the slogan was ‘we are one’, strangely abandoning the diversity theme 
in favour of the melting-pot image of unification, which strikingly contrasted with 
the fragmenting realities in this time of crisis for the EU and the euro. An introductory 
animation depicted a little green caterpillar’s journey from Baku through Greece, Italy, 
France, Switzerland, Germany and Denmark to Sweden, where it had turned into a butterfly. 
The journey made a characteristic bow shape in order to avoid East Europe as much as 
possible, and thus reproducing instead the dominance of the Big Five and the traditional 
South and West European touristic odyssey. In this way, a very traditional virtual map of 
Europe was tacitly reproduced, where, like in the 1950 Schumann Declaration and the 
ECSC, the French–German border was the central axis, and territories east of the old Iron 
Curtain were silently erased. A newly written ESC song, ‘We Write the Story’, by ex-ABBA 
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members Björn and Benny with DJ Avicii, called for a ‘new Enlightenment’ with justice, 
peace, liberty, equality, reason, conscience and human rights. An interval act in one of 
the semi-finals acknowledged the positive role of the eastern expansion, as the voice-over 
spoke: ‘In the new millennium, the Eurovision Song Contest opened up its doors to even 
more countries and cultures, as the East came in to join the party. The East brought some 
well-needed energy back into the competition that we love so much.’
The Copenhagen 2014 final further developed the uses of social media to enhance audience 
interactivity, under the slogan ‘join us!’ The opening sequence went from neighbouring 
Malmö to Copenhagen, starting with the significant words: ‘There is one show / one 
competition / everybody wants to win’, displayed in different languages while enthusiastic 
crowds waved national flags in the arena. What received most media attention was, however, 
that year’s winner, Conchita Wurst (a drag persona of Thomas Neuwirth), who strangely 
combined a long white dress with a tidy beard. 
Lastly, the 2015 Vienna final took place in the central European city celebrating its 200-
year anniversary of having hosted the Congress of Vienna, which reorganized Europe after 
the Napoleonic Wars, and to which Ludwig van Beethoven composed some of his most heroic 
and later least appreciated works. Hence, it was no coincidence that in the opening sequence, 
Vienna’s Philharmonic Orchestra was shown from the Schönbrunn Palace performing a 
classical musical montage, starting with Charpentier’s Eurovision theme and then launching 
into the European anthem, which since 1972 has been based on Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ theme 
from the final movement of his Ninth Symphony (1823). These two European tunes were 
linked and thus symbolically married to each other by the overture to Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart’s opera ‘The Marriage of Figaro’, which premiered in Vienna on 1 May 1786. This 
opening linked Vienna’s central position in European classical music and European heritage 
to Europe’s contemporary music and media culture. The year 2015 was also the ESC’s 60-
year anniversary, celebrated by letting Australia participate as a ‘very special anniversary 
guest’, and the hosts proudly announced that this final was broadcast live in China! These 
transgressions of Europe’s territorial boundaries underlined its success but risked diluting its 
defining basis. The slogan this year was ‘building bridges’, which Conchita Wurst interpreted 
as expressing the fundamental ESC idea that ‘everybody is allowed to come as they are […] 
and this is such a beautiful message from the Eurovision to the world – that it is all about 
respecting people!’ At the opening, the hosting trio sang about building bridges that reach out 
to ‘touch the borderlines’, a children’s choir sang of ‘reaching out to the stars’, the competing 
artists entered the stage on a ‘magic bridge’, and the hosts again talked about Eurovision 
building bridges ‘between countries, cultures, music styles and, most importantly, between 
people’. Juxtaposed videos showed fans interacting virtually across European countries and 
cities but also in Australia, the US, South Africa, Sri Lanka, India and Japan. Despite Vienna 
being one of those cities that can claim to bridge East and West, East–West relations were 
not foregrounded this year, perhaps indicating that its role in structuring the European 
imagination had shrunk. What instead resurfaced was the theme of human rights, identity 
and difference: the Serbian singer Bojana Stamenov’s ‘Beauty Never Lies’ (#10) contained 
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lines such as ‘Finally I can say: yes, I’m different, and it’s okay! Here I am!’; same-sex kisses 
were shown in the fan film montage and then on stage behind Lithuania’s Monika Linkytė 
and Vaidas Baumila singing ‘This Time’ (#18); and in the Swedish winner Måns Zelmerlöf ’s 
concluding words, expressed with emotional earnest: ‘We are all heroes – no matter whom we 
love, who we are or what we believe in – we are all heroes!’
Final Strategies: Four Positions
All in all, the finals held in Eastern Europe slightly more often referred to European 
unification than those in the West. When Europe was thematized in these events, the most 
common trope was to represent its vitalizing expansion and enjoyable diversity, based on 
the power of song to support togetherness. Europe was narrated as once divided and limited 
but increasingly integrated and expanding, with the powers of music and television media a 
key tool for this progressive development. Internal differences between competing nations 
and regions continued to threaten the overall unity but were also depicted as a source of 
energy and mutual attraction. Europe appears as an unquestionable entity, safeguarded by 
institutions such as on the one hand the EBU/ESC for music and television and on the 
other hand the EU for politics and the economy. This entity is never openly challenged; 
instead, a double struggle is staged: to expand the virtues of Europe to encompass the whole 
geographical continent and to open it up enough to fully accommodate the rich diversity of 
its new nations. These two tasks are necessarily intertwined, and the ESC is presented as a 
vanguard model in the cultural media arena for how this process ought to be pursued also in 
the political field. This highly ideological framing conceals the fact that among the growing 
set of participating countries, there are actually very divergent degrees of identification with 
any expressed idea of European culture. The success of the ESC is therefore very uneven, 
varying between countries and regions, and not necessarily corresponding to any real 
success of European values or cultural identities.37 
Participants compete for being best at entertaining Europe, and this often includes efforts to 
depict oneself as the European par excellence. Such a struggle is visible both between the host 
nation and the TV commentators who present the transmission to their respective national 
audiences, and between the competing entries in each show. One may tentatively discern four 
main strategies or attitudes in each host country’s relation to Europe’s cultural space:38 
 1. Exclusion. In Eastern Europe, only Russia seemed content with being Europe’s 
neighbour, hence, to some extent, accepting its own marginalization by its released 
neighbours. This strategy of (self-) exclusion was made possible by being proud of 
being big enough on its own. After Conchita Wurst’s victory in 2014, some Russian 
and Belarus nationalists denounced the ‘collapse’ of the EU’s moral values, depicting 
Europe as Russia’s ‘decadent’ other. They declared that they did not need Europe at all, 
calling instead for a culturally and morally conservative Eurasian alternative. Despite 
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such criticism, Russia and other authoritarian regimes have so far remained in the ESC 
and competed with other European nations, sometimes with a tone of symbolic self-
othering, sometimes (for example, Russia 2013–2015) with calls for peace that have 
in neighbouring countries been suspected of hiding propagandistic purposes related 
to contemporary geopolitical conflicts. The nearest West European counterpart to this 
strategy would be that of the UK, where some also tend to exclude themselves from 
Europe.
 2. Polarization. Azerbaijan in 2012 presented itself as an exotic other that through its 
difference might be attractive to the rest of Europe. This strategy of polarization always 
risks that more Central European representatives will see this polar difference as an 
otherness that rather places the country outside the European boundaries, instead 
of accepting it as an attractive and vitalizing internal contrast. Outside of the former 
Eastern bloc, mainly countries such as Turkey and Israel tend towards this category as 
they play with rather double-edged discourses of Orientalism.
 3. Hybridization. A more common strategy found in many regions of the continent 
is to present Europe as a diverse plurality and the host country as one of a colourful 
multiplicity of cultures that together form the hybrid totality of the ESC. This strategy 
of hybridization is most common among new East European participants, and it 
corresponds well to official EU policies as expressed in the European motto ‘united in 
diversity’. One way to succeed with this strategy is to make repeated parallels between 
the diversity of the host country and that of the rest of Europe. This shows that hybrid 
diversity is a fundamental condition for them both, so that adding the host country 
does not fundamentally break up any previous unity but conforms to the European 
standards. As shown in the case of Estonia 2002, the strategies could be quite mixed, 
since depicting a nation as contributing to the diversity of Europe in general could well 
be combined with suppressing any internal diversity within that nation.
 4. Assimilation. A more ambitious strategy is one of full assimilation, where the host 
country’s unique difference is downplayed; rather, it is taken for granted that the host 
country is already a core part of what is typically European. This could, for instance, 
be done by underlining how the nation’s cultural traditions have always been an 
integral element of the European whole. It is easier for the more established parts of 
the European integration process to succeed with such a strategy. East European hosts 
have so far not tried this, but one may expect such examples to appear in the future, for 
instance if Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic ever host the event. Outside Eastern 
Europe, countries such as Sweden, Ireland and Greece could switch between elements 
of this strategy of assimilation and the previous one of hybridization.
However, these strategic attitudes are not as such yet actual narrations of Europe, but rather 
positions taken towards Europe and thus part of the narrative set-up.39 When Europe 
explicitly figures in these events, it is either as the collective to which all participants belong 
or as the addressee of the host’s call for viewers to enjoy and to vote: ‘Hello, Europe!’ As for 
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the narrative process, the finals’ framing events mainly seem to perform Europe as always 
celebrating its growing strength and perfection, though some East European hosts also add 
a discrete element of remembering now-overcome hardships. Narrative elements are thus 
certainly present in the framing ESC events but more developed in the competing songs, to 
which I will therefore now turn my attention.
Songs of Europe
Among the more than 1,400 songs performed in the ESC finals or semi-finals between 
1956 and 2015, seven had ‘Euro’ in their titles and a lyrical topic that explicitly thematized 
Europeanness – the Belgian group Telex, ‘Euro-vision’ (#17 in the 1980 Hague final); the 
French group Cocktail Chic, ‘Européennes’ (#17 in Bergen, 1986); Ireland’s Liam Reilly, 
‘Somewhere in Europe’ (#2 in Zagreb, 1990); Italy’s Enrico Ruggeri, ‘Sole D’Europa’ (#12 
in Millstreet 1993); Spain’s Rosa, ‘Europe’s Living a Celebration’ (#7 in Tallinn, 2002), the 
Lithuanian group InCulto, ‘Eastern European Funk’ (did not qualify from a 2010 Oslo semi-
final) and Montenegro’s Rambo Amadeus, ‘Euro Neuro’ (semi-final in Baku, 2012).40 The 
Italian singer Toto Cotugno’s ‘Insieme: 1992’ (1990), with its prominent call for Europe to 
unite, should be included among them.41 However, dozens of other songs also referred to 
European issues without mentioning it in their titles.
In West European ESC songs of Europe before the turn of the millennium, two main 
topics stood out. One was a touristic celebration of Europe’s rich historical heritage, focusing 
on the urban culture in the traditional western part of the continent. Always the beautiful 
West and South European capitals were celebrated, combining holiday pleasures with 
European history’s cultural treasures, and with travel and mass media as communicative 
resources binding them together and making them accessible to all Europeans. Europe was 
in those songs mainly described as a united, but diverse, site of pleasure, an old, but still 
vital, continent, sometimes juxtaposed as an ancient alternative to the more youthful and 
technically advanced US.
A second topic that became most prominent from 1990 onwards was the blessing of an 
intensified and expanding European integration. Many West European songs from 1990 to 
1993, in particular, expressed the idea of a united Europe as attractive. The post-1989 period 
was formative for unification, preparing for the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, which established 
the EU. The former Eastern bloc’s inclusion still lay in the future; however, the ground was 
prepared by tunes that called for uniting the whole of Europe, not just its Western half, 
though none explicitly mentioned Eastern Europe as such.
Looking closer at the 1989–2015 period, in nearly 90 entries (less than ten per cent of 
the total number of participating songs in finals and semi-finals), one can discern lyrical 
topics that can easily be heard to imply European issues. More than 50 of them are from 
Eastern Europe. Only two of those had ‘Europe’ in their name (Lithuanian group InCulto’s 
‘Eastern European Funk’, 2010, and the Montenegrin artist Rambo Amadeus’ ‘Euro Neuro’, 
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2012), but a few more mentioned ‘Europe’ in their lyrics, and the others seem relevant since 
they name different European nations or talk about borders, unification, peace or a future 
collective utopia in ways that appear to refer to collective European issues rather than to just 
the general and ordinary human love experience. 
Deciding which metaphors are associated with Europe is a matter of interpretation, and 
the song selection made here is therefore too arbitrary to allow any strict statistics. However, 
since 1989, perhaps twice as many East European ESC songs have seemed to have had a 
relevant European topic than their West European counterparts. 
To begin with, a glance at the German songs from 1989 onwards hints at how the new 
era started. With the reunification of East and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, Germany can be seen as an ambiguous case, fusing traits from the West European 
centre and the former Eastern bloc. In the Swiss Lausanne final of 1989, just as East Germany 
began to collapse, Nino de Angelo, in a black suit and white shirt, standing still and alone 
with his microphone, performed the intense ballad ‘Flieger/Flyers’ (#14), singing about a 
‘you‘ and ‘me’ who not long ago flew so high in ‘an aeroplane full of young dreams’. ‘You’ 
remain anchored in ‘my’ heart, and ‘I’ remember that ‘you’ often said: ‘we are strong, we two’. 
Considering the contemporary situation and the ESC context, this might have been heard 
as a poetic reference to the still two separate Germanys longing for a reunion. By the 1990 
Zagreb final in Yugoslavia, the Berlin Wall had been open for several months, and just two 
weeks after this ESC final, the two states signed a reunification treaty. That year’s German 
entry was Chris Kempers and Daniel Kovac’s ‘Frei Zu Leben/Free to Live’ (#9), explicitly 
about the new feeling of being ‘free to live and look forward / step by step, hand in hand’. 
Miracles can happen: ‘we simply just have to go together across all borders’. This was again a 
solemn ballad, now with a more rock gospel sound. The singing couple dressed like the year 
before in black and white, but this time discretely moving around, with a rock group decked 
out in white standing behind them.
The following year after Toto Cotugno’s victory, the 1991 final in Rome featured Germany’s 
Atlantis 2000 with ‘Dieser Traum Darf Niemals Sterben/This Dream Must Never Die’ (#18). 
No less than six singers stood on stage: five suit-and-tie men in black and white plus one 
woman in black trousers and a glittering but not very ‘sexy’ top. The music was a mighty 
ballad with full orchestral backing, recalling a ‘time for lies’ that ‘will have to come to an end’: 
‘when there’s no more hate, we will be forever free’. There were allusions to a past world of 
surveillance and control and hopes for a future in freedom. In the Swedish city of Malmö in 
1992, a group called Wind sang ‘Träume Sind Für Alle Da/Dreams Are There for Everybody’ 
(#16). This time the singing woman had a pure white dress, and her male partner (playing 
the electric guitar) just had a red jacket over his otherwise pristine white clothes. The music 
was a happier and more relaxed swinging tune with full orchestra and much trumpet. Again, 
the topic was about dreaming of a better future: ‘tomorrow is another day’, ‘it is never much 
too late’, etc. The previous hopes obviously had not been fulfilled. 
In Millstreet, Ireland, in 1993, the pop and rock band Münchener Freiheit sang ‘Viel Zu 
Weit/Much Too Far’ (#18), in which utopia was even further displaced. Again, the group 
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was dressed in white, with a grand piano on stage and string orchestra backing. The music 
was rather laid back, with a slowly falling chorus melody in a melancholic minor mode. 
In 1988, the band had a UK one-hit wonder with ‘Keeping the Dream Alive’, which later 
featured on ‘American Idol’. That tune had also talked of dreams: too lofty but nevertheless 
kept alive. Five years later, the ESC entry was troubled and pessimistic: ‘Somewhere in time 
and space / there must be distant worlds / untouched and beautiful / but filled with life / 
[…] But that is much too far away / out there in the darkness / Much too far / Here is our 
reality’. The song placed Paradise in the distant past at the beginning of life and ended with 
the unsettling question: ‘What came then?’ 
The impact of dreaming about a brighter future seemed to have ceased, and the more 
pessimistic prognosis of postponing utopia was not particularly successful. Having for 
three years finished either 16th (once) and 18th (twice) in the finals, Germany changed 
course, switching from 1994 onwards to competing with less overt political songs about 
love, partying and fun. This turned out to be much more successful, as the young girl 
group MeKaDo’s catchy and happy upbeat ‘Wir Geben ’ne Party/We’re Throwing a 
Party’ with its deliberately smooth r’n’b feel rocketed Germany up to #3 in Dublin in 
1994. The five German songs from 1989 to 1993 together offer a fascinating but rather 
bleak and gloomy mini-story of the rise and fall of reunification dreams. The present 
was characterized as caught between dream and reality and between past and future, 
wavering between hopes and disillusion. These songs focused on Germany but were 
metaphorically also relevant to the complete reintegration of ex-Eastern bloc countries 
into the European community. 
Before overviewing the whole song material, a few prominent examples will serve as 
illustrations of how such narratives may be constructed.
In the 2003 Riga final, the Polish band Ich Troje’s ‘Keine Grenzen – Żadnych Granic/
No Borders’ (#7) was performed in a mixture of German, Polish and Russian.42 It painted 
peaceful unification as a dreamt utopia and did not explicitly hint at any past glory. The 
singer wished to be an astronaut looking down at the earth: ‘No borders, no flags / From 
up there, the world is just beautiful / No countries, no nations / No wars can be seen from 
up there’. This ‘unlimited world without flags […] without quarrels, explosions, rage and 
wars’ knows ‘no stupid quarrels, no different races / no wars, no states’ and is therefore ‘just 
beautiful’. The slow, romantic singer–songwriter ballad was performed by a couple where 
the man in grey patched outfit and red-dyed hair possessed a husky, hoarse voice full of 
professional charismatic intensity; the woman sported a white dress and a queen-like silvery 
coat. The blue stage was decorated with planets, a map of the globe and twelve-star circles 
reminding of the European flag. Europe was also present not only through the ESC context 
of performance but also in the symbolically seamless combination of the three languages – 
firmly rooting this general topic in a European West–East setting – in the spirit of the 
European motto ‘united in diversity’. In the final, Germany gave this tune the maximum 
12 points, while Russia awarded it nul points – symptomatic of how the East–West divide 
had moved eastward after the cold war. This was at a time of a gradual rapprochement in 
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Polish–German relations, unlike Polish–Russian relations. The song was an invitation to 
friendship across the Oder–Neisse Line, which after World War II became one of Europe’s 
and the world’s greatest divides and whose transgression could therefore serve as a model 
for global peace through universal transnationalism. 
Katrin Sieg’s critical analysis of this song has argued that ‘the band’s choice to embody this 
integrationist discourse in a family that allegorizes different civilizations, activates essentialist 
divisions between genders and generations which have long fed colonial fantasies’.43 She 
supports this with an analysis of the languages used in the song. The woman sings mainly in 
Polish, the man mainly in German (both also sing some lines in Russian), which Sieg believes 
genders the East–West relations in an orientalizing manner. He moves around; she is static 
and repeatedly places her hand on her belly, which Sieg believes reminds viewers that the 
female singer was pregnant at that time. The man embodies ‘active, western modernity’, while 
she stands for ‘the passive, mythic, fecund East’. Her way of signifying Poland as a mother 
lines up with a long and rather conservative historical tradition. The end, where he kneels 
before her and she seems to bless his bowed head, Sieg interprets as indirectly conveying 
‘religious connotations of transcending earthly strife’, supporting ‘a universalist rhetoric of 
peace, freedom and brotherhood’.44 East–West relations are thus ethnified, gendered and 
Figure 7.3. Lithuania’s InCulto performing ‘Eastern European Funk’ in Oslo 2010 (photo Ane Charlotte Spilde; 
es.wikipedia.org/wiki/InCulto).
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eroticized through a mythic family imagery that seems to contradict the lyrics’ dissolution of 
boundaries and instead reinforces and naturalizes international power differences.45
This example may generally be interpreted as telling a typical European story about 
international relations. The tension between celebrating inter-European borders and erasing 
them is one that underpins and drives the whole ESC event, which like sports games and 
other contests is on the one hand based on fierce competition between representatives of 
different countries, and on the other celebrates a shared identity, in that it is supposed to 
promote peaceful friendliness and coexistence and offer a space for appreciating mutual 
diversity. The narrative locates the unifying erasure of borders not in the present but in a 
distant future, as a utopian dream and task, thereby implicitly confirming and perhaps even 
reifying them in the contemporary context.
The first East European song entry that actually had ‘Europe’ in its title was the Lithuanian 
group InCulto’s ‘Eastern European Funk’ (2010), which in an Oslo semi-final presented a 
challenging perspective on unification seen from the ‘new’ part of the continent:
You’ve seen it all before
We ain’t got no taste we’re all a bore
But you should give us a chance
’Cause we’re just victims of circumstance
We’ve had it pretty tough
But that’s ok, we like it rough
We’ll settle the score
We survived the reds and two world wars
Get up and dance to our Eastern European kinda funk!
Yes Sir we are legal we are, though we are not as legal as you
No Sir we’re not equal no, though we are both from the EU
We build your homes and wash your dishes,
Keep you your hands all soft and clean
But one of these days you’ll realize Eastern Europe is in your genes
The five boys first made rhythmic sounds by just beatboxing, and played air-guitar and other 
imaginary instruments, perhaps illustrating doing hard work. This explicit class perspective on 
European interrelations is unique in the ESC context, and was maybe too provocative to allow 
the tune to advance to the final. With pantomime movements, they illustrated housebuilding 
and dishwashing, then showing their white hands to the audience before touching their genitals 
to signify the genetic invasion from Eastern Europe. At the end, they ripped off their long 
trousers and continued dancing in shiny silver shorts. The music was a funky modern dance 
tune with a few rhythmic, but slightly anarchic, Balkan brass elements giving it a mildly eastern 
sound. 
This song expressed the Schuman Declaration idea of rising from war disasters to glory, 
but transposed onto the post-Communist experience and adding an East–West tension 
07510_Ch07_p179_236.indd   204 4/4/17   6:13 PM
Euro-Visions: East European Narratives in Televised Popular Music
205
to the equation. Its roots dated back almost two millennia to at least the division of the 
Christianized Roman Empire into a western and an eastern half. InCulto made explicit 
the mutual distrust that has surfaced both politically and within the ESC. Since the early 
1990s, the ESC has repeatedly debated how to balance the taste structures of Eastern and 
Western Europe, which came to disturb the already-precarious balance between North 
and South European preferences. As always, this song was thus typical of its time, after the 
first euphoria of eastward EU expansion had faded but had not yet been transformed into 
crisis management. In 2015, the Romanian group Voltaj with ‘De La Capăt/All Over Again’ 
touched upon related topics in the accompanying gloomy b/w video images showing an 
abandoned young child trying to reach his parents working abroad: ‘More than 3 million 
Romanians are working abroad, trying to make a better life for their children. Unfortunately, 
the children are left behind’. This hinted at the difficult cross-European migration problems, 
but the song lyrics actually did little to further address this issue, except the vague chorus, 
‘You will be the reason to start all over again’, and to strengthen the statement, at the end the 
singer, therefore, exclaimed: ‘Don’t leave the children behind!’
‘Eastern European Funk’ thus presented itself as a peripheral voice narrating a story 
about Europe’s destiny to be forced to acknowledge and integrate its own forgotten, 
subordinated and disorderly eastern half, transforming it from a repressed underside 
to an actually enjoyable equal part. Such lyrics could never have represented a non-
Eastern country. ‘We’ were depicted as a kind of European proletariat, but instead of 
looking for a fight, it invited all of Europe to ‘get up and dance’, and finally predicted 
that ‘you’ in the affluent West will one day ‘realize Eastern Europe is in your genes’: 
that the initially ugly, tasteless and poor Eastern Europe is really an integral part of the 
continent and can also offer some pleasure in the form of these funky tunes. Again, 
music is the main agent of change from hostility and suppression to mutual recognition 
and unification in diversity.
This can be interpreted as a kind of colonialist story in line with Hegel’s famous 
master–slave dialectic (see Cederberg’s chapter in this book). In this reading, European 
unification becomes an example of how through migrant labour and other dependencies 
based on imperialist relations of the peripheral East to the dominant West, established 
communicative links also enable, besides exploitation and subordination, a mutual 
learning and creative impulse. With no reference to any happy origin, and describing a 
divided present that is being unified so that old hostilities can become shared pleasures, 
‘Eastern European Funk’ fits into this narrative category as well.
This is in some way true too for Rambo Amadeus’ (real name Antonije Pušić) ‘Euro 
Neuro’ (Montenegro, 2012), which did not qualify from its semi-final, this time in Baku. 
The composer, writer and performer is described as a ‘charming king of jovial pop’, making 
‘crazy jazz-funk music, interesting texts and unpredictable live performances, spiced 
with brutal satire’.46 This is a valid description also of his song ‘Euro Neuro’, where he 
rapped in broken East European English, backed by heavy beats intertwined with Oriental 
fragments.




Try not to be hermetic! A-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha…
Euro neuro, don’t be sceptic, hermetic, pathetic, analphabetic
Forget all cosmetic, you need new poetic, aesthetic, eclectic, dialectic
Euro neuro, don’t be dogmatic, bureaucratic; you need to become pragmatic 
to stop change climatic, automatic. 
Need contribution from the institution to find solution for pollution
to save the children of the evolution
Euro neuro, Euro neuro, 
Euro neuro – monetary break dance
Euro neuro, Euro neuro,
Euro neuro – give me a chance to refinance […]
Euro neuro, I don’t like snobbism, nationalism, puritanism,
I am a different organism. My heroism is pacifism, altruism, 
I enjoy bicyclism, liberalism, 
tourism, nudism, optimism, it is good for rheumatism […]
Behind Rambo stood a wooden Trojan Horse by whose closed door hung a white peace 
or surrender flag. From behind the horse suddenly came three young male dancers who 
sometimes breakdanced in the background, and sometimes unfurled three white–red 
Figure 7.4. Montenegro’s Rambo Amadeus performing ‘Euro Neuro’ in Baku 2012 
(photo Anton Mukhin, used by permission; www.ridus.ru/news/33769).
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rolls of song lyric lines. At the end, one of them was wrapped in the rolls and carried out 
by the other two. The song lyrics linked the European financial crisis to the global climate 
crisis and called for joint unbureaucratic action. The lyrics were in contrast to anti-EU 
sentiments (‘don’t be sceptic’), asking for a ‘contribution from the institution to find a 
solution for pollution’, and for a ‘chance to refinance’. The song called for ‘non-hermetic’ 
openness both among national citizens and within EU institutions. It seemed to argue 
that just like the Greeks who left their wooden horse at the city gates of Troy as an offering 
to Athena, the goddess of war, and inside concealing a deadly weapon (in that case in the 
form of armed men), so does the EU; its euro currency presents itself as a peace project 
but is in reality unleashing forces that are destroying the welfare of the ordinary citizen. 
The monetary policies fetter the free people, just as those rhetorical word strings tied up 
the poor man who was then carried off the stage as a lame prisoner. Again, this song could 
only have been sung at this particular moment when Europe was in a deep financial crisis. 
It would have made little sense ten years before when the European economy still seemed 
to be growing. 
In an MA thesis on nation branding in the ESC, Albert Meijer has a partially different 
interpretation of ‘Euro Neuro’.47 First, he stresses that Antonije Pušić clearly is a comedian 
whose performing persona Rambo Amadeus is meant to appear like ‘a drunk man talking 
politics in a bar’. Second, he interprets the wooden animal as a Trojan donkey rather than a 
horse. In the song’s promotional video, Amadeus rides a donkey through tourist environments 
(from open landscapes to a discotheque). On stage, he shows his empty pockets, indicating 
that he has lost or wasted all his money. The music mixes self-exoticizing Balkan reed 
instruments with hyper-Western hip-hop rhythms. Amadeus reflects on the euro-crisis and 
calls for the EU to support its weaker member states. But Amadeus is not necessarily Pušić, 
and the lyrical message may be ambiguous. Meijer points to the fact that Montenegro, with 
its largely pro-EU population, has the euro as its official currency, is a candidate country for 
EU membership and receives financial support. Amadeus’ Eurosceptic tone may therefore 
perhaps not represent Pušić or Montenegro but can be understood as a satirical parody of 
profligate nations like Greece who beg for financial support. In Meijer’s reading, the Trojan 
donkey and the many ‘–isms’ with Greek origin also point towards Greece. Meijer concludes 
that the song has a double message: it is both a criticism of European institutions for being too 
bureaucratic and not sufficiently supporting poor countries, as well as an attack on profligate 
countries. He hears words like ‘give me a chance to refinance’ as drunk bar talk, and argues 
that the performance intends rather to place Montenegro in Europe’s smart and urban centre, 
in contrast to backward neighbours like Greece. Perhaps it is not the euro as such but instead 
Greece and other countries that are the problem – sneaking their way into EMU (European 
Monetary Union) collaboration and destroying it by not managing their economies.
This might surely be a relevant subtext, but it is still hard to avoid the main, primary 
storyline, according to which the cool guy formulates an alternative solution to Europe’s 
financial and ecological crisis. In any case, the narrative again avoids mentioning any 
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glorious past, instead telling about contemporary problems and hinting at a better future if 
only the right measures are taken.
Narrative Dimensions of the Songs
With these few examples in mind, it is now time to more systematically overview how all the 
ESC songs examined here elaborate the four key features or dimensions of narrative: set-up, 
process, mode and meaning:48 
 1. Set-up. Narratives represent a world populated by characters and objects given 
identifying characteristics and roles, and are told by a narrator. As for peripheral ESC 
songs, the narrator most commonly represents an East European individual or nation, 
whereas Europe is either implicitly present as the world of the narration or explicitly 
thematized in the form of a symbolic character. 
 2. Process. Narratives both are and represent temporal sequences: they form chains of 
signifiers that are supposed to be ‘read’ after each other while also signifying some series 
of consecutive events. Their diachronic ordering is therefore central, as the narratively 
constructed world undergoes a transformation through a series of events shaping a 
temporal flow, a (hi)story with some kind of beginning, middle and end, located in a 
sequence from past to the contemporary present to the implied (feared or hoped) future. 
 3. Mode. The narrative can take on many forms, such as showing/telling, linear/nonlinear, etc. 
It can also be told in various moods, such as tragic or comic, serious or ironic, apologetic 
or critical. Such modes are established by a combination of textual and contextual features, 
and, in turn, tend to determine how readers or users interpret the narrative. 
 4. Meaning. The story links characters and sequences of events into a narrative whole that 
gives some kind of identifying meaning to Europe. Narratives tend to convey certain core 
values and identifications that an analysis of the previous features help discover. 
All narratives are positioned in larger webs of signification and intertwined with other 
narratives they integrate or contradict. Hence, interpretation needs to include elements of 
comparison with other narratives. Bearing all these features in mind, my song analysis will 
mainly focus on the set-up and process dimensions, which together make it possible to 
identify prominent tropes of Europe. The reason being the selected genre of ESC songs 
already delimits the modes and contexts relevant in this case. 
Narrative Set-up: Positioning Europe
As for their narrative set-up, several West European ESC songs have given Europe an acting 
role in the story told. Only the French group Cocktail Chic identified the singing ‘I’ as 
European in ‘Européennes’ (1986): ‘We’re European girls’. Toto Cotugno in ‘Insieme: 1992’ 
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(1990) addressed Europe as a ‘you’ when taking the role of an Italian urging Europe (‘not 
far away’) to unite. It was more common to make Europe a third-person agent, for instance 
the Belgian group Telex in ‘Euro-vision’ (1980) sang that ‘old Europe cheers the country 
that wins’; Italy’s Enrico Ruggeri in ‘Sole D’Europa’ (1993) begged for the sun to ‘cover 
Europe with light’; and Spain’s Rosa sang ‘Europe’s Living a Celebration’ (2002). In ‘Dancing 
Lasha Tumbai’ (#2 in Helsinki, 2007), Ukraine’s Verka Serduchka exclaimed that ‘Europe is 
dancing’, and Georgia’s Stephane & 3G in ‘We Don’t Wanna Put In’ (withdrawn before the 
Moscow final in 2009) explained, ‘I like all Europe countries and I love Europe’, but no other 
East European songs gave Europe any active narrative role.
More commonly, Europe has appeared as the narrative context of the story told. This was 
the case with the Irish singer Liam Reilly’s ‘Somewhere in Europe’ (1990), when Ireland’s 
Dervish in ‘They Can’t Stop the Spring’ (#24 in Helsinki, 2007) celebrated that ‘the curtain 
has been raised, and Europe’s all one stage’, or when Finland’s Paradise Oskar in ‘Da Da 
Dam’ (#21 in Düsseldorf, 2011) sung about a boy who ‘knows each European country by 
heart’. An example from Eastern Europe was when Hungary’s Gjon Delhusa in ‘Fortuna’ 
(semi-final in Oslo, 1996) depicted how the polar star was ‘sending an urgent message over 
Europe’, calling for singers from different countries to gather. References to the ESC media 
context itself appear from time to time, for instance when Russia’s Polina Gagarina in ‘A 
Million Voices’ (#2 in Vienna, 2015) sang: ‘Now as the world is listening / from cities and 
satellites’. Such songs thereby place their stories firmly on European soil and by extension 
connect them to European issues. 
Europeanness can also appear as an identifying characteristic, for instance when 
Lithuania’s InCulto in ‘Eastern European Funk’ (2010) concluded that ‘Eastern Europe is 
in your genes’. Without mentioning the word ‘Europe’, it was clearly signified when the 
Romanian entry Monica Anghel & Sincron in the tragic ‘Rugă pentru pacea lumii/Prayer 
for World Peace’ (a 1996 Oslo semi-final) complained that ‘we are born too much on the 
eastern side of the map’ and therefore have had to shed tears and blood, abandoned by 
God. In some cases, Europe as such only indirectly appeared through the mentioning of 
the ESC itself, for instance when the UK entry Scooch in ‘Flying the Flag (For You)’ (#22 in 
Helsinki, 2007) sang about a ‘Eurovision flight’, or when Lithuania’s LT United in ‘We Are 
the Winners’ (#6 in Athens, 2006) described themselves as ‘winners of Eurovision’. Another 
indirect presence was in Montenegrin Rambo Amadeus’ ‘Euro Neuro’ (2012), where Europe 
is implied by its € currency. 
In the remaining majority of songs, Europe is not even mentioned but serves as the 
contextual framework for the drama told, and thus as an implicit shared identification of 
the textual ‘I’ and ‘you’. For instance, roughly a dozen songs named a number of European 
nationalities that cojointly mapped a common geopolitical space. This could be bilateral, 
with a link to or contrast made between two main poles, or more widely international, 
when different countries and/or capital cities were lumped together. In both cases, a shared 
participation in the same continent was evident, even when there was no truly transnational 
explicit naming of Europe as a distinct totality. One can in this respect identify two balancing 
07510_Ch07_p179_236.indd   209 4/4/17   6:13 PM
Europe Faces Europe
210
or competing models of European unification. The most common was to construct Europe as 
an additive composite of individual nations: different flags, songs and/or peoples sharing the 
same moment of love, for instance. The other model would instead start with the European 
totality and construct it as an organic whole, hence giving national and other divisions only 
secondary importance. 
The latter approach is particularly absent. It is, in fact, impossible to find anyone from 
Eastern Europe who took up the theme from ‘Insieme: 1992’, visualizing Europe as a 
homogenous totality: ‘a woman without borders’ where ‘You and I’ are united as one, ‘under 
the same flags’, ‘uniting more and more’. Cotugno’s gendered way of depicting Europe as a 
woman is, of course, a highly problematic objectification that from a masculine perspective 
inscribes citizenship in a familial sphere of imagination, which tends to naturalize social 
relations and symbolic traditions.49 But even if it is a relief that such images have not 
flourished recently, it may be a bit surprising that so few voices dare to speak of East and 
West Europe as an integral community. National boundaries certainly remain dominant in 
this context.
Whereas before 1989 the North–South polarity was the strongest line of cultural division 
in the ESC, since then the West–East polarity is undoubtedly the most prominent one. It 
is the only apparent regional tension evident in this material, but the songs take varying 
positions regarding the European project. The four attitudes mentioned for the final events 
are also present in the individual songs. 
 1. Exclusion. Only some Russian songs clearly employ a strategy of self-exclusion, accepting 
its own marginal status in relation to Europe, and being a self-sufficient superpower 
without any explicit desire to merge with the others. When Buranovskiye Babushki sang 
‘Party For Everybody’ (#2 in Baku, 2012), the charming group of elderly women baked 
around a big oven, singing and dancing to a kind of folk tune. The song was an invitation 
to ‘kids’ and ‘relatives’ to come ‘back home’ to a party with happy dancing: ‘We are singing 
extremely strongly / because we are together!’ The overflowing happiness was linked to 
strength and to a traditional, already-achieved unity. The ‘we’ here appeared to be rather 
Russia than Europe. Like the whole 2009 Moscow final, the song was a friendly invitation 
to Russia as a strong alternative to the internally divided and weakened EU, rather than 
a step towards placing Russia within Europe. The phrase ‘waiting for kids coming back 
home’ might actually be heard as an invitation to ex-Soviet lost sons to return to Mother 
Russia’s embrace, in which case the words ‘the relatives have come’ could stand for the 
rest of Europe seen as a separate neighbour with a shared history. The song may thus be 
interpreted as expressing a mellow kind of Soviet nostalgia.50 Mumiy Troll with ‘Lady 
Alpine Blue’ (#12 in Copenhagen, 2001) likewise contrasted the ‘Siberian’ ‘I’ with a 
Central European lady whom he courted but with ‘no promises’ – hardly ground for any 
joint treaties. 
  Prime Minister’s ‘Northern Girl’ (#10 in Tallinn, 2002) represented (Western!) Europe 
by way of pretty but non-threatening girls from Rome, Paris, Lisbon and Madrid, pushed 
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into the background as irrelevant to the desires of the singing ‘I’, possibly a nationally 
non-specific male due to the lyrical content, the English language and the multi-ethnic 
singer mix, even though the song competed for Russia. An intertextual reference may 
be heard to the Beach Boys’ ‘California Girl’ (1965): in both cases, the ‘I’ has met so 
many pretty girls around the world, but only one has won his heart. The identity of the 
‘Northern Girl’ remained mysterious – ‘a real mystery’, a ‘Snow Queen’ and ‘Northern 
Star’, a ‘Lady Ice’ with ‘frosty eyes’ who ‘never cries’ and is ‘tough like a pearl’. One line of 
interpretation is that she might have represented the Nordic (or perhaps even Estonian, 
as a gesture to that year’s host of the final) blonde, finally melting for the charms of 
the singing Russian boy. However, she may also stand for Russia itself, remaining a 
forbidding but alluring mystery for Europe. In any case, the song carefully upheld the 
divisions rather than suggesting any transgressive unification. 
  This self-sufficient Russian tradition changed only in Malmö in 2013, when Dina 
Garipova with ‘What If?’ (#5) took a different stance, asking, ‘What if I could make us 
unify?’ and then continuing:
What if we would open up the doors?
What if we could help each other more? […]
What if we all opened our arms?
What if we came together as one? […]
Together we can change the path of time
Together we have power to decide […] 
Let’s unite and make a change
Let’s unite and write a new page
Come on sinners, come on saints
Have faith […]
 Directed towards Europe at the ESC, this invitation to cooperate in the spirit of ‘Insieme: 
1992’ thus temporarily broke with the previously dominating tendency for Russia to 
pursue a strategy of self-sufficient exclusion. Garipova, with her long black hair and 
wearing a lace-like white dress, sang this serious ballad backed by strings, piano and 
percussion. The song itself created a hot, gospel-like r’n’b vibe with four backing 
vocalists in white and light grey standing close behind her, holding and shaking each 
other’s hands to visually illustrate the song’s lyrical message.
 2. Polarization. A couple of East European songs chose a strategy of polarization that 
depicted a deep East–West divide. In the Romanian entry ‘Prayer for World Peace’ 
by Monica Anghel & Sincron (1996), ‘we’ were ‘born too much on the eastern side 
of the map’, and the Lithuanian song ‘Eastern European Funk’ (2010) painted a vivid 
contrast between the tough and tasteless East and the West, which has yet to accept 
that both sides are part of Europe. Such polarizing moves may serve to highlight 
the existence of a radical plurality within the confines of this continent, but it may 
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also risk reifying stereotypic dichotomies. The actual outcome depends on how the 
polarities are further developed within the narrative in question: whether the two 
sides are locked into fixed distinct camps or if their juxtaposition opens up into a 
mutual interaction across the boundaries – the two mentioned songs tend more 
towards these latter dynamics, moving towards the next category.
3. Hybridization. There are also a few examples of hybridization. The Russian group 
t.A.T.u in ‘Ne ver’, ne boysya’ (#3 in Riga, 2003) vaguely talked about ‘different people’, 
but the Bosnian & Herzegovinian entry Feminnem’s ‘Call Me’ (#14 in Kyiv, 2005) 
heard a ‘million hearts’ that ‘beat as one’: ‘Different flags, but nations gathered / from 
the north to the south, all standing side by side’. The Hungarian group Compact Disco 
in ‘Sound of Our Hearts’ (#24 in Baku, 2012) likewise made an even clearer case for the 
‘united in diversity’ motto by stating that differences may ‘enrich things’ and should 
just be turned ‘in key’ to become a positive resource for communication. 
4. Assimilation. However, the by far most common song strategy was assimilation. Lots of 
examples could be cited of a shift to fuse many into one or to define problems, fates and 
hopes as universal, thus taking one’s own inclusion into the European cultural space as 
self-evident. This seemed easier to achieve in individual songs than in those final events 
held in Eastern Europe.
One way to position oneself in relation to the rest of Europe is through the choice of 
language for the song lyrics. I have here used the English translations found on ‘The 
Diggiloo Thrush’ website (http://www.diggiloo.net) and on the ESC website (http://www.
eurovision.tv), but the effects of songs, of course, differ considerably whether performed 
in English or in other native languages.51 In two periods, 1966–1972 and 1977–1998, the 
EBU forced all nations to perform in their own native language, which possibly tended 
to favour Ireland, Malta and the UK, then the only ones whose language most Europeans 
could at least understand reasonably well. During the periods 1956–1965, 1973–1976 
and since 1999, songs may be performed in any language. In the first period, no winners 
performed in English, and between 1973 and 1976 three out of four chose English 
(one of them being the UK). Since the year 2000, around 70 per cent of the final songs 
have been performed in English. Only one of the seventeen winners between 1999 and 
2015 was performed in a non-English language: Marija Šerifović’s ‘Molitva’ in Serbian 
(2007). (Ruslana’s ‘Wild Dances’ [2004] was just partly sung in Ukrainian.) Since ABBA’s 
‘Waterloo’ (1974), choosing to sing in English, therefore, appears to be a more successful 
strategy than using one’s own native language. Among the songs studied here, roughly 
the normal two-thirds of those from non-anglophone countries were sung in English, 
with no apparent differences between East and West in this respect. Linguistically, Europe 
is thus performed mainly in English (with various accents), which is also true for most 
contemporary popular music in many European countries, as well as on other continents. 
Hence, English has become the lingua franca in this context, thanks to post–World War II 
UK and US pop music. 
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However, no less than a one-third minority also offered sounds of multilingual diversity. 
The final hosts likewise tended to mix different languages with the dominant English, 
flanked by their own national language and French as a second diplomatic resource. They 
also made forays into other European languages to underscore the diversity aspect of the 
competition. Hence, across the anglophone hegemony, the presence of different languages 
in hosting presentations as well as in non-English and even more multi-language songs 
makes the multilinguistic character of the European context explicitly audible and present 
in the ESC. To some extent, this keeps Étienne Balibar’s vision alive of Europe as ‘the 
interpreter of the world, translating languages and cultures in all directions’.52 The ESC’s 
increasingly multilingual routines have of course not fully realized such ambitious ethics but 
are nevertheless a small step towards that goal, developed through the televisual practice of 
handling the discursive interaction between different nationalities rather than by realizing 
any abstract ideal.
Narrative Process: Communicative Resurrection
When starting this analysis, I expected to find a range of clearly different key narratives. 
Having previously studied West European ESC tunes, I had found at least two major 
stories told: one about vivid memories of Europe’s glory in the form of imaginary or real 
travels between great South and West European cities, and another (though sometimes 
slightly overlapping) of a process of increasing unification. Looking outside the ESC, 
other narratives could also be added. However, few East European ESC songs deviated 
from a standard narrative that just appeared in slightly shifting variants. There is perhaps 
generally not one single completely shared narrative of Europe, but within this particular 
genre context, there are unexpectedly few contrasts or contradictions between different 
mutually contesting stories, i.e. surprisingly few competing narratives. In fact, it seems 
possible to distil one main narrative that most of these songs follow, only with minor 
variations in tone and attitude or in the disposition between its main phases and steps. 
This master narrative depicts a divided and/or tormented Europe with a uniquely rich 
history, followed by a long period of self-destructive internal division from which it is now –  
or at least soon – rising up to acquire new unity and strength with respect for internal 
diversity. The depicted Europe finds itself in a peace and welfare project of unification 
and expansion, tearing down internal boundaries and uniting on a new basis to overcome 
its suffering and to gain redemption through dialogical communication. It tends to refer 
to the post-1945 and/or post-1989 events as key opportunities for opening up such new 
possibilities. 
This almost-mythical theme was present in many West European songs, for instance 
when ‘Insieme: 1992’ ecstatically celebrated the new unity after an age of separation: ‘With 
you, so far and different / With you, a friend that I thought I’d lost / You and I, having the 
same dream / Together, unite, unite, Europe’. In Copenhagen in 2014, the Austrian singer 
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Conchita Wurst’s ‘Rise Like a Phoenix’ had lines like ‘Rise like a phoenix / out of the ashes 
/ seeking rather than vengeance / retribution’. His performance replaced the terrors of war 
with the crime of sexual discrimination but retained the similar gesture of rebirth and 
reconciliation.
There are three structural steps in this resurrectional or millenarian master narrative of 
Europe: 
1. Europe’s glorious past of endeavours that have accumulated a growing treasure of 
cultural heritage, thus making Europe unique and indeed almost chosen for a great 
mission, sometimes with sacred overtones. This aspect may well be common in other 
societies as well, but in the ESC it is generally just a prehistoric memory of origin to 
which some songs tend to look back slightly nostalgically. 
2. Europe has then experienced a long period of recent suffering: a story of loss, decline, 
crisis and wars. In some variants, this phase is still ongoing. The causes are sometimes 
found in ecological carelessness or materialistic greed, but more often in internal division 
and mutual hostility between European nations. East European versions typically add 
totalitarian oppression and occupation to the wars focused in Western Europe.
3. Most songs articulating that crisis also point out a solution indicating a redemptive 
future on a communicative basis. This has either already begun in the current unification 
process, or lies in the near or distant future as a task, a wish or a dream of a better world 
to come if only people could enter mutual dialogue and cooperation across borders. 
Again, peace and friendship among nations are the most general aspect of this utopian 
paradise, but in Eastern Europe, freedom is sometimes also added.
A problem-solving narrative that describes how a protagonist experiences difficulties – 
whether external or internal – to finally gain redemption is an almost-omnipresent trope in 
popular culture, from ancient sagas to Mozart’s ‘The Magic Flute’ to contemporary Harlequin 
romance or crime fiction. This may to some extent explain its impact also in ESC songs. 
However, one may well find other storylines in other ESC songs with lyrics that do not 
specifically identify Europe. For instance, many songs do not so much present any dynamic 
narrative but rather elaborate an emotion, bodily experience or dilemma, for instance 
feelings of desire or disappointment. Others perform some kind of little drama where two 
individuals work out their mutual relations of love or hate. But almost all songs that in some 
way refer to Europe contain at least important elements of the narrative of resurrection.
Another reason for this narrative’s dominance could be that the competition itself 
invites precisely such a storyline. Artists have struggled to qualify for participation, and 
the winner will also be able to look back on the difficulties with a happy ending. Songs 
and artists with a reflexive relation to themselves may well be tempted to select such a 
narrative, which will then also be near at hand for the television audience. However, 
this again has not prevented other songs from telling other stories that may also for 
them resonate with other aspects of the ESC experience, not necessarily as a journey 
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through darkness but, for instance, perhaps instead as a string of shining pearls, from 
expectations to fulfilment, which would imply a slightly different narrative structure.
However, this reading of history is not limited to popular genres or competitions but 
deeply embedded in official European self-understanding, from the European anthem to the 
Schuman Declaration, which serves as a founding myth of the EU and is celebrated on Europe 
Day (9 May). The millenarian narrative, in fact, has an even longer prehistory, dating back 
to ancient stories of suffering and relief, not least in a mixed Promethean–Jewish–Christian 
lineage that partly overlaps the phoenix story. Prometheus, who steals fire to set humanity free, 
resonated with the self-understanding of Enlightenment and was celebrated by Beethoven in 
his Ninth Symphony theme, which is now the European anthem. The myth of Europa and a 
bull-shaped Zeus is another example, where the nymph Europa was enchanted by the white 
bull who then took her from her family and friends, over the ocean, to found a new dynasty 
on Crete: here the abduction and dislocation were passing troubles that ended happily with 
three half-divine sons and a new life on European soil.53 A third example is that of Jesus 
Christ in the Bible, who must die in order to rise again and go to heaven, and thereby deliver 
humanity from sin. All these tales resonate in the current songs of Europe and lend a sense 
of precariousness and vulnerability to Europe: this is a continent that feels it has experienced 
a particularly deep crisis; yet it has also been chosen and elevated by this suffering and is 
destined for a noble, great and bright future. 
While the millenarian master narrative is an imaginary tradition, it is also founded in specific 
real experiences, including the whole series of inter-European wars, for instance the Napoleonic 
Wars, the Franco-German war and the two ‘world wars’. Étienne Balibar, Jürgen Habermas and 
Paul Ricoeur have all in different ways argued that these experiences of disastrous division have 
finally given Europe competences for overcoming wars and concluding peace. They contend 
that such learning from history is a task for Europeans to live up to, not only for Europe to obtain 
happiness but also as a contribution to universal world peace and as a way to re-compensate 
for the immense global suffering historically caused by Europe’s ruthless hunger for resources 
and power, from crusades to colonialism. Similar ideas were formulated by the philosophers 
and politicians discussed in Cederberg’s chapter in this book. Ann Rigney has suggested that 
this ‘European master narrative has also morphed into a metanarrative of memory itself: out 
of multiple bitter experiences Europeans have been forced to learn the art of reconciliation and 
how to transcend the past while also remembering it’: 
An increasingly dominant narrative has thus linked European identity and integration 
precisely to this ability to deal with divisive and troublesome pasts for the sake of a better 
future, by allowing stories to be told from different perspectives, but above all through 
performances of remorse that help transform the affective charge of grievous events and 
hence help the parties involved to transcend their enmity.54
The ESC songs analysed here exemplify precisely such stories ‘told from different perspectives’, 
generally in ‘performances of remorse’ rather than, for instance, accusation or revenge. These 
07510_Ch07_p179_236.indd   215 4/4/17   6:13 PM
Europe Faces Europe
216
songs thus realize this shared master narrative in slightly different ways. Sometimes this appears 
to result in a different basic narrative that does not fully present the aforementioned three 
key phases. However, it is mostly possible to still interpret them as conforming to the master 
narrative, as either a phase may be seen as implied if not explicitly mentioned or there is only a 
slight variation in the emphasis or timing of the transitions between phases. In other instances, 
the variation is even more clearly within the main template, in the form of nuances as to how 
each phase is realized and filled with qualitative content:
 1. Golden vs. dark past. Many songs do not explicitly describe, or even refer to, the first 
stage of European history: its glorious past. Only a few narratives begin with a true fall 
that is reversed in the end, whereas most instead present a more linear narrative from 
darkness to light. There is thus a spectrum between songs stressing the initial fall from 
greatness to catastrophe and those silently taking it for granted and concentrating all 
narrative effort on the coming renaissance for peace and glory.
  Only a handful of song lyrics hence mentioned a glorious European past, which in 
the sad present could inspire dreams of a better future world. They depict a lost Paradise 
or Arcadia by nostalgically specifying a golden age: a remembered time when you and 
me ‘flew so high’ (the German singer Nino de Angelo: ‘Flieger’, 1989), when we had ‘faith 
in a blue sky’ (the Romanian entry Monica Anghel & Sincron: ‘Prayer for World Peace’, 
1996), when dreams had not yet died (the Latvian duo Walters & Kazha: ‘The War Is 
Not Over’; #5 in Kiev 2005), when ‘all that we’ve built’ had not yet gone (Ukraine’s 
Alyosha: ‘Sweet People’; #10 in Oslo 2010). 
  Two entries from the 2013 Malmö event also belong to this subgroup. One was 
Moldova’s Aliona Moon with the dramatic ‘O mie/A Thousand’ (#11), sung in Romanian 
and speaking of clouds, tears and ‘the pain of losing you’. She initially remembered 
when ‘that great feeling came to stay within my soul’ before doors started to close. There 
was an abstract and general sense of loss and destruction – ‘We built up memories for 
ourselves, which we then destroyed’ – but also a wish for a new start: ‘I can’t believe that 
the feeling we had is in the past / I want a new beginning’. 
  The other example from 2013 was the Estonian singer Birgit’s ‘Et uus saaks alguse/So 
There Can Be a New Beginning’ (#20). This solemn ballad spoke of difficult times but 
with a confidence that ‘everything may change for the better’:
The ice will melt again and the leafless tree will blossom
Every end is just a new beginning
We need the night, so the day can bring light
so there can be a new beginning
Let the past be past
so there can be a new beginning again
The curtain opens again
The next act is about to begin, where I get up
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The same soul, but with a new game ahead
My destiny can be changed, my path renewed
and I know, I know
everything may change for the better
Every door that closes will once open again
 New beginnings, ice melting, trees blooming, doors opening and destiny changed 
seemed obviously to refer to Estonia’s post-Communist renaissance, and talking of 
a ‘curtain’ being opened also clearly placed the song in post-1989 Europe, based on 
Baltic memories of having been fenced in by the Iron Curtain. The message was visually 
underlined when one-third of the way into the tune, the singer emerged from the 
darkness and showed her long white dress, stretching her left hand up to the sky while 
the musical backing went from a lonely piano to an orchestra.
  However, the majority of songs studied here never explicitly refer to any ancient happy 
origin. This hidden first phase of the master narrative may still echo as a concealed 
background to the experience of war, division and oppression that the songs present; yet 
in these songs, the experience is never developed in full, lacking any nostalgic mode of 
narration. They painted a similar contrast between a dark present and a brighter future, 
but without referring nostalgically or otherwise to a golden past, which was instead just 
silently implicated as a hidden origin before the fall into misery. This was, for instance, true 
for the songs interpreted above: the Polish group Ich Troje’s ‘Keine Grenzen – Żadnych 
Granic’ (2003) and the Lithuanian entry InCulto’s ‘Eastern European Funk’ (2010). 
  I am therefore not of the opinion that the songs’ European self-identification relies 
strongly on a nostalgic strategy. With some few exceptions where memories are 
evoked to inspire the future, the changes asked for are rarely simply restorations of a 
remembered past but rather presented as a genuinely new step for Europe in the world. 
It was, in fact, easier to find nostalgic lyrics in West European popular songs, both in the 
ESC and elsewhere.
 2. Dreaming vs. acting present. A second distinction can be made between songs that place 
resurrection either in the dreamt future or in the ongoing present. Either the present 
is still within the dark phase 2, and the happy ending of phase 3 is yet just a dream for 
the future, or phase 2 has already ended and phase 3 begun. I found roughly the same 
number of each kind. Those songs that started with a glorious past tended to paint the 
present in rather dark colours and place the utopian solution in the future, possibly 
because it might otherwise had become too difficult to press two temporal shifts into 
the narrated past: first the fall from Paradise to Purgatory and then onwards to the 
heavens again. It was subsequently easier to place the whole second shift in the future.
  At the darker end of the scale, where wars and terror still seem to rule, and utopia is 
more of a dream and a hope for the future, Romania’s Monica Anghel & Sincron with 
‘Prayer for World Peace’ (1996) cried out for help and wished for a final release in the 
future: ‘We gave tears, and we also gave blood / Where are you, God? Where did you 
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go? / May we all have peace in the years to come’. Georgia’s Diana Gurtskaya in ‘Peace 
Will Come’ (#11 in Belgrade 2008) likewise placed European resurrection in the future 
as a dream or a mission: ‘My world is slowly dying / Say it out loud: peace will come’.55 
Hungary’s Boggie in ‘Wars for Nothing’ (#20 in Vienna 2015) complained that ‘our earth 
is a mess / All the wars for nothing, it never ends’, as ‘Soldiers walk towards the dark’ – 
yet still ‘All the souls deserve a chance at life’, and in the background, steel-grey piles of 
arms miraculously turned into green trees. The Czech duo Marta Jandová and Václav 
Noid Bárta in ‘Hope Never Dies’ (semi-final, same year) were first very pessimistic 
(‘There is no light to pray for’) but then let love bring light anyway: ‘we can rise and fight 
/ for a light to live for […] / We will walk, walk reborn / Hope never dies’. At the same 
time, Russia’s Polina Gagarina in ‘A Million Voices’ had even stronger hopes: ‘We believe 
in a dream / Praying for peace and healing / I hope we can start again’. Sometimes such 
rays of hope are described as emanating from stars in blue heavens, which in the ESC 
context adds a European touch, for instance in Gagarina’s words, ‘Together like the stars 
in the sky / we can sing / we can shine’, or when Azerbaijan’s Elnur Hüseynov in ‘Hour 
of the Wolf ’ (#12, also 2015) sang, ‘I’m ready / for the stars to guide me’.
  One group of songs was more positive in describing Europe’s resurrection from 
misery to glory as having already begun. None of them had room for delving into a 
more ancient glorious age. The already-mentioned Hungarian Gjon Delhusa’s ‘Fortuna’ 
(1996) belongs to this subcategory. Another example was Feminnem’s ‘Call Me’ (for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005), with the sound and stage show notably referencing 
ABBA’s classic ESC hit ‘Waterloo’. The three girls sang that they previously thought ‘that 
we could never make it / that a million hearts could never beat as one’, but now:
Singer after singer, remembered
Different flags, but nations gathered
from the north to the south, all standing side by side […]
Call me […] Sing with me, it’s how it should be
for the rest of our lives 
 In a self-reflexive move, the song thematized the competitive performance, asking 
viewers to call in and vote, as if that could itself create togetherness. It all seems so 
simple: ‘United in the song, that’s all it takes’. The happy international gathering was 
of course the ESC but by extension also Europe in general, as the words ‘Fifty candles 
on the party cakes / for the many years of happiness’ point to the year 1955, possibly 
referring to the European unification process, as that was, for instance, the year when 
the European flag was adopted by the CoE and there was a period of intense political 
activity. The process had its ups and downs (‘There was laughter, and there was crying’), 
but happiness prevails.
  The Hungarian group Compact Disco’s funky electronic ‘Sound of Our Hearts’ (2012) 
likewise took up the theme of transnational unification:
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The whole big world is just one place […]
Harmony can be achieved,
just find some way to get connected
Differences may not be wrong
They enrich things that we know
Different faiths, different views
All we can do is to turn them in key […]
 The visual design of the performance added a background that mixed hearts and peace 
signs with doves and a map of Europe. The recipe advocated here confirmed the EU 
principle of subsidiarity and the European motto by acknowledging the positive value of 
diversity and of communication across borders. The unifying desire is ‘the sound of our 
hearts’, ‘a zeal from above’ and ‘a fever they can’t take away’, a kind of heavenly impulse 
that has grown within each citizen. Europe is here implicitly given a global mission to 
take the lead in overcoming internal strife and understanding the value of difference. 
This song narrative is therefore related to a theme of millenarian resurrection – from 
mutual hatred to mutual love – and with the positive turn having already started in the 
present.
3. Unified vs. diversified future. A further distinction is along a continuous scale from 
dreaming of an integrated Europe without borders to acknowledging differences 
as a positive resource. This concerns both how explicit songs represent a West–East 
dichotomy and what recipe is offered for the European unification project. A West–East 
polarity was most clearly expressed by Lithuania’s InCulto, whose ‘Eastern European 
Funk’ (2010) described the poor Eastern Europe as the low Other of Western Europe: its 
subordinate opposite that (West) Europe has to accept as an integral part of itself. Most 
others just vaguely talked about a division between nations in general terms. Poland’s 
Ich Troje in ‘No Borders’ (2003) hoped to erase all differences between people, in a world 
without borders, flags, nations and wars. Hungary’s Compact Disco in ‘Sound Of Our 
Hearts’ (2012) instead acknowledged that ‘differences may not be wrong’, as they enrich 
the world and should just be attuned to each other. From Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Feminnem in ‘Call Me’ (2005) opted for a middle way by depicting nations from North 
to South Europe with ‘different flags’ but ’standing side by side’. Unity and diversity are 
thus balanced with shifting emphasis. 
4. Internal vs. external evils. Finally, songs differ as to whether or not their future wishes 
add freedom from external oppression to peace after mutual (and in a European sense 
‘internal’) war. West European songs painted an image of Europe coming to terms with 
World War II and more recently the Balkan wars, but some East European ESC voices 
also add the Soviet occupation as representing more recent dark times. The painful 
memories of two world wars are then superimposed by Communist dictatorship and 
isolation in the confines of the Soviet empire. A quick check indicates that only roughly 
a quarter of the East European songs studied here talk in terms of a transition from 
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oppression and occupation to freedom. In contrast, the vast majority of the remaining 
selected songs focus on the deliverance from war and division to peaceful reunion. The 
handful of songs with oppression/freedom as a central motif included the two German 
songs ‘Free to Live’ by Chris Kempers & Daniel Kovac (1990) and ‘This Dream Must 
Never Die’ by Atlantis 2000 (1991), but also the Estonian entry Sahlene’s ‘Runaway’ (#3 
in Tallinn, 2002) and the Albanian duo Adrian Lulgjuraj & Bledar Sejko’s ‘Identity’ (did 
not qualify from its 2013 Malmö semi-final). The Armenian group Genealogy’s ‘Face 
the Shadow’ (#16 in Vienna, 2015) had the line ‘Оnce you’ve risen, you are meant to be 
free’ but otherwise dealt more with guilt and responsibility than liberation as such. The 
Belarusian duo Uzari & Maimuna’s ‘Time’ (Vienna semi-final, 2015) dreamt of breaking 
out from a confinement: ‘Now I’m willing to fight / and I know that time is on my 
side / Time is like thunder’. The theme of liberation is not quite unproblematic since it 
highlights an external enemy in the form of an oppressive power (usually Russia as the 
main successor of the Soviet Union) that has been – or needs to be – overthrown. This 
does not erase the boundary between East and West but rather moves it eastward. It 
risks hiding one’s own responsibilities for past evils, eroding the self-critical discourse 
of peace after internal wars, and instead constructing a new we–they boundary that 
potentially implies a Fortress Europe ideology.
Besides the narrative of rising from darkness to light, only faint traces were found of two 
other narratives that might be described as ‘remembered glory’ and ‘in crisis and needs a new 
direction’. Sometimes there was not even a trace left of any memory of hardships or crisis. 
This can be seen as just concealing the period when the dominant narrative temporarily 
declined. But it is also an example of another marginalized story that depicts Europe as a 
happy place, all the way from its glorious past to its (equally or even more) glorious future – 
either described as an eternal, unchangeable present of pleasure and joy or as a steady 
progression from a promising start and towards perfection.
Some West European ESC songs constructed a touristic narrative presenting Europe as 
an old great heritage site at the centre of the world, cultivating nostalgic memories of a 
magnificent past and with beautiful treasures or fun experiences still to enjoy. This story of 
a classical or romantic paradise that lives on in the collective memory and can even today 
be enjoyed by the cosmopolitan tourist presents Europe as rich, just and peaceful. Such a 
narrative tends to forget all the dark times of inner divisions and disaster, instead focusing 
on the glorious and sunny aspects of history – and seldom mentioning how Europe’s colonial 
history oppressed and exploited people on other continents. This narrative is expressed in 
several West European ESC songs, from Liam Reilly’s ‘Somewhere in Europe’ (1990) to 
Christer Sjögren’s ‘I Love Europe’ (Swedish national finals, 2008). However, it is strikingly 
absent in songs from Eastern Europe. No real efforts have been made to update such a 
vision of European cultural treasures by integrating East and West European cities and 
countries into one totality. This might indicate the difficulty of imagining Europe as a whole 
in such a narrative. That such stories seem yet unthinkable hints at the persistent problems 
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in reinventing an integrated larger Europe on similar terms, as it was previously possible to 
imagine Western Europe as one single but heterogeneous cosmopolitan space.
In ‘Flying the Flag (For You)’ (2007), the British group Scooch sang of ‘flying the flag for 
you’ from London to Berlin, Paris to Tallinn, and Helsinki to Prague, alluding to the EU 
bridging East and West, but few East Europeans echoed that kind of gesture. The Hungarian 
singer Gjon Delhusa’s ‘Fortuna’ (1996) was rather alone in at least making an effort to 
mention cities from both halves of the continent. It described how the polar star (like 
the one over Bethlehem) sent a message via TV and radio across Europe, getting singers 
together from Dublin, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Oslo, Copenhagen, Budapest, Prague 
and Sarajevo to change the world in a shared belief in the future. The guiding star had 
Christian associations to how the three kings were led to Bethlehem, but the media context 
immediately transposed it to the EU and Eurovision level. ‘The ether is burning’ and Lady 
Fortuna’s ‘wheel of destiny’ will bring miracles to some who ‘believe in something beautiful’. 
This was a unique occasion where cities from both West and East Europe were listed, and 
the song clearly made the ESC a metaphor for European unification and for hopes for future 
change in general. However, while West European touristic narratives tended to focus on 
the rich heritage of countries and cities, ‘Fortuna’ did not construct this as a touristic arc 
between capitals but rather subsumed it under the quite different temporal narrative of 
millenarian resurrection, i.e. within the dominant storyline summarized above.
A divided Europe entering a deepening crisis was the other secondary narrative. Romania’s 
Monica Anghel & Sincron in ‘Prayer for World Peace’ (1996) had a very dark tone: ‘Abandoned 
by our dreams, our star fades […] Where are you, God?’ Still, this gospel-influenced ballad 
ended with a firm hope: ‘Give us again the faith in a blue sky / May we all have peace in 
the years to come’. In ‘Peace Will Come’, Georgia’s Diana Gurtskaya (2008) likewise sang of 
a sky ‘crying cold bitter tears’:  ‘My world is slowly dying’. However, at the end, the artists 
surprisingly did a clothes change (from black to white) and chanted, ‘Peace will come’. The 
German band Münchener Freiheit’s ‘Viel Zu Weit’ (1993) was ambivalently torn between 
hope (‘Life like in paradise […] I believe in it’) and despair (‘But it’s too far away’), which in 
the end sounded more like impatience and thus after all did not really contradict the master 
narrative. A few years later, Germany’s Bianca Shomburg with ‘Zeit’ (#18 in Dublin, 1997) 
was again quite pessimistic: ‘Can we live happily in peace? – No’, but still opened the door for 
future redemption: ‘Time, time, even if the road is long / All I need is a little time’. 
The most pessimistic example of them all was perhaps the Ukrainian singer Alyosha’s 
tragic jazz ballad ‘Sweet People’ (2010), lamenting how people kill and destroy the earth. 
‘The end is really near’, she sang, exhorting everyone: ‘Don’t turn all the earth to stone / 
because, because, because / this is your home’. Even without any explicit European reference, 
it was not hard to place this typical song in a European context, and even in this bitter song, 
there was at least a hint of resurrection in exhorting those in power to become sensible and 
stop the killing. 
It should be noted that a certain ambiguity in reference is inherent in most of these 
songs, in that they address both global and European issues. This ambivalence is typical of 
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the universalizing tendency of much European thought and discourse. There is a tendency 
to perceive European topics as evidently universal, while global issues are discussed in 
terms that take a European perspective for granted. My interpretive focus on narratives of 
Europe might sometimes read songs as more European-focused than they perhaps actually 
are; the ESC setting too steers interpretation in that direction. It should be remembered that 
many songs speak in very general terms of communication across borders. From a different 
perspective, some of them could equally well be heard to thematize worldwide transnational 
relations rather than just those within this particular continent. In any case, specific references 
to Europe’s relations with other continents are extremely rare. I could not find any such song 
from Eastern Europe and only very few from West European countries, most of which came 
from ex-colonial nations such as Portugal with Lúcia Moniz’s ‘O meu coração não tem cor/My 
Heart Has No Colour’ (#6 in Oslo 1996), and typically tended to deny rather than affirm any 
such we–them polarity. A polarity between Europe and (US) America could also be formulated 
in some older West European entries such as the French group Cocktail Chic’s ‘Européennes’ 
(1986), which compared Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Capri, London, Paris and Saint-Tropez 
with L.A., trying to reconcile the continents as different but complementing each other.
In the Montenegrin entry Rambo Amadeus’ ‘Euro Neuro’ (2012), Europe was seen as 
deeply, or even increasingly, divided and in crisis. Moreover, the official institutions were 
doomed to fail to break out of the ‘monetary breakdance’ of the mutually reinforcing 
financial and ecological crises. This perhaps signals a more radically different narrative 
than the dominant one, as the literary scholar Ann Rigney has suggested: ‘As we reel from 
one Euro-crisis to another and governments struggle to control the financial markets, the 
contours of a new narrative about the rise and erosion of the social democratic welfare state 
in postwar Europe may already be emerging’.56 But there too the ESC format did not really 
seem to allow a fully developed dystopian discourse. The story was therefore squeezed into 
the dominant form by hinting at a future alternative solution (a ‘different organism’) outside 
the current institutional structures – in new social movements, civic society or ordinary 
citizens’ lifeworlds – to find better ways to combine the local with the global. In this way, the 
song could anyway end by promising a future paradise, conforming the dominant narrative. 
These two – and other – deviant European narratives may well be found in other musical 
genres outside the ESC. In Signifying Europe, I, for instance, analysed a wider set of popular 
songs, including much more critical lyrics by left- and right-wing subcultural groups of 
various kinds, but they have not as yet been heard in the ESC.
The supremacist narrative of a colonial Fortress Europe standing up to its external enemies 
is virtually taboo in the ESC. The Georgian singer Nina Sublatti’s aggressive performance of 
‘Warrior’ (#11 in Vienna 2015) could be critically interpreted in those terms, with lines such 
as ‘World’s gonna listen to me / Violence / Set it free / Wings are gonna spread up / I’m a 
warrior’. However, the threat is soon neutralized by assuring that the world is ‘gonna light up 
in peace’. (The same year, an equally challenging tune with the same title was sung by Malta’s 
semi-finalist Amber: ‘Never look back, the past is the past / I had no choice but to become 
a warrior / I had to conquer’.) In much more outspoken terms, supremacist voices can be 
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heard in genres that are a far cry from those that appear in the ESC, in more or less fascist 
rock music, where Europe is depicted as having a glorious imperialist past and an original 
unity that must be defended against external threats from Islam, migration, multiculturalism, 
feminism and other modern evils. Such examples include Skrewdriver’s ‘Mother Europe’ 
(1994), Ancient Rites’ ‘Mother Europe’ (1998) and Globus’ ‘Europa’ (2006). Such a narrative 
would violently contradict the basic ESC idea and probably not even be accepted. But also 
outside the ESC, the master narrative’s reflections on having to overcome disastrous wars 
and mutual animosity are more common in tunes such as the occultist Killing Joke’s ‘Europe’ 
(1985) or the leftist Asian Dub Foundation’s ‘Fortress Europe’ (2003). However, it should be 
remembered that the silencing of any mention of Europe’s relations with other continents may 
well express another kind of violence that suppresses the others not by words but by silence.
Narrative Mode: Serious Reflection
As for their narrative mode, all these songs were by definition popular songs, making use 
of typical combinations of music, lyrics and visual performance. Only some few (less than 
a fifth) had a humorous or comic mood, like the Lithuanian entry InCulto with ‘Eastern 
European Funk’ (2010), and only Montenegro’s Rambo Amadeus with ‘Euro Neuro’ (2012) 
had an ironic-satirical attitude. Ironic narratives are notoriously hard to interpret since each 
of their statements can be deciphered in alternative ways, either as standing for what they 
apparently say or as in fact meaning quite the opposite, through a distancing act of reversal. 
Very few ESC songs are fundamentally tragic in the sense of the distinction between 
comedy and tragedy in classical Greek drama. They all tend to be comedies in the sense of at 
least hinting at a possible happy ending. This is true for the ESC in general, and it therefore 
comes as no surprise that it also holds for the selection discussed here. When speaking above 
of a ‘comic mood’, it is not that dramaturgical structure that is intended, since all of the master 
narrative of resurrection would, in principle, belong to that category. The reason being it 
references at least some future reconciliation and redemption after the endured hardships. 
It instead concerns the general happy tone of presentation, opposed not to the tragic but to 
the serious. In modern, and particularly late modern, times, when the idea of a divine fate 
has lost much of its force, that is in many genres (at least within the ESC) a more relevant 
distinction than the one between comic and tragic plots.
An overwhelming majority of these songs had such a serious tone. Again, just a few told 
clearly narrative tales with a sequence of events, either in the third person or with a self-
biographical element. The most common subgenre was a general reflection on the current 
situation (in almost half of the songs), followed by slightly fewer that formulated a call, prayer 
or plea urging the listener(s) to in some way work for a better future. Very few East European 
songs referring to European themes were just hedonistic celebrations of bodily pleasure. 
Unsurprisingly, those songs that presented the full resurrection narrative, starting with 
some memories of a long-past golden age, were always serious and never humoristic in 
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tone. The same was true for those songs that formulated a plea (roughly a quarter of the 
whole set).
The most common rhetorical configuration found in half of the songs was for the lyrics 
to focus on an ‘I’ and a ‘you’ that together might fuse into a ‘we’. Only half as many instead 
relied on an ‘I’ who stood alone without any obvious ‘you’ partner, though sometimes 
linking up with a collective ‘we’. A third, and slightly less common, option was to have a ‘we’ 
as the main character, possibly relating to a ‘you’ or a ‘they’ of some kind.
Only a quarter of the songs’ lyrics have a clearly linear temporal organization, evidently 
corresponding roughly to those that told a tale. The most common narratives (in particular 
among the comic ones) were instead nonlinear, without any clear beginning and end. 
Finally, a rather firm belief in a better future was dominant in at least two-thirds of these 
songs. A sense of futurity thus definitely prevailed, looking forward and hoping for progress. 
This was, for instance, true of every comic song in the material. Only two songs were dominated 
by a nostalgic mood, as they looked backwards with a sense of loss: the German singer Nino 
de Angelo’s ‘Flieger’ (1989), with lines like ‘I’ve never totally forgotten the time / when we 
were flyers’ and ‘The two of us, it was so great’, and the Moldovan artist Aliona Moon’s ‘O 
mie’ (2013), with lines such as ‘A thousand sunsets lost in the sea, lost within us’, ‘We built up 
memories for ourselves, which we then destroyed’ and ‘I can’t believe that the feeling we had 
is in the past’. A slightly larger minority of the songs were quite pessimistic about the future, 
but without nostalgically remembering any lost paradise. As already shown when discussing 
Alyosha’s ‘Sweet People’ (2010), even the most pessimistic of songs did not really go so far as 
to abandon the master narrative of communicative resurrection, even if there was just a faint 
suggestion of a possible happy ending hidden in a desperate call for people to come to their 
senses and finally stop ruining the world.
In all, this mixed picture may be summed up by concluding that most songs about Europe 
were serious reflections, calling listeners to help improve the world, and more rarely telling a 
linear story. Most of them focused on the singing ‘I’, relating to a beloved ‘you’, and sometimes 
also part of a larger ‘we’. As a rule, there was a belief in a happy future, and nostalgia was rare, 
though there were slightly more examples of a pessimistic outlook.
Narrative Meaning: European Values
Europe’s millenarian master narrative of resurrection is thus found in East Europe’s ESC 
entries, suggesting a development from past glory to internal strife to peace and unification. 
One of its narrative elements has to do with its meaning – in this case, how Europe is 
identified or which values and traits are associated with being European. This is hard to assert 
in any straightforward manner, but based on the narratives analysed here, a preliminary 
interpretation points towards at least three important elements or tropes for identifying 
Europe that recur in songs and final events.57 Each of these values link to one of the master 
narrative’s three main phases:
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1. Unique universality. The ESC event and many songs about Europe share an idea that 
Europe is somehow chosen for a particularly important mission and challenge, in 
some way elevated above the other continents. This affirms a long heritage of religious, 
philosophical and historical thinking activated in the Enlightenment, for example 
in Friedrich Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’ (1785), which Beethoven used for the lyrics to his 
Ninth Symphony. The musical creativity and transnational unification of the ESC and 
its participating nations are presented as a unique resource that gives Europe particular 
capacities that no other continent or country can surpass. This confirms a theme of 
nobility or elevation found in other European symbolism as well – from the myth of 
Europa, where the nymph’s abduction transforms her into a unique founder of a new 
dynasty of half-divine men, to the European flag with its perfect star circle, signifying 
nations rising up together into the sky to guide others. Animations and films in the finals 
as well as many ESC song lyrics often make references to Europe’s rich cultural heritage, 
reproducing the idea of Europe as the cradle of Western civilization and modernity at 
large, with enlightened reason and human rights. 
  This entails not least a unique capacity for (imagined) universality. Europe appears 
from its mythical origin to be chosen for a grand mission: elevated to universality, which 
it has a duty to share with the rest of the world in a spirit of equality and solidarity. In 
various disguises, a universalism is inherent in remarkably much of European thinking. 
From a critical perspective, this serves to underpin a Eurocentric narrative of the West 
as taking the global lead with its privileged mode of modernity, which has throughout 
history legitimized the fearful atrocities of crusades and colonial powers. This might 
on the other hand also explain the ease with which human rights discourses have 
been lately adopted and promoted by the ESC, even though political contents are in 
principle banned and equal rights for women, gays or ethnic minorities are in several 
countries still a challenging political issue. This trend was particularly strong in the 
2013 Malmö final, where LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer) 
rights formed a central focus of the hosting framework. That event also launched a new 
ESC final anthem written by ex-ABBA members Benny Andersson and Björn Ulvaeus 
together with DJ Avicii: ‘We Write the Story’. This was a solemn tribute to the ‘Legacy’ of 
‘Justice and Peace and Liberty’ among ‘humans born free and equal’, welcoming ‘a new 
Enlightenment’ where ‘Reason and conscience’ may one day ‘rule the world’ – ‘We are 
humans / We are one!’ Even though this was an extreme example, it is possible to hear 
echoes of similar convictions in several competing songs as well.
  It can be noted that the combination of European specificity and universalism is a 
notoriously tricky one. The high ambitions of Europeans to defend universality always 
risk attracting the accusation of being blind and ultimately imperialist Eurocentrism. An 
interesting example of the tension was the decision to adopt the ‘Ode to Joy’ theme as the 
European anthem but without any words.58 This lack of lyrics mirrors two problematic 
borderlines for European identification. One argument was that German (or indeed any 
specific language) was not appropriate since it would not be European but prioritize 
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one nation. If this argument expressed the need to differentiate the European from 
the national, the other argument instead stood for the other main demarcation – that 
between the European and the global: the objection that the lyrics ‘all men are brothers’ 
[alle Menschen werden Brüder]  was a too universal message. The ‘united in diversity’ 
motto serves to negotiate between the European and the national, whereas the accusation 
of an empty abstraction in the European flag relates to the European–universal interface. 
There is thus a risky balance between uniqueness and universality, but their combination 
seems to be a typical European trait, in the ESC narratives as elsewhere.
2. Resurrecting from division. If the first phase of the ESC master narrative points back to 
Europe’s birth as an elevation to universality, the second phase is equally important. 
Strikingly many ESC songs speak of division: war, disaster and destruction. Europe and 
Europeans have experienced deep misery, which has made them acutely aware of their 
precariousness and that of their fellow beings. It is this vulnerability that motivates the 
desire for peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation. Similar tropes appear in the 
Christian Passion story, ‘Ode to Joy’ and the Schuman Declaration.59
  It is this experience of loss and pain that fuels the dreams of peace so often repeated 
in the ESC songs. Singing about having suffered is almost only done in songs from East 
European countries, describing themselves as having become strong and tough due to 
such hardships. Without the European downfall into deepest agony, there would not be 
the profound sense of resurrection that is central to the millenarian narrative. This value 
of resurrection is linked to that of elevated nobility. Wars destroy the ancient cultural 
heritage but also breed science and technology and indirectly too culture and reason 
through the experience of loss that makes Europeans sensitive to the suffering of others 
and to one’s own ethical responsibility. On the other hand, the dialectics of Enlightenment 
nourish destructive forces but also an intense longing for overcoming them. 
3. Communicative mobility. A third key value may be derived from looking closer at the 
third phase of the master narrative: the process or dream of unification. This is often 
expressed as a desire for change, and though this change may basically be a temporal 
transition to a new situation, it often also entails a spatial shift or reconfiguration. 
Displacement, dislocation and a general sense of mobility are three of the core European 
values that the ESC too cherishes. Artists travel to the host city in order to meet each 
other in the final, and their bodies explore new moves on stage, stirring the public’s 
emotions. Broadcasters transmit their tunes to a dispersed European (and tendentially 
global) audience. Many songs also describe such moves across physical and/or social 
space. And again, this value has several links to other symbols: Europa was abducted 
from the Middle East to Crete, and the euro banknotes are full of windows, doors and 
bridges that also celebrate mobility.
  This kind of mobility has to do with communication, and communicativity is 
indeed a central value in the ESC as well as in other parts of the European unification 
process. There are certainly cases (like the hymn ‘We Write the Story’ and the slogan 
‘we are one’) where equality and community develop into homogeneity or even 
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uniformity. However, most ESC voices, especially from Eastern Europe, tend rather 
to emphasize that peaceful unification must accommodate difference. This is also the 
case with the European motto ‘united in diversity’. Communication with others is one 
of the competition’s key values, but it is thematized too in many songs which stress 
that Europe’s diversity not only causes divisive conflicts but also underpins a desire for 
polyphonic yet harmonic togetherness. Peaceful coexistence is here intrinsically united 
with freedom and mutual dialogue.
  Again, this value interacts with the other two. The unique mobility of capitalism 
accumulates riches, rich empires invest in communications, and Europe’s noble 
universalism is based on trust in dialogical communication. On the other hand, 
migrations lead to conflicts, and wars produce refugees, so there are also negative 
dialectics of mobility and precariousness. 
Concluding Reflections
Other songs not involved in the ESC and from other genres of popular music than mainstream 
pop add varied flavours to the identification of Europe. Some join the ESC chorus by giving 
a positive image of Europe’s historical richness and beauty, often with a nostalgic glow of 
memories of experiencing inter-European encounters. Others tell the story of a continent 
that has risen from destruction to a determination to unite and prosper, in some cases simply 
celebrating this recent achievement, and in others, breeding a fear of new waves of war to 
come. Some just pay homage to European beauty, culture, diversity or unification; some 
are pessimistic laments of a Europe in decline or falling apart; some warn of authoritarian, 
violent, racist, xenophobic or fascist developments; others instead call for patriotic deeds in a 
necessary new war against an alleged Muslim threat.60 
The musical styles and expressions of all these songs cannot be reduced to any common 
denominator. Traits either from European ethnic folk music or from the European art 
music tradition are often used to suggest a shared legacy, just as with the European anthem. 
However, within these broad frameworks, the songs can make considerably diverging 
statements. Like the ESC entries, the most ‘mainstream’ other tunes express a joyful pleasure 
of sharing happy experiences across borders, which is similar to the message of the official 
EU symbols. The more artistically ambitious ones tend instead to focus on painful memories 
and fears of alienation, strife or even destruction, constructing Europe as something 
deeply problematic and filled with unresolved tensions. Many tunes are quite open in their 
interpretations, merely pointing at the risks of new conflicts, but some are more politically 
explicit: either problematizing ongoing developments from critical positions questioning the 
new power structures that marginalize various weak others, or from a right-wing position of 
traditionalist nostalgia for strong nations, emanating in a xenophobic, racist and even overtly 
fascist discourse. No such openly xenophobic voices have so far been heard in the ESC finals, 
nor any calls for crusades against alleged non-European enemies, whether represented by 
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Islam, East Asia, Africa or America. In fact, the ESC songs tend to construct Europeanness 
in a universalizing manner: they do not make explicit any external boundaries of Europe 
or specify its ‘other(s)’, whether in friendly or hostile terms. Implicitly, like the 2014 New 
Narrative declaration by the European Commission’s cultural committee discussed in the 
introduction to this book, they make sporadic references to undemocratic authoritarianism 
or nationalist populism as something Europe needs to avoid; however, the cosmopolitanism 
they generally advocate is too internally diverse to allow any explicit ‘other’ to be pinpointed. 
In this, they strongly differ from, for instance, some Islamophobic rock tunes. 
The themes of European cultural treasures and the desire and need for unification are found 
both in the ESC and elsewhere. What most songs about Europe have in common is an idea that 
Europe is somehow chosen for a particularly important mission and challenge, confirming the 
theme of noble elevation so widespread in European symbolism. None of the relevant West 
European ESC songs depicted their own country as fundamentally other or different from the 
European norm but instead celebrated Europe’s cultural and touristic city gems. This kind of 
cultural approach to Europe’s rich heritage is almost totally absent in the Eastern European 
entries. Both halves of the continent have songs expressing a desire for unification, peace and 
communication, but whereas nations in Western Europe describe themselves as already integral 
parts of Europe and breed contentment with its cultural treasures, those in Eastern Europe 
tend to struggle with a sense of marginality and a desire to enter, but not based so much on 
any cultural desire for the dominant European culture as on a desire for recognition and for 
sharing Western democracy’s economic wealth and political resources. (Countries like Russia 
and also Turkey were less so inclined, appearing to be rather more self-sufficiently proud of 
their position as great powers bridging East and West.)
The omnipresent master narrative of communicative resurrection takes different shapes. 
Some neglect to mention an ancient period of glory that would explain Europe’s global 
importance. The more negative ones place happiness in an urgent dream for the future, 
while the optimists describe the present as having already taken decisive steps towards 
reconciliation. War and peace are the most common topics in these narratives, though 
some East European countries add oppression and freedom, alluding to their particular 
experience of having been forced into the Soviet bloc. 
Of course, no songs fully represent ‘their’ countries, nor are their voices totally confined 
to their national belongings. The aim here is not to identify what ‘is’ European, but how it 
is discursively and culturally constructed, and the same applies to national identities. Yet 
it is not hard to discern a pattern where, for instance, Russian (and British) voices define 
themselves as external observers of Europe’s process of unification, while especially the 
Baltic states often thematize a new-won freedom from oppression.
In terms of time periods or phases, one may discern utopian hopes blossoming from 
1989 to the mid-1990s. A period of negotiations and increasing realism or even pessimism 
followed up to around 2005, when the referendums rejected the Lisbon Treaty and instilled 
an increasing sense of failure and crisis, which the financial euro-crisis further accentuated 
some years later. At the same time, the ESC itself appears to be a huge success story, with 
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decisive steps to include new members, and revising the event’s format to accommodate 
them can be traced from 1993 onwards, with the introduction of televoting (1997) and 
semi-finals (2004) as technical means to improve the event. Estonia’s victory in 2001 saw 
the 2002 final take place in Tallinn, which was followed by a series of other East European 
finals. Consequently, the ESC’s focus moved eastwards, and today the ESC appears to be one 
of the most successful pan-European initiatives there are – both within the media sector and 
more generally. While the unification project increasingly staggers along on other frontiers, 
as also mirrored in song lyrics, the ESC itself follows a slightly different pattern, giving new 
authority and self-confidence to the finals and songs that claim to show Europe a better 
way forward. This non-contemporaneity makes it hard to neatly divide up these years into 
distinct periods. The German entries (here analysed as an ambiguous border case between 
West and East) point to a certain decline in optimism from 1989 to 1993, but 1993 was at 
the same time the start of an eastward shift in the centre of gravity, manifested by the series 
of East European finals from 2002 to 2012.
As a discourse genre, the ESC finals and songs are a kind of compromise formation, 
filtered through many layers of censorship and selection, which partly explains the 
uniformity of the narratives found. The ESC’s grand narrative corresponds to both the old 
and the ‘new’ narrative of Europe. Alternatives certainly exist in popular music outside the 
ESC as well as in other cultural fields, but the dominant narrative is strikingly uniform 
and coherent in relatively more regulated subfields such as the ESC. In this popular media 
landscape, the ESC plays a productive institutional role by offering a cultural public space 
for agonistically constructing and exploring European-wide musical modes of affective and 
collective subjectivity and identification.
Generally in the finals, it was hard to find any developed narratives of Europe, besides 
general references to Europe as a highly diverse continent of mutually collaborating 
but also competing nations. The East European hosts’ most common strategy seems to 
have been hybridization, i.e. describing their own contribution to the shared European 
community in terms of a voice in a mixed choir where multicultural diversity is a strength 
and resource rather than an obstacle to unification. This is very much in line with the 
official symbols and narratives launched by the leading European institutions, including 
the CoE and the EU.
As for individual songs from Eastern Europe, they have also remarkably adhered to 
the official EU mythology, expressed in the old founding narrative celebrated on Europe 
Day in remembrance of the Schuman Declaration. Virtually all songs that seemed to have 
a European message contained at least some fragments of the grand ‘master narrative’ of 
Europe: a tale of resurrection from a catastrophic state of inner division, wishing to revive 
an original greatness and overcoming fragmentation and war, and instead communicating 
and cooperating across borders to make the whole world a better place. This old narrative 
of Europe seems very much alive in the ESC today, and certainly in Eastern Europe, thus 
confirming a tradition that goes back not just until the start of the ESC but long before that: 
for over centuries being voiced again and again after each European war.
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The East European ESC finals and songs thus do not present any radically different, 
emphatically new narrative of Europe. Instead, they tend to reactivate, revitalize and, to some 
extent, also revise the old EU narrative of communicative resurrection by reminding of the 
continued relevance of counteracting war and other forms of mutual hostility. Their theme 
of resurrection through communication across differences rests on an established tradition; 
however, the emphasis is on shared values and responsibilities similar to the cultural 
ideals of renaissance and cosmopolitanism foregrounded in the European Commission’s 
document New Narrative for Europe (2014). The East–West divide has certainly for a long 
time been a powerful European discourse. Although this must be recognized and critically 
analysed, it is important not to contribute to its reproduction as a stereotypical dualism 
that like Orientalism rather oversimplifies collective identity relations into sterile binaries. 
It is crucial not to get stuck in such divides, and instead be open to understanding how 
they interact with numerous other interactions, crossroads and dynamics, transgressing 
every such rigid division. Integrating previously excluded East European experiences into 
the European master narrative is a slow and complex process that has indeed reinforced 
discourses of translation and transborder friendship.
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